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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS &
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
Complementarity' is one of the main governing principles upon
which the operation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is prem-
ised. It is not a new concept and is consistent with the history of
repression of crimes against international law. The primary responsibility
for punishing these crimes lies with States, even in cases where the "in-
ternational character" of the crimes urged the creation of international
mechanisms for repression.
According to the doctrine of State sovereignty each State has the
right to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory-
known as the territoriality principle. Even if the crimes committed are of
a type that affects the international community as a whole, States are
often hesitant to have their own nationals tried by an international judi-
cial organ. History demonstrates that States rarely waived this right,
which is inherent to their sovereignties, and did not rely exclusively on
international justice. Rather they always preferred to exercise their juris-
diction exclusively, and only occasionally, when coerced by special
circumstances, have they accepted international intervention. In order to
create an international criminal court to punish grave crimes of an inter-
national character, this historical obstacle had to be overcome. The
compromise reached is the principle of complementarity. This principle
requires the existence of both national and international criminal justice
functioning in a subsidiary manner for the repression of crimes of inter-
national law. When the former fails to do so, the latter intervenes and
ensures that perpetrators do not go unpunished.
A. Aspects Prior & Subsequent to World War I
Most violators of international law have been tried in domestic fo-
rums. Rarely was a tribunal created to try offenses against humankind.
One notable early example occurred in Naples when Conradin von
1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplo-
matic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
on 17 July 1998, pmbl. T 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
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Hohenstafen, Duke of Suabia, was tried and later executed for initiating
an unjust war on October 29, 1268.2
After World War I war criminals were tried in domestic courts and in
U.S. military tribunals. "An effort was made to obtain many of those ac-
cused of having committed war crimes from Germany for trial in Allied
Tribunals."3 According to articles 228 to 230 of the Versailles Treaty,4
Germany agreed to turn over suspected war criminals to the Allies for
trial by Allied Tribunals. However, at the Paris Peace Conference on
February 6, 1920, Kurt von Lersner, head of the German peace delega-
tion, refused to accept the extradition list,5 formally demanded by
France, England, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Rumania, and Serbia. This list
was prepared by the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors
of War and on Enforcement of Penalties, which completed its report in
1920 and submitted a list of 895 alleged war criminals to be tried by the
2. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 707 (Jordan J. Paust et al.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
3. Id. at 708.
4. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, arts. 228-30, S. TREATY Doc. No. 66-
49, at 90 (1919).
Article 228 stipulates:
The German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers
to bring before military Tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in vio-
lation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be
sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstand-
ing any proceedings or prosecution before a Tribunal in Germany or in the territory
of her allies. The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated
Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having
committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified ei-
ther by name or by rank, office or employment which they held under the German
authorities.
Id. art. 228. Article 229 stipulates:
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associ-
ated Powers will be brought before the military Tribunals of that Power. Persons
guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and As-
sociated Powers will be brought before military Tribunals composed of members of
the military Tribunals of the Powers concerned. In every case the accused will be
entitled to name his own counsel.
Id. art. 229. Article 230 stipulates:
The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of
every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full
knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders, and the just appre-
ciation of responsibility.
Id. art. 230.
5. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2, at 709; see generally M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 199-200 (1992)
[hereinafter BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY].
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Allied Tribunals.6 The German Government was not very stable and this
demand might have led to its overthrow. Consequently, as a compromise,
the Allies agreed to accept Germany's offer to try a select number of ac-
cused offenders before its Reichsaericht Supreme Court sitting at
Leipzig.7 The Allies maintained that even though they allowed Germany
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction and try the accused in German courts,
they reserved their rights under article 228 of the Versailles Treaty to set
aside the German verdicts. That article required that the German Gov-
ernment surrender to the Allies anyone accused of having committed war
crimes so that such person or persons could be tried by a special military
tribunal, on an international level.8 Faced with this threat, Germany
passed new legislation and assumed jurisdiction in order to be able to
prosecute the selected offenders under national law.9
Germany sought the respect of its State sovereignty by exercising its
criminal jurisdiction in its own national courts. The principle of com-
plementarity can be recognized in the Treaty's commitment to try and
punish offenders if Germany failed to do so. The language of article 228
of the Versailles Treaty echoes the notion of primacy, and seems to em-
phasize the supremacy of international tribunals over national tribunals.
6. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ITS ESTABLISHMENT,
THE STATUTE, A STUDY OF THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTI-
GATIVE COMMISSIONS AND THE FORMER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 12 (2001)
[hereinafter BASSIOUNI, THE ICC: A STUDY]; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions: From Versailles to Rwanda, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 33-34 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999) [hereinafter Bassiouni,
From Versailles to Rwanda]. Sources conflict as to the number of alleged war criminals listed
for prosecution. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 17 (1992)
(stating that the Allies presented a list of 854 individuals, including political and military fig-
ures).
7. BASSIOUNI, THE ICC: A STUDY, supra note 6, at 15; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 2, at 709. One could suggest that deferral to the German national courts, which was
subject to subsequent intervention by the Allied Powers, would trigger the idea of complemen-
tarity.
8. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 6, at 37; see also M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 2 (1987). Because of Germany's reluctance to hand
over accused war criminals, only forty-five cases were selected for prosecution. Germany tried
only twelve defendants before its Supreme Court sitting in Leipzig and six of these defendants
were acquitted. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 201. Some argue
that the Leipzig Trials demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of the German court to
carry out prosecutions, since it required international interference by the Allies. The Allies
were dissatisfied with the result and decided not to submit any further defendants to the Ger-
man court. Instead, they conducted their own trials according to article 229 of the Versailles
Treaty. However, the Allies never requested the extradition of any accused Germans, and only
Belgium and France held a few in absentia trials. Thus the Allies' commitment to try and
punish the offenders was not fulfilled.
9. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 6, at 38; BASSIOUNI, THE ICC: A
STUDY, supra note 6, at 18.
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However, the Allies' subsequent agreement to defer to the German
courts, rather than enforce their rights to prosecute the accused, denotes
a shift from the notion of primacy to the more lenient notion of comple-
mentarity. Even in the face of the existence of international jurisdiction,
the inherent, fundamental idea of national jurisdiction prevailed, despite
the State's failure to fulfill its duty toward the international community.
The peace treaties with Turkey at the end of the war reflected a simi-
lar approach to dealing with accused war criminals. Article 230 of the
Treaty of Sevres' ° obliged Turkey to surrender those responsible for the
massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on terri-
tory forming part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914. In addition,
the Allied Powers reserved the right to designate a tribunal, including a
court created by the League of Nations to try those responsible. The
Turkish government similarly recognized the right of the Allied Powers
to prosecute individuals accused of violating the laws and customs of
war before domestic or mixed domestic tribunals, "notwithstanding any
proceedings or prosecutions before a tribunal in Turkey."" However, the
Treaty of Sevres was never ratified and thus its provisions were never
implemented.' 2 The Treaty of Lausanne 3 replaced the Treaty of Sevres,
but did not contain any provisions on prosecution. It reflected the Allied
10. Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, Aug. 10, 1920 (Treaty of
Sevres), reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921) [hereinafter Treaty of Sevres].
11. Id. art. 226; see also BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 174;
Mathew Lippman, The Convention On The Prevention and Punishment Of The Crime Of
Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 415, 420-21 (1998).
12. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 6, at 36. However, prior to the
Treaty of Sevres, between April 1919 and July 1920, a Turkish Military Tribunal did prosecute
and convict thirty-four offenders, of which fifteen were sentenced to death. Of these fifteen,
only three were actually executed: eleven received the sentence in absentia and one escaped.
The remaining 19 received non-death sentences. Public opinion caused the Ottoman Grand
Vezir to release forty-one prisoners. This prompted Great Britain to request the transfer of the
remaining detainees to British custody. Consequently, the Turkish government objected,
claiming that such transfer,
[wlould be in direct contradiction with its sovereign rights in view of the fact that
by international law each State has [the] right to try its own Tribunals. Moreover,
His Britannic Majesty having by conclusion of an armistice with the Ottoman Em-
pire recognized [the] latter as a de facto and de jure sovereign State, it is
incontestably evident that the Imperial Government possesses all the prerogatives
for freely exercising [the] the principles inherent in its sovereignty.
Id. The quote emphasizes the idea that priority of national criminal jurisdictions always con-
trols the thoughts of every State, and the idea of deference to international or external tribunals
was resisted as well. Thus, Turkey expressed its desire to practice its jurisdiction over the
offenders and made several attempts in order to reach this target. Likewise, the German ex-
perience with the Allied Powers through the Treaty of Versailles and the Paris Peace
Conference demonstrates the same idea.
13. Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments, July 24, 1923 (Treaty of Lausanne), 28
L.N.T.S. 12 [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne].
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Powers' decision to defer to Turkish claims of sovereignty, and also their
concern that prosecution before an international tribunal would promote
domestic instability.4
B. World War I and the International Military Tribunals
It might be argued that the International Military Tribunal (IMT) es-
tablished at the end of World War II, reflected another form of the
complementarity principle, and the significance of cooperation with na-
tional criminal jurisdictions. The IMT was set up to try only the major
war criminals, while the bulk of the task was left to internal criminal ju-
risdictions. It was operated in a subsidiary manner. In the Moscow
Declaration of 1943,'" the three main Allied Powers declared that the
German war criminals should be judged and punished in the countries in
which their crimes were committed (that is, according to the principle of
territorial jurisdiction). Only "the major criminals, whose offenses have
no particular geographical localization," would be punished "by joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies."'6 This declaration was re-
ferred to in the London Agreement of August 8, 19457 establishing the
Nuremberg Tribunal. Thus, one might conclude that the fact that the IMT
judged only twenty-two accused criminals, of whom nineteen were de-
clared guilty and three were acquitted, 8 was due to the recognition of the
14. Lippman, supra note 11, at 421; see also supra text accompanying note 12, which
expresses the idea of deferring to such Treaties. Another issue was the evidentiary problems
impeding prosecution. Turkey, in order to mollify the Allies, initiated the largely symbolic in
absentia prosecution of various former Cabinet Ministers and leaders of the Ittihad Party, even
though they had fled the country. The former Cabinet Ministers and party leaders were subse-
quently convicted of the murder and pillage of the Armenians, but most received insignificant
sentences.
15. The Triparte Conference at Moscow, Oct. 19-30, 1943, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION, No. 395, at 599-605 (1943) [hereinafter Moscow Declaration].
16. Id. at 601; see also Paolo Benvenuti, Complementarity of the International Criminal
Court to National Criminal Jurisdictions, in I ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 24 (William Schabas et al. eds., 1999).
17. London Agreement of Aug. 8, 1945, reprinted in 1 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 8, 8-9 (1947) [hereinafter London Agree-
ment].
18. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946,
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 333 (1947). Although Hjalmar Schacht, Franz Von Papen,
and Hans Fritzsche were acquitted by the IMT, they were retried before the Spruchkammer
(Denazification Court) in Nuremberg. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 612-14; see also WILLIAM
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 278 (2000). It might
be argued that such a practice reflects Germany's insistence to exercise its national criminal
jurisdiction. Thus, this demonstrates that States deem it important to ensure that their role in
exercising their criminal jurisdiction in the repression of such crimes, which derives from their
sovereignty, is not hindered by the international tribunals. Moreover, this provides a fabulous
example of national justice stepping in when international justice fails. Unlike Germany,
where those accused and convicted of war crimes became, for the most part, pariahs in their
(Vol. 23:869
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role of national criminal jurisdictions. The others would "be sent back to
the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that
they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liber-
ated countries and of free governments" 9 which would be erected
therein.
[G]ermans who take part in wholesale shooting of [Polish] offi-
cers or in the execution of French, Dutch ... or have shared in
slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of
the Soviet Union ... will be brought back to the scene of their
crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have
20
outraged .
The IMTs represented an approach different than the one adopted at
the end of World War I. The Versailles Treaty, and the deferral of juris-
diction outlined in it, reflected the direct application of the concept of
complementarity, a concept later to be found in the ICC Statute. The In-
ternational Tribunals of the Versailles Treaty, had a direct relationship
with the German national courts, and deferred to them under the condi-
tion that the international tribunals would intervene if the German courts
failed to act. The doctrine of State sovereignty played a major role in
shaping this settlement.
In contrast, the IMTs reflected the principle of primacy, or the su-
premacy of international law over national law, in regard to trying major
war criminals, particularly in the field of the core crimes.' Although
there was no explicit discussion concerning this issue during the judg-
ment, there was a supremacy element to the IMT itself. 22 However, due
to the lack of the direct relationship between the IMT and national
courts, since both had different jurisdictions and tried different
society, Japan viewed persons convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE) as victims. Shigemitsu Mamoru, a career diplomat and a Foreign Minister in Tojo
Midelki's Wartime Cabinet, serves as an example of such sentiment. Sentenced by the IMTFE
to seven years imprisonment, he was released on parole in November 1950 and in November
1951, he was given clemency. Later, in 1954 he was reappointed Foreign Minister.
19. Moscow Declaration, supra note 15, at 604 ; see also London Agreement, supra note
17, at 8, 9 (affirming the trials of minor war criminals on the national level, where their crimes
had occurred). Article 4 stipulates, "nothing in this agreement shall prejudice the provisions
established by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war criminals to the countries
where they committed their crimes." Id. at 9.
20. Moscow Declaration, supra note 15, at 604. By 1948, European countries and the
United States had brought a total of 969 cases in their respective courts, involving 3,470 ac-
cused, of whom 952 were sentenced to death, 1,905 were imprisoned, and 613 were acquitted.
BASSIOuNI, THE ICC: A STUDY, supra note 6, at 23.
21. Panel Discussion: Association of American Law Schools Panel on the International
Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223, 249 (1999) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (re-
marks by Leila Sadat Wexler).
22. Id.
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categories of war criminals, the complementarity principle emerged in a
different form. The Tribunal tried only major criminals whose offenses
had no particular geographical localization, and left the minor criminals
to internal criminal jurisdictions. This task was undertaken by the Occu-
pying Powers themselves, each within its own zone, with its own set of
courts, applying its own scheme of law.23 In order to establish a mini-
mum common basis for the trials to be conducted in the four zones of
occupation, in December 1945, the Allied Control Council, acting as a
legislative body for all of Germany, enacted Law No. 10 entitled "Pun-
ishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace, Crimes
Against Humanity." Consequently, it was the responsibility of each zone
commander to implement Law No. 10 in his zone.24 This appears to be a
compromise, which serves as a good example for effective cooperation
in the sense of complementarity between international and national
criminal jurisdictions.25
C. The Principle of Complementarity in the Drafting History
of the Genocide Convention:
The principle of complementarity emerged in a similar form to that
now present in the International Criminal Court (ICC) during and subse-
quent to the early experiences of the Treaty of Versailles and the IMT.
However, as mentioned in the previous Section, the IMT experience re-
flected the practice of complementarity in different form. That is because
the problems, which often arise due to the conflict between national sov-
ereignty and international criminal jurisdiction, did not arise. During this
period no tension developed between international and national jurisdic-
tions.26 However, this was to prove temporary. Nonetheless, it might be
argued that the decision by Germany to retry Fritzsche, Von Papen, and
Schacht subsequent to their acquittals by the IMT,27 reflects and empha-
sizes that States often deny waiving their right to exercise their criminal
jurisdiction, especially over their nationals. Although occasionally some
23. Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 24.
24. Id.
25. Otto Triffterer, Preliminary Remarks: The Permanent International Criminal Court-
Ideal and Reality, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 17, 38 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STAT-
UTE]. In this respect, the agreement between the four major powers fighting at that time
against Germany, and those nineteen States, which in addition signed the Nuremberg Statute,
was based on mutual trust. Accordingly, there was no need to centralize the prosecution so as
to guarantee uniformity with an international court besides Nuremberg and Tokyo. Rather, a
far-reaching complementarity existed. On both levels, the prosecution and sentencing were
based on a practical division of labor.
26. Id. at 37.
27. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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States are unwilling to prosecute the perpetrators, they nevertheless resist
the idea of exclusive international intervention.
The drafting history of the Genocide Convention28 illustrates well the
aforementioned observation. The travaux preparatoires of the Conven-
tion reflect the two main aspects of the present study: First, the idea that
even in the case of the creation of international tribunals, most States
claim to exercise their own national criminal jurisdiction; and second,
the concept of complementarity.
Despite the fact that article VI of the current text of the Convention
is silent about the nature of the relationship between national courts and
the International Penal Tribunal, the texts proposed by some of the dele-
gates during the preparatory work reflected their intentions about such a
relationship. However, others opposed the idea of creating an intema-
tional tribunal. During the debates some delegates proposed exercising
universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and establishing an in-
ternational tribunal to try those perpetrating such crimes.
The first aspect, that of States affirming their right to exercise na-
tional criminal prosecution, was well represented in the Ad Hoc
Committee by Mr. Morozov of the USSR. He stressed that no exception
should be created, even in the case of genocide, to the principle of re-
specting national sovereignty by preserving a State's territorial
jurisdiction. 9 He vigorously opposed creating an international tribunal to
try the crime of genocide.3° Instead, he proposed the following new lan-
guage for article IX of the draft submitted by his delegation:
The Convention should provide that persons guilty of genocide
shall be prosecuted as being guilty of a criminal offence; that
crimes thus committed within the territory coming under the law
of a [S]tate shall be referred to the national courts for trial in ac-
cordance with the internal legislation of that [S]tate.3'
Accordingly, one may conclude that the Soviet Union held the posi-
tion that only national courts should carry out such a duty. This proposal
was also adopted by Mr. Perez-Perozo of Venezuela,32 and Mr. Rudzinski
28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
29. Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on
Genocide, 7th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR-7 (1948).
30. Id. at 4-5; see also SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 356.
31. Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide, supra note 29, at 3.
32. Id. at 5-6. Venezuela feared that the establishment of such a judicial body might
wound national pride. It claimed the whole idea was inconsistent with the principle of respect
for national sovereignty laid down in article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter.
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of Poland.33 This proposal demonstrates the fact that most States are ter-
ribly jealous about their powers of criminal prosecution. They perceive
these powers as linked to the very concept of sovereignty.
34
The second aspect, that of complementarity was also reflected dur-
ing the drafting work. One might believe that the principle of
complementarity was genuinely negotiated for the first time with the
initiation of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an ICC.35 However, as the
drafting history of the Genocide Convention makes evident, this is far
from the truth. The Ad Hoc Committee's chair, John Maktos of the
United States, was in favor of establishing an international penal tribunal
to try those perpetrating genocide.36 However, even this modest proposal
would only provide such a tribunal with minimum powers.37 Maktos
proposed a rule of subsidiarity or complementarity, by which an interna-
tional court would only have jurisdiction if the State with territorial
jurisdiction could not, or had failed to act.38 The Ad Hoc Committee
adopted the principle of complementarity by four votes to none, with
three abstentions.39
Furthermore, in its initial proposals on the Genocide Convention, the
Secretariat clearly favored establishing an international tribunal. Two
options were considered. Model statutes reflecting these alternatives,
based largely on the 1937 League of Nations treaty, were appended to
the Secretariat's draft. The international court would hear cases if a State
was unwilling to try or extradite offenders.40 Donnedieu de Vabres and
Vespasian Pella, two experts consulted by the Secretariat, decided that an
33. Id. at 11-12. Poland claimed that it would be premature to establish an international
court. Although Poland's delegate's language does not clearly reflect the opposition of the idea
of an international tribunal, one may deduce, nonetheless, that such wording implies an indi-
rect opposition to this idea, due to the prevailing notion of State sovereignty.
34. Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 23. However, France conceived of an International Tri-
bunal with exclusive jurisdiction, having no confidence in national justice systems to assume
responsibility for genocide prosecutions stating, "[n]o State would commit its governing au-
thorities to its own courts." Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide, supra note 29, at 9.
This idea reflects only the minority's opinion.
35. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session,
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
44, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft Statute].
36. Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide, supra note 29, at 12-13.
37. Id. at 13-15.
38. Id.; see also SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 371. The Chair proposed that in order to se-
cure as many ratifications of the Convention as possible and to allay any fears on the part of
prospective signatories lest the international court, with its powers as yet undefined, infringed
their sovereign rights, the Committee should decide at once upon its powers, by inserting a
clause under which "the jurisdiction of the international court would be exercised in cases
where it has found that the State in which the crime was committed, had not taken adequate
measures for its punishment."
39. U.N. ESCOR, 8th mtg., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8 (1948).
40. SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 369.
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international jurisdiction should have a subsidiary or complementary
status, and should be activated if national courts failed to effectively
prosecute.4' In the Sixth Committee, the United States42 and Uruguay43
urged incorporating a sentence to recognize this principle. Consequently,
they proposed similar amendments.
In light of the foregoing, it might be deduced that the principle of
complementarity emerged even during the early efforts to establish an
International Penal Tribunal. One might suggest that such a principle is
the outcome of two combined factors, namely, the respect of national
sovereignty and the need to facilitate international criminal justice to
repress genocide. The tension between the two desires led to the com-
promise, which reflects the idea of complementarity.
D. The Impact of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
on the Notion of Sovereignty:
Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not create an interna-
tional tribunal to try offenders,44 they imposed legal obligations and
41. Id. at 369-70.
42. Id. at 373; see also United States of America: Amendment to Article VII of the Draft
Convention (E1794), Genocide-Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social
Council, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/235 (1948) [hereinafter U.S.
Amendment to Article VII]:
Jurisdiction of the international tribunal in any case shall be subject to a finding by
the tribunal that the State in which the crime was committed had failed to take ap-
propriate measures to bring to trial persons who, in the judgment of the court,
should have been brought to trial or had failed to impose suitable punishment upon
those convicted of the crime.
Id. One might deduce that the United States' proposal reflects the exact conceptions of inabil-
ity and unwillingness as mentioned under article 17(2) and (3) of the current ICC Statute.
43. U.S. Amendment to Article VII, supra note 42; see also Uruguay: Amendments to the
Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (E1794),
Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm., 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/209 (1948):
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article IV
shall be tried by the competent tribunals of the State in the territory of which the act
was committed. Should the competent organs of the State which is under a duty to
punish the crime fail to proceed to such punishment effectively, any of the Parties to
the present Convention may submit the case to the International Court of Justice
which shall decide whether the complaint is justified. Should it be proved that there
has been such failure as aforesaid the Court shall deal with and pronounce judg-
ment on the crime of genocide. For this purpose the Court shall organize a Criminal
Chamber.
Id. That proposal also reflected the same conceptions of inability and unwillingness as men-
tioned in article 17 of the ICC Statute. However, Uruguay withdrew its amendment later after
the resolution on the ICC was adopted.
44. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
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duties on nearly all States to repress these serious crimes through their
national institutions. Geneva law insists on the punishment of grave
breaches of international humanitarian law; however, it does not set out
specific penalties, nor does it create an international tribunal. In this re-
spect, Geneva law does not follow the example of the London
Agreement, which established the Nuremberg Tribunal, or that of the
Genocide Convention and its promise of an International Penal Tribunal.
Geneva law makes its impact on international jurisdiction by placing a
duty and an obligation upon all States to repress violations. The Geneva
Conventions oblige States Parties to "undertake to respect and to ensure
respect" for the Conventions in all circumstances. 4 Accordingly, States
should act and cooperate with each other in the field of criminal prosecu-
tion.46 Moreover, they must enact national legislation prohibiting and
punishing grave breaches. 47 Thus, the system of repressing such viola-
tions is supposed to be carried out through the actions of national courts.
This concept of the Conventions is reflected through most States'
opposition to the idea of primacy or of an international tribunal enacted
with exclusive jurisdiction.4 ' Given the fact that the Conventions impose
this duty to prosecute the authors of these crimes upon all States,49 States
will therefore often resist any attempt to deny them this duty inherent in
• 0
the basic principle of sovereignty. In addition, the Conventions empower
States Parties with mandatory universal jurisdiction, called "adjudicative"
jurisdiction, which is broader in effect than the principle of
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12 1948, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
45. Article I is common to Geneva Conventions I-IV. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, su-
pra note 44, art. 1.
46. Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 28.
47. Geneva Convention I, supra note 44, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 44,
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 44, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 44,
art. 146.
48. This idea is clearly reflected through the aforementioned historical development; it
will be clarified further later in this Article. See Section B.3, infra, for a discussion of primacy
and its impact on States.
49. See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, art. 4(b), G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention]; see also Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res.
39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Conven-
tion Against Torture].
50. States not willing to take effective actions toward the perpetrators continue to operate
under the idea of sovereignty. States' hesitation to act through universal jurisdiction could also
serve as a good example of this principle.
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territorial jurisdiction.. This extends States' duties, and consequently,
makes the situation more complex. All of these combined factors illus-
trated and strengthened States' opposition to the primacy of international
jurisdiction over national jurisdiction."
From looking at the texts and drafting histories of the Geneva and
Genocide Conventions, we might deduce that the notion of State sover-
eignty often prevailed. It played an influential role with the majority of
States, even with those who accepted the idea of a restricted interna-
tional tribunal, that is, those who favored the principle of subsidiarity.
Consequently, one could suggest that the aforementioned proposals re-
flect the implicit thoughts and intentions of most States. Some
vigorously opposed the entire idea of international intervention, while
others accepted the idea on the condition that the Court should comple-
ment national jurisdictions. Both of these views or ideas convene at a
certain point; they have in common a strong desire to respect State sov-
ereignty. Driven by this desire, some States refused international
criminal jurisdiction, because they viewed it as a violation of national
sovereignty. Others restricted international criminal jurisdiction only to
situations when national courts fail to fulfill their duties. This condition
is also based on the idea of State sovereignty. These views, even though
they seem contradictory, lead to the same conclusion: that most States
would never sign or ratify a treaty establishing an international court
with exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, the principle of complementarity
seems to be the best, if not the only, compromise available to reconcile
these positions.
E. The Primacy of the Ad Hoc Tribunals
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) was created ad hoc by a decision of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council to deal with the unique situation in the former
Yugoslavia. 2 Another ad hoc tribunal, the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was created to deal with a similarly
51. However, one might argue that, although the principle of universal jurisdiction im-
poses upon States a greater duty to prosecute, which by its role strengthens their existing idea
about repressing such crimes, the mechanism of practicing universal jurisdiction might im-
pede the concept of sovereignty. For example, one State might prosecute a national of another
State without any links at all. One might argue that such tension between States, which might
affect their sovereignties is usually solved through the diplomatic channels, that is, extraditing
the accused or reaching a compromise with respect to his or her prosecution. It is evermore the
idea of exclusive international intervention that causes States the greatest fear.
52. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the For-
mer Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, 3417th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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disturbing situation in that country.53 Article 9 of the ICTY Statute54 and
article 815 of the ICTR Statute, prescribed the relationship between the
Tribunals and national courts. The establishment of the Tribunals was
based on the principle of concurrent jurisdiction. However, since both
tribunals have a special mission, that of contributing to the restoration
and maintenance of peace in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, they
need more than simple concurrent jurisdiction. Hence, the statutes grant
them primacy over the jurisdiction of national courts. At any stage of the
procedure, the International Tribunals may formally request the national
courts to defer to their competence.16 "This extra ordinary jurisdictional
priority is justified by the compelling international humanitarian inter-
53. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
54. ICTY Statute, supra note 52, art. 9. Article 9 stipulates:
I. The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1 January 1,991.
2. The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. At any
stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request na-
tional courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal in
accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence of the International Tribunal.
55. ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 8. Article 8 stipulates:
I. The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have con-
current jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between I January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
2. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have primacy over the na-
tional courts of all States. At any stage of the procedure, the International
Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to defer to its
competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
56. ICTY Statute, supra note 52, art. 9(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 8(2); see also
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 9H 64-5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-
General's Report on the Former Yugoslavia]. In this respect the Secretary-General emphasized
that it was not the intention of the Security Council to preclude or prevent the exercise of ju-
risdiction by national courts with respect to the acts committed. For a further discussion about
concurrent jurisdiction, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 306-20 (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL
P. SCHARF, I AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 121-36 (1995) [hereinafter MORRIS & SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
THE ICTY, VOL. I].
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ests involved""7 and by the Security Council's determination that both
situations constituted a threat to international peace and security."
However, the notion and practice of primacy proved problematic in
both the ICTY and ICTR experiences. As mentioned previously, States
usually opposed any attempt that might encroach upon their national
sovereignty. It was argued that the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals
with primacy over national courts constitutes an infringement of national
sovereignty. 9 The ICTY Appeals Chamber held in the Tadic case that
such infringement was fully justified on the basis of the U.N. Charter,
which sometimes restricts national sovereignty in favor of a U.N. Secu-
rity Council mandatei 0
Despite the fact that States are fully aware that they are under a duty
imposed by the Charter to defer to the competence of the ad hoc tribu-
nals, and to accept their primacy over national courts, the inherent idea
of sovereignty still influenced some when they interpreted the concept of
primacy. Immediately after the adoption of Resolution 827 (1993) estab-
lishing the ICTY, four permanent members of the Security Council,
made statements that reflected their opposition to the ICTY's primacy.6'
These statements limit the scope of the Tribunal 62 and reflect both the
57. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of Na-
tional Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 394-95 (1998).
58. Id.
59. Goran K. Sluiter, Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 681, 710 (Horst Fischer et al eds.,
2001).
60. See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Prose-
cutor v. Tadic), Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 55-60 (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995) 35 I.L.M.
32, 50-52 [hereinafter Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction]; see also U.N. CHARTER art 2,
para.7. The U.N. Charter stipulates:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to in-
tervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
[S]tate or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
Id. Such wording demonstrates that provisions taken by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII are the only exception for denial to State sovereignty. For commentary on article
2(7), see Felix Ermacora, Article 2(7), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CoM-
MENTARY 139-54 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995). See also CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 60-72 (Leland M. Goodrich et al. eds., 3d ed.
1969).
61. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 11, 16, 18-19, 46, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1360
(1993) [hereinafter Security Council Statements Against ICTY Primacy].
62. However, the judges of the ICTY have endorsed a much stronger view of primacy,
stating "[w]hen an International Tribunal such as the present one is created, it must be en-
dowed with primacy over national courts." Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 60,
158.
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dissatisfaction with the scope of primacy and States' preference for the
compromise of the complementarity regime. Mr. Merim~e, of France,
declared: "[W]e believe that, pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 2, the Tri-
bunal may intervene at any stage of the procedure and assert its primacy,
including from the stage of investigation where appropriate, in the situa-
tions covered under Article 10, paragraph 2."63 Meanwhile, Sir David
Hannay of the United Kingdom,64 and Madeleine Albright of the United
States65 mainly held the same view. "These statements are significant,
because if key members of the Security Council cannot fully accept of
[sic] the ICTY's primacy, then other States will be reluctant to do so as
well.,,
66
63. Security Council Statements Against ICTY Primacy, supra note 61, at 16; see also
Brown, supra note 57, at 398. Article 10(2) of the ICTY Statute stipulates:
A person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the
International Tribunal only if:
(a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary
crime; or
(b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were de-
signed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or
the case was not diligently prosecuted.
ICTY Statute, supra note 52, art. 10(2).
64. Sir David Hannay said:
Articles 9 and 10 of the Statute deal with the relationship between the International
Tribunal and national courts. In our view, the primacy of the Tribunal, referred to in
Article 9, paragraph 2, relates primarily to the courts in the territory of former
Yugoslavia: elsewhere it will only be in the kinds of exceptional circumstances out-
lined in Article 10, paragraph 2, that primacy should be applicable.
Security Council Statements Against ICTY Primacy, supra note 61, at 18 (emphasis added).
65. Id.; Ms. Albright said, "it is understood that the primacy of the International Tribunal
referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9 only refers to the situation described in Article 10." Id.
(emphasis added). The statement made by Mr. Vorontsov, the Russian Federation's delegate is
also relevant:
As we understand it, the provisions of Article 9, paragraph 2, denote the duty of a
State to give very serious consideration to a request by the Tribunal to refer to it a
case that is being considered in a national court. But this is not a duty automatically
to refer the proceedings to the Tribunal on such a matter. A refusal to refer the case
naturally has to be justified. We take it that this provision will be reflected in the
rules of procedure and the rules of evidence of the Tribunal.
Id. (emphasis added).
66. Brown, supra note 57, at 399. Although article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates the
members of the U.N. to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council when made
in accordance with the Charter, nowhere does the Charter address the issue of whether state-
ments by Members of the Security Council made subsequent to the adoption of a binding
decision can alter the scope of the obligations created by the clear terms of that decision. Re-
gardless of the legal effect of these statements, they have practical and political significance.
See Bartram S. Brown, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT, supra note 6, at 489, 508-09.
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From an examination of these statements, one might conclude the
Member States intended to restrict the practice of primacy over national
courts to the two situations laid down under article 10(2). These situa-
tions reflect the scheme proposed by the International Law Commission
(ILC) in its draft statute for an international criminal court. In the pre-
amble to the draft, the ILC stated that an international criminal court "is
intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems in
cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be inef-
fective .... 67 Furthermore, article 17(2)(a) and (c) of the ICC Statute68
mirrors the situations mentioned in article 10(2) of the ICTY Statute.
This shows that States intended the more lenient regime of complemen-
tarity, which would not be triggered until, inter alia the aforementioned
requirements are met. While the ICTY Statute states that it has primacy
over national jurisdictions, it appears from the restrictions of primacy to
situations where the aforementioned requirements were met, that States
intended the more lenient regime of complementarity. 69
On the other hand, the ICTR Statute grants it "primacy over all
States." This is stronger language than the more ambiguously stated
"primacy over national courts" language in the ICTY Statute. Profes-
sor Brown argues that this change indicates that a stronger consensus
on primacy developed within the Security Council after the initial
reactions against it. 0 This might be true. However, it seems likely that
the stronger language reflected a one-time response to the particular
crisis that existed in Rwanda at the time and not a consensus
on primacy. Statements made by France,7' Argentina,
67. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 35, at 44.
68. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2).
69. Although the ICTY and ICTR statutes do not deny the right of national courts to exercise
jurisdiction according to the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, the prevailing idea of primacy
caused concern for some States. Rule 9(iii) mirrors primacy in practice, especially beyond those
situations mentioned under article 10(2) of the ICTY Statute and article 9(2) of the ICTR Statute;
Rules 9 through 13 of both tribunals generally secure the Tribunal's primacy over national courts
when those courts fail to effectively prosecute violations of international criminal law. They also
provide the enforcement mechanisms necessary for the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction.
70. Brown, supra note 57, at 402.
71. Mr. Merim~e (France) stated:
In conclusion, I hope that the judgment of such cases in the future will fall within
the competence of a permanent international criminal court established by treaty.
... In our view, it is only because such a court does not exist that the Security
Council has had to make use of its powers to establish a first and then a second ad
hoc international tribunal. This initiative on the part of the organ entrusted with the
maintenance of peace was legitimate and indispensable.
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 300 (1998) [hereinafter MORRIS & SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO THE ICTR, VOL. 2].
72. Id. at 303. Ms. Canas (Argentina) stated:
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China,73 Brazil,74 Spain75, Nigeria,76 and Rwanda77 before voting on the
draft resolution establishing the Tribunal confirm that the Security
The establishment of this ad hoc Tribunal by the Council responds to the specific cir-
cumstances being confronted by Rwanda, and it is the result of a specific request made
by the Rwandese Government for rapid and effective action in this direction to contribute
to reconciliation and reconstruction and to the maintenance of peace in Rwanda.
It is clear that, this Tribunal having been set up as an ad hoc organ, it is not author-
ized to establish rules of international law or to legislate as regards such law but,
rather, it is to apply existing international law.
I should like to point out that for my Government, a standing international tribunal,
in order to be established as legitimate and effective, should be the result of a treaty
agreed among sovereign [SItates.
Id.
73. Id. at 305. China expressed the following views concerning the establishment of the
Rwanda Tribunal: "The establishment of an international tribunal ... is a special measure
taken by the international community to handle certain special problems. It is only a supple-
ment to domestic criminal jurisdiction and the current exercise of universal jurisdiction over
certain international crimes." Id.; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
ICTR, VOL. 2, supra note 71, at 309-10.
74. MORRIS & SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE ICTR, VOL. 2, supra note 71, at
304. Mr. Sardenberg (Brazil) stated:
We voted in favour of the creation of the Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia because
of the exceptionally serious circumstances of the situation .... I wish to stress that our
vote on the establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda should not be con-
strued as an overall endorsement of the procedural or substantive elements involved.
To our mind, neither of these instances establishes any legal precedent for the future. It
is only in the light of the exceptional and extremely serious circumstances, and of the
urgency required by the situation in Rwanda, that we agreed to proceed with the estab-
lishment of the International Tribunal.
Id.
75. Id. at 305-06. Mr. Yanez-Barnuevo (Spain) stated:
The international community could not remain indifferent in the face of those deeds. It is
not only the Rwandese people that is affected by such grave violations of human rights
and the fundamental values of mankind, but the entire international community. This is
why, for the second time in its history, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter, has established a jurisdictional organ with a specific competence but also
with broad powers to hand down judgments in these very serious cases.... The decision
taken today with the adoption of [R]esolution 955 (1994) is within the authority con-
ferred by the Charter of the United Nations upon the Security Council to act in cases of
threats to peace. None the less, the establishment of this institution-as in the case of the
earlier institution relating to the formerYugoslavia-should in no way cut off the interna-
tional community's access to the path towards the establishment of a universal criminal
jurisdiction. Case-by-[c]ase solutions may be adequate for reasons of urgency, but a gen-
eral institution would provide a better solution to specific problems .... Spain therefore
resolutely supports the work currently being done by the General Assembly, on the basis
of a draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission, with a view to the es-
tablishment of a permanent international criminal court with general jurisdiction.
Id.
76. Id. at 306. Mr. Gambari (Nigeria) stated, "[iut is our understanding that the Interna-
tional Tribunal for Rwanda is designed not to replace, but to complement, the sovereignty of
Rwanda." Id.
77. MORRIS & SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE ICTR, VOL. 2, supra note 71, at
309. Despite the fact that the Security Council had recognized that the national judicial system
of Rwanda was incapable of undertaking this immense task-that is, to handle a large number
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Council adopted the stronger language due to pressure by the particular
crisis, and not because a general consensus on primacy existed among
the Members. The debate surrounding the ICTR reflects that it will still
be difficult, if not impossible, to reach a consensus for establishing a
permanent international tribunal based purely on the notion of primacy.
There were two types of State opposition to an international tribunal
based on the concept of primacy. First, the statements made by France,
Argentina, Brazil, and China imply that such a tribunal empowered with
primacy must be only temporary, and is only acceptable due to the
stressing need of the situation. Second, the implications of statements
made by Spain, China, Rwanda, and Nigeria are self-evident and suggest
their preference for adopting the principle of complementarity rather
than primacy, especially when it comes to establishing a permanent in-
ternational tribunal.
Furthermore, problems with the practical enforcement of primacy by
these ad hoc tribunals make it clear that primacy is not a viable option
for the ICC.78 The primacy of the ICTY and the ICTR does not have im-
mediate self-application." This primacy is not automatic; in fact it is
of cases in addition to those handled by the Rwanda Tribunal-Rwanda requested the estab-
lishment of an international tribunal to supplement rather than to supersede the jurisdiction of
its national courts.
78. Brown, supra note 57, at 426. Regarding the ICTY, the fact that four of the five per-
manent members of the Security Council made qualifying statements on article 9 shows that
primacy has great practical and political significance. It was concluded from these statements,
that when the ICTY Statute was adopted, the key powers in the Council did not endorse the
full extent of the tribunal's primacy over national courts. This may indicate the response of the
Security Council if it is asked to enforce a request for deferral which falls within the scope of
article 9, but not within the scope of these qualifying statements. The ICTY Prosecutors have
based all their requests for deferral upon on rule 9(iii), which sets out precisely the primacy
aspect of article 9, which does not fall within the two enumerated circumstances of article
10(2) of the ICTY Statute. Since four members of the Security Council possessing veto power
have said that they do not believe that primacy extends so far, it is reasonable to assume that,
unless they have a change of heart, the Security Council is unlikely to enforce the ICTY's
requests that this broader primacy be enforced. Accordingly, no binding decisions against any
failure of States to cooperate with the Tribunal would be made. This has created a deplorable
gap between the theoretically binding nature of the Tribunal's primacy and the defacto limita-
tion of that primacy to cases of voluntary State cooperation. This lack of political support
leaves the Tribunal unable to enforce even this most basic aspect of its jurisdiction.
79. Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 34. The ad hoc tribunals have no coercive means in order
to directly implement their primary jurisdiction. This results from the lack of supranational
character in these tribunals (at least within the narrow meaning of the European Court of Jus-
tice) and from the inter-State character of the rules governing them. However, the ad hoc
tribunals can react as provided by rules 11 and 61 of their Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
which refer to the Security Council the duty to enforce the tribunals' primacy as a result of a
State's failure to cooperate with the tribunals. The question of whether the Security Council
should react is a political issue. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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only mandatory and not directly applicable. 0 Thus, States must enforce
the principle of primacy and take the measures necessary under domestic
law when an international court formally requests national courts to de-
fer a case.8' However, some domestic laws, by providing for the
possibility that a national judge can challenge the jurisdiction of the in-
ternational tribunal, refuse to recognize the direct primacy of the
tribunal. All of these laws, therefore, conflict with the principle of kom-
petenz-kompetenz (jurisdiction of an international tribunal to determine
82its own jurisdiction), universally recognized at the international level.
Although the Tadic decision83 reinforces the primacy of the ad hoc
tribunals, the Ntakirutimana case, for example, exposes their weakness
to enforce such a mechanism . The public statements of the Texas Mag-
80. Flavia Lattanzi, The Complementarity Character of the Jurisdiction of the Court with
Respect to National Jurisdictions, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON
THE DRAFT STATUTE 1, 3 (Flavia Lattanzi ed., 1998). Cassese has observed:
[T]he ICTY remains very much like a giant without arms and legs, it needs artificial
limbs to walk and work. And these artificial limbs are [S]tate authorities. If the co-
operation of [SItates is not forthcoming, the ICTY cannot fulfill its functions. It has
no means at its disposal to force [S]tates to cooperate with it.
Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 37 n.34.
81. Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 35.
82. Id.; see also Lattanzi, supra note 80, at 4. For example, article 3 of the Italian Law
provides for the transfer of the criminal proceedings at the request of the International Tribu-
nal, but only if the following conditions are satisfied: a) the International Tribunal proceeds
with respect to the same facts as the Italian Judge; and b) the fact must fall within the territo-
rial and temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, in accordance with article 8 of the
Statute. Article 4 of the French Law used to provide similar provisions. The Bosnian, Danish
and Swedish implementing laws, on the other hand, are fully in line with the obligation to
defer to the ad hoc tribunal. They do not provide for any procedure to verify particular condi-
tions. For a detailed discussion of the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, see Appeals Decision
on Jurisdiction, supra note 60, 11 17-20.
83. The ICTY in the Tadic case concentrates on the results of the attitude of States will-
ing to render effective the primacy of the International Tribunal. See Appeals Decision on
Jurisdiction, supra note 60.
84. Despite the outcomes of the two cases appearing before the Tribunals (ICTY and
ICTR), both Tribunals were empowered with the same notion of primacy. See In the Matter of
Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 20714, at *6-20 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 17, 1997). Notwithstanding the existence of the two agreements on surrender of persons
between the government of the United States and the ICTY (signed on October 5, 1994) and
the government of the United States and the ICTR (signed on January 24, 1995), the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division, denied the request of
the ICTR to surrender the accused person on the grounds that the agreement with the ICTR
was unconstitutional and, therefore, inapplicable. Moreover, the Court deemed that evidence
enclosed with the request for surrender by the ICTR "does not rise to the level of probable
cause." However, this decision was reversed on August 5, 1998 by a Federal Judge who or-
dered the deportation of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana to the ICTR. This decision was subject to
appeal.
In August 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the U.S. District
Judge's ruling to order the surrender of Ntakirutimana to CTR. Ntakirutimana appealed the
decision before the U.S. Supreme Court and on January 24, 2000, the Court refused a request
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istrate, as well as his initial ruling, indicate how the primacy of interna-
tional tribunals can be perceived as a threat to State sovereignty.85 Since
States often resist any attempt to subordinate their national sovereignty,
their refusal to cooperate with the international tribunals to enforce the
tribunal's primacy is a predictable result.
In conclusion, the appropriate relationship between national and in-
ternational jurisdiction depends upon a delicate balance of national
sovereignty interests and international community interests. Specific
threats to international peace and security in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda gave rise to international tribunals endowed with primacy over
national courts. Now, however, as States contemplate a permanent ICC,
they must strike a more general balance between the traditional State
preference for national jurisdiction over crimes, and the need to ensure
that fundamental norms of international humanitarian law will be univer-
sally enforced. It would have been impossible to create an effective ICC
unless even those States with the most fair and credible legal systems
were willing to accept some compromise in their national criminal juris-
diction, that is, to relinquish part of the their sovereign rights.
Humanitarian interests and the fundamental need to maintain interna-
tional peace and security justify such a compromise. Here, such balance
is reflected through the mechanism (complementarity) of the new per-
manent institution, the ICC. The principle of complementarity, which is
considered the cornerstone for the future ICC. Part II will shed light on
the practical role of complementarity through the ICC Statute and its
impact on the provisions of that statute.
to review the Fifth Circuit ruling, clearing the way for U.S. officials to hand over Ntakiruti-
mana to the ICTR.
It might be argued that the subsequent deferral of the United States to the competence of
the international tribunal demonstrates its willingness and acceptance of the primacy of the
tribunals, thus opposing its earlier statement made subsequent to the Security Council's Reso-
lution for establishing the ICTY. However, it might be argued that the reverse of such a
decision in itself does not reflect the approval of the United States of the exclusive notion of
primacy. Due to political considerations, the decision of the current case was an embarrass-
ment for the U.S. government, which had taken a high profile stance in publicly encouraging
other States to cooperate with the Tribunals.
85. As Magistrate Judge Notzen explained:
I question whether we are acting here to subordinate U.S. sovereignty to the United
Nations. I am particularly bothered by the potential harm of depriving this man of
his freedom .... Little by little, we are losing the guarantees of those individual
freedoms each time we give up a bit of our freedoms. It makes me, as the grandfa-
ther of five little girls, worry about their future.
U.S. Magistrate Marcel Notzen of Laredo, quoted in William Norman Grigg, The Long Arm of
UN Law, July 20, 1998, at http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/1998/vol4no15/
vol4nol5_un-law.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).
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II. THE ICC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
A fundamental problem facing the drafters of the Statute of the ICC
was the role the institution would play in relation to national courts. The
common view was that the ICC should complement national jurisdic-
tions. Defining the precise nature of such a relationship was both
politically sensitive and legally complex 6 Some delegations to the draft-
ing of the ICC, while supporting the establishment of an ICC, were
unwilling to create a body that could impinge on national sovereignty. 7
A number of delegations stressed that the principle of complementarity
should create a strong presumption in favor of national jurisdiction. Such
presumption, they said, was justified by the advantages of national judi-
cial systems."
The view was also expressed that in dealing with the principle of
complementarity a balanced approach was necessary. It was important
not only to safeguard the primacy of national jurisdictions, but also to
avoid the jurisdiction of the court becoming merely residual to national
jurisdiction.89 The drafters recognized that the issue of complementarity
and the relationship between the ICC and national courts would have to
be examined in a number of other interconnected areas, for example, in
regard to international judicial cooperation, and issues involving surren-
der, among others. Thus, the main trend was to achieve consensus on this
relationship, since States were reluctant to agree to a compromise on any
fundamental issue without having a clear sense of how the final, com-
plete picture would appear. Once the legal relationship between the
Court and States could be established, it would be easier to make pro-
gress on other major issues.9
86. John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41, 41
(Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
87. For thorough discussions on the drafting history of the principle of complementarity
see, for example, 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 35; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22,
TT 29-51, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report]; Report of
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Vol. 1, Supp. No. 22, f 153-78, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter
1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 1]; Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, 51st Sess., Vol. 2, Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 2].
88. 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 87, $ 31.
89. Id. [34.
90. Holmes, supra note 86, at 43.
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A. The 1994 ILC Draft and Its Role in the Development
of the Concept of Complementarity.
The first attempt to study such a relationship was taken by the ILC,
which placed the principle of complementarity in the third paragraph of
the preamble of its Draft Statute.' The principle is repeated, again in
general terms, in article 1 of the Draft.92 The 1994 ILC Draft Statute has
been the cornerstone for the construction of the notion of complementar-
ity, specifically those practical aspects .built into the current ICC
Statute.93
In the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court (Ad Hoc Committee), one of the main questions was
whether the principle of complementarity should be reflected in the pre-
amble or embodied in an article of the 1994 Draft Statute. Two views
were expressed. According to one view, considering the importance of
the matter, a mere reference in the preamble was insufficient, and a defi-
nition, or at least a mention, of the principle should appear in an article
of the Statute, preferably in its opening part. Such a provision would re-
move any doubt as to the importance of the principle of complementarity
in the application and interpretation of subsequent articles.94
According to the other view, the principle could be elaborated in the
preamble:
[R]eference was made in this context to [a]rticle 31 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which the
preamble to a treaty was considered part of the context within
which a treaty should be interpreted, and the remark was made
that a statement on complementarity in the preamble to the Stat-
ute would form part of the context in which the Statute as a
whole was to be interpreted and applied.9
Several delegations felt that an abstract definition of the principle
would serve no useful purpose and found it preferable to have a common
91. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 35, pmbl. 3 ("emphasising further that such a
court is intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such
trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective").
92. Id. at 43 (stating "[tjhere is established an International Criminal Court, which shall
have the power to bring persons to justice for the most serious crimes of international concern,
and which shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions... ").
93. The drafters relied on the 1994 ILC Draft Statute as the main framework to interpret
and develop the idea of complementarity.
94. 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 87, 35-36.
95. Id. 1 37; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Article 31 stipulates: "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose . I... Id
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understanding of the practical implications of the principle for the opera-
tion of the ICC.
96
The Ad Hoc Committee also debated how far ICC jurisdiction
should extend in regard to national jurisdiction. It recognized that unlike
the jurisdiction of the two ad hoc tribunals, which is provided and exer-
cised independently of the unavailability or effectiveness of local
authorities to prosecute the suspected criminals, the jurisdiction of the
ICC is intended only for those cases where national procedures are un-
available or ineffective."
The inclusion in the 1994 Draft Statute preamble of "or may be inef-
fective" made it clear that the ILC believed that the Court's jurisdiction
should extend beyond those situations where the national jurisdiction
was simply not functioning. The ILC Draft was silent with respect to
unavailability, presumably satisfied that the Court could exercise juris-
diction if the national system failed to proceed.9 This was the underlying
premise of article 35 of the ILC Draft Statute, which addressed the ques-
tion of admissibility, and the concept of complementarity. This article
provided the criteria for determining when a case is admissible or inad-
missible by the Court. 99 It is this criterion which formed the basis of the
current ICC provision on admissibility.' °° There was a wide measure of
agreement that the words "available" and "ineffective" were unclear.
Questions were raised as to the standards that would determine whether
a particular national judicial system was "ineffective."' ' Consequently,
the Ad Hoc Committee made the observation that the commentary to the
96. Id. [30.
97. Lattanzi, supra note 80, at 9.
98. Holmes, supra note 86, at 44.
99. See 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 35, at 105. Article 35 reflects the notion of
complementarity by stating,
[t]he Court may, on application by the accused or at the request of an interested
State at any time prior to the commencement of the trial, or of its own motion, de-
cide, having regard to the purposes of this statute set out in the Preamble, that a
case before it is inadmissible on the ground that the crime in question:
a) has been duly investigated by a State with Jurisdiction over it, and the de-
cision of that State not to proceed to a prosecution is apparently well-
founded;
b) is under investigation by a State which has or may have jurisdiction over it,
and there is no reason for the Court to take any further action for the time
being with respect to the crime; or
c) is not of such gravity to justify further action by the Court.
Id.
100. The drafters developed their work on article 35 of the ILC Draft Statute by submit-
ting proposals during the meetings until they reached the final version of article 17 of the
current statute.
101. 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 87, 41.
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preamble clearly envisaged a very high threshold for exceptions to na-
tional jurisdiction and that the ILC only expected the ICC to operate in
cases in which there was no prospect that the alleged perpetrators of se-
rious crimes would be duly tried in national courts.0 2 In 1996, the Ad
Hoc Committee was replaced by a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom).
In this respect, the 1996 PrepCom adopted an identical approach.' 3 The
unclear definitions of "unavailability or ineffectiveness" of national judi-
cial systems were criticized during the 1996 session of the PrepCom.
There were other criticisms regarding the admissibility provisions.
Some States believed that the terms used by the ILC in the preamble's
third paragraph were too vague while others found them too intrusive."
It was noted that the principle of complementarity involved, besides the
third paragraph of the preamble, a number of other articles, and article
35 on admissibility, was central among them. States criticized the formu-
lation of article 35 because the grounds indicated in that article, on the
basis of which the Court decides whether the case before it is admissible,
were too narrow. They covered only those cases being investigated, and
did not cover the cases that had been or were being prosecuted at the
time. Past or ongoing legal proceedings should be subject to qualifica-
tions of impartiality, diligent prosecution, and so on. Moreover, it was
observed that grounds for inadmissibility scattered in other articles of the
Statute-for example, article 42, ne bis in idem-could be included in
article 35, making it the main article on complementarity in the operative
part of the Statute.' °5
Other delegations pointed out the difficulties of assessing ineffective
procedures and faulted the subjective character of the proposed criteria.
They felt that more stringent and objective criteria, possibly to be in-
cluded in the text, would be needed for the purposes of greater clarity
and security. The efficiency of national proceedings, as juxtaposed with
the intention to shield the accused would be such a criterion. Several
delegations noted that notions such as "absence of good faith" and "un-
conscionable delay" in the conduct of national proceedings would be
useful tools for the clarification of this issue. Other delegations felt that
these terms were vague and possibly confusing.' °6 This realization be-
came the first step in adding new criteria in order to achieve a clearer
and more objective standard.' 7
102. Id. 42.
103. 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 1, supra note 87, 1 154.
104. Holmes, supra note 86, at 45.
105. 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 1, supra note 87, 164.
106. Id. 166.
107. 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 2, supra note 87, at 3. See, for example the new pro-
posal to the Preamble of the ILC Draft: "Emphasizing further that the international criminal
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At the commencement of the PrepCom's August 1997 session, the
Chairman of the Committee asked the head of the Canadian delegation,
Mr. John Holmes, to coordinate informal consultations on the issue. ' 8
Subsequently, the coordinator produced a draft article on complementar-
ity, which was later approved by the Committee at the end of the August
session. °9 Later, several more provisions were added to the draft article
to achieve consensus. First, a text box was placed at the beginning of the
draft article to explain its origins."" Second, a number of footnotes were
added to explain the approach taken. Many of these notes referred to the
fact that the final version of the draft article would depend on the out-
come of discussions on other issues in the Statute."' Third, the terms
"unwilling" or "unable genuinely," were mentioned for the first time in the
draft of article 35. "2 In addition, the criteria to determine "unwillingness,"
including sham trials, and "inability" was also addressed in this article."3
court shall complement national criminal justice systems when they are unable or unwilling to
fulfill their obligations to bring to trial such persons." Id. at 2. Here, for the first time, the
terms "unable" and "unwilling" emerged.
108. See Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held 4 to 15 Au-
gust 1997, U.N. GAOR, 52nd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev. I (1997) [hereinafter
1997 PrepCon Decisions]. The PrepCom did not discuss the issue of complementarity again
until the August 1997 session.
109. Holmes, supra note 86, at 45-6.
110. 1997 PrepCom Decisions, supra note 108, at 10. The text box reads:
The following draft text represents the results of informal consultations on article
35 and is intended to facilitate the work towards the elaboration of the Statute of the
Court. The content of the text represents a possible way to address the issue of
complementarity and is without prejudice to the views of any delegation. The text
does not represent agreement on the eventual content or approach to be included in
this article.
Id.
I 11. See 1997 PrepCoin Decisions, supra note 108, at 11-12; see also Holmes, supra
note 86, at 46.
112. 1997 PrepCom Decisions, supra note 108, at 10-11. Article 35(2) of the Draft
reads:
Having regard to paragraph 3 of the Preamble, the Court shall determine that a case
is inadmissible where:
a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdic-
tion over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution;
b) the case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the de-
cision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute.
Id. art. 35(2).
113. Id. Article 35(3) states:
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
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Finally, the delegates considered an alternative approach to the one put
forward.'
4
This progress continued and similar draft articles emerged during the
Inter-Sessional Meeting in Zutphen"5 and in the Draft Final Act." 6 Until
the latter stage, most delegations accepted the view that the compromise
on complementarity had been achieved and the text box and the alterna-
tive approach would disappear over time. ' 7 Despite this progress, some
delegates were still concerned about the definitions of "inability" and
"unwillingness" and some of the technical issues related to the comple-
mentarity provisions. The negotiations on these issues continued even in
the Rome Conference."8 Nevertheless, the Statute, which included the
a) the proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal re-
sponsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as set out in
article 20;
b) there has been an undue delay in the proceedings which in the circum-
stances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice;
c) the proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or im-
partially and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned
to justice.
Id. art. 35(3). Article 35(4) states:
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether,
due to a total or partial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the
State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
Id. art. 35(4).
114. 1997 PrepCom Decisions, supra note 108, at 12. The text reads as follows:
An alternative approach, which needs further discussion, is that the Court shall not
have the power to intervene when a national decision has been taken in a particular
case. That approach could be reflected as follows: The Court has no jurisdiction
where the case in question is being investigated or prosecuted, or has been prose-
cuted, by a State which has jurisdiction over it.
Id.
115. See U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting From 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, the
Netherlands, art. 11, at 41-43, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (1998) [hereinafter Report of
the Inter-Sessional Meeting in Zutphen].
116. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Draft Statute & Draft Final Act, art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 Draft Final Act].
117. Holmes, supra note 86, at 48.
118. See Sharon A. Williams, Issues of Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 25, at 390. In essence article
17 could not be opened up for substantial change or the package based on compromise would
have folded. This was made clear in the general debate in the Committee of the Whole by the
coordinator. Not all States were completely satisfied, but saw the article as a delicately bal-
anced compromise. However, some delegations including China, Egypt, Mexico, Indonesia,
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provisions on complementarity, was adopted as a package, to be either
accepted or rejected in its entirety.
B. Complementarity & Article 1 of the ICC Statute
The following Section will highlight the concerns and compromises
of the delegates regarding complementarity by examining the comple-
mentarity provisions found in the current ICC Statute. To attain the goal
of international justice, article 1 of the ICC Statute states in simple lan-
guage that the Court will "be a permanent institution and shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern ... and shall be complementary to na-
tional criminal jurisdictions." The ICC Statute does not define the term
"complementarity" anywhere. However the plain texts of paragraph 10
of the preamble " 9 and of article 1 compel the conclusion that the ICC is
intended to supplement the domestic punishment of international viola-
tions, rather than supplant domestic enforcement of international norms.
Indeed, the obligation of States to use their domestic fora to punish vio-
lators of international law was not the outcome of recent treaties,' 20 but
has roots that run back to the ideas of Hugo Grotius."2 The Complemen-
tarity principle is intended to preserve the ICC's power over
irresponsible States that refuse to prosecute those who commit heinous
international crimes. It balances that supranational power against the
India, and Uruguay wanted to reopen the negotiations. Thus, the intention of the coordinator
who had continued with his role at the request of the Bureau of the Committee of the Whole in
Rome was to "resist holding informal consultations for as long as possible" for two reasons.
First, this would have led to unending consultations and proposals, and accordingly impede
adopting a strengthened complementarity article. Second, the coordinator was of the view that
bilateral contacts with delegations would afford him a better opportunity for gauging concerns
of States opposed to the Draft Statute's text. Three main problems with the text surfaced as
indicated by the coordinator. These problems concerned the terms "unwillingness," "undue
delay," and "inability" or "partial collapse." For a discussion on these issues, see infra Section
II.C.
119. This text reads, "the International Criminal Court established under this Statute
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
10.
120. See, e.g., supra notes 28, 44, and 49 (listing the international instruments that im-
pose this duty upon States and the priority to suppress those crimes under their provisions);
see also ICC Statute, supra note I, pmbl. T 6 ("[r]ecalling that it is the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes"). In this re-
spect, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) deemed the obligation "to respect and to ensure
respect," which in fact reflects the duty upon States to suppress crimes under International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), an obligation of general international law. Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
121. Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consis-
tent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REv. 20, 26
(2001).
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sovereign right of States to prosecute their own nationals without exter-
nal interference.
The reference to the principle of complementarity in both the pre-
amble and article 1 seem duplicative. This was done to satisfy most of
the desires of the States. The ILC Draft Statute, as seen, had included a
provision in the preamble on complementarity. Article 15 of the draft
statute submitted by the PrepCom also included a reference to the pre-
amble, and a suggestion for further clarification of complementarity. 1"
Moreover, at the Conference, the delegation of Andorra began informal
discussions on the preamble. These discussions seemed to indicate that a
paragraph might be needed in the preamble to elaborate the principle of
complementarity as was done in the ILC Draft Statute. However, since
the principle itself was already elaborated in article 17, delegations de-
cided that it was no longer necessary to include further elaboration in the
preamble and that the basic principle would be adequate. Meanwhile,
members of the Drafting Committee working on part 1 of the Statute,
suggested that a reference to the principle of complementarity should
also be added in part 1, in addition to the reference considered for inclu-
sion in the preamble. They believed that the principle was so
fundamental that it should be restated in article 1 on the establishment of
the Court. Consequently, this led to a minor change to article 17, result-
ing in an additional reference to the preamble and to article 1, which was
quickly acceded to by delegations.
23
From an analytical examination of the drafting history, one might
suggest that this duplication does not spring from any legal necessity;
rather it was the result of fear that such an international jurisdiction
might supplant States' sovereignty.
24
C. Complementarity and Issues of Admissibility
Under the rubric of "admissibility" in article 17, the ICC Statute re-
flects the balance and the complex relationship between national legal
systems and the ICC. 121 In order to implement the complementarity
122. See 1998 Draft Final Act, supra note 116, at 40 n.15. A footnote was placed as fol-
lows, "[s]uggestions were made that the principle of complementarity should be further
clarified either in this article or elsewhere in the Statute."
123. See Williams, supra note 118, at 391; see also Holmes, supra note 86, at 55-56.
124. Vienna Convention, supra note 95, art. 31. The reference to the principle of com-
plementarity in the preamble is sufficient to reflect the very essence of complementarity, since
the preamble to a treaty was considered part of the context within which a treaty should be
interpreted, and a statement on complementarity in the preamble to the ICC Statute would
form part of the context in which the Statute as a whole was to be interpreted and applied; see
also 1995 Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 87, 35-36 (adopting a similar principle).
125. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 66-67 (2001).
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principle, the ICC Prosecutor and judicial chambers must respect and
adhere to the Statute's admissibility criteria. Article 17 represents the
most direct mechanism for allocating responsibility for a prosecution
between the ICC and one or more domestic sovereigns that may have
jurisdictional authority. If, according to the criteria listed in article 17, a
case is determined to be "inadmissible," the ICC Statute blocks the au-
thority of the ICC Prosecutor and judicial chambers. These admissibility
criteria, therefore, establish the critical bulwark that protects the author-
ity and right of sovereign States to prosecute these cases in their national
courts, as opposed to relying on the ICC.'26
There are four questions that must be answered to determine admis-
sibility. First, is the case being investigated by a State with jurisdiction?
Second, has a State investigated and concluded that there is no basis to
prosecute? Third, has the person already been tried for this conduct? Fi-
nally, is the case of insufficient gravity to proceed? If the answer to any
of these questions is in the affirmative, the Court may, sua sponte, raise
the issue of admissibility. The ICC Prosecutor must, sua sponte, raise the
issue of admissibility.'2 7 These criteria may sound simple, but in practice
they will be complicated. The Statute gives both the Prosecutor and the
judicial chambers the tools necessary to determine admissibility. These
tools are the technical terms embedded in article 17. The finding of "un-
willingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute" is governed
and restricted by these technical terms.'28 The significance of these terms
appears from a literal reading of the text of article 17 itself.29
126. Newton, supra note 121, at 47-48.
127. Panel Discussion, supra note 21, at 250. However, this does not mean that the
Prosecutor shall rely merely on one of the aforementioned grounds. The appropriate construc-
tion of the Statute suggests that the determination of the admissibility of a case should be
tested in light of the purpose of article 17 and the statute as a whole. For example, the Prose-
cutor in his assessment whether a case is or would be admissible, should prove, on the one
hand, that the State which is investigating the case is not acting bona fide, and on the other
hand that the case oversteps the gravity test. This is best exemplified in the wording of article
53(l) of the Statute. This construction matches the spirit and purposes of the Statute, which
are also reflected in paragraphs 3 and 4 of its preamble. For the text of article 53(1), see infra
note 173.
128. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(l)(b).
129. Id. Article 17(1) reads:
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall deter-
mine that a case is inadmissible where:
a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdic-
tion over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution;
b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely
to prosecute;
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The core of the admissibility test is whether a State with jurisdiction
has the willingness and ability to investigate and prosecute. If the Court
concludes that such a national forum is available, it must show deference
to the national jurisdiction that has seized itself of the matter.3 ° Accord-
ing to article 17(1) the Court must decline jurisdiction unless the
Prosecutor can show that the State which has seized itself of the matter is
"unwilling or unable genuinely" to carry out the investigation or prose-
cution. The burden of proof rests on the Prosecutor.
The nature of the "unwillingness" and "inability" tests will in many
cases demand greater resources of the Prosecutor in preparing the admis-
sibility argument than proving the guilt of the alleged perpetrator.'3 '
These terms seem to endow both the Prosecutor and the Court with a
wide discretion of assessment, and therefore the delegations considered
the definition of the terms an indispensable issue.
Defining "unwillingness" became a contentious issue to resolve. The
difficulties centered on how subjective or objective the test for determin-
ing unwillingness should be. The intention was to eliminate the terms
that contained subjective elements.' 32 However, some subjectivity had to
be retained to give the Court latitude in its decision on unwillingness. In
c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the sub-
ject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article
20, paragraph 3 ....
Article 17(2) reads:
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider,
having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law,
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal re-
sponsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in
article 5;
b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the cir-
cumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice;
c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice.
Article 17(3) reads:
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether,
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system,
the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
130. Morten Bergsmo, The Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court
(Part II, Articles 11-19), 6/4 EUR. J. OF CRIME, CRIM. L. AND CRIM. JUST. 29, 43 (1998).
131. Id.
132. Holmes, supra note 86, at 49.
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the end, the drafters compromised by adding the word "genuinely" in
order to serve in the determination of the unwillingness. Some delega-
tions argued vigorously in favor of the word "genuinely." To them, it
reflected a more objective connotation than the words "effectively," or
"diligently" which the ILC had used in its draft. Many other delegations
argued that "genuinely" was even less clear than the other terms. Never-
theless, the term was adopted as being the "the least objectionable
word. 133
It seems that the latter argument was correct; the word genuinely is
to a certain extent vague and led to uncertainty. It was argued that this
word might create ambiguities. In the opinion of Professor Sadat and
Richard Carden, the application of the word poses two controversial
questions: Does "genuinely" refer to situations where the State's motives
are not genuine-they are diplicitous or disingenuous-or to situations
where the State is really unable or unwilling to prosecute?34 An exami-
nation of article 17, suggests that "genuinely" refers to situations where
the State is really unable or unwilling to proceed. By analyzing the pur-
pose of the words "effectively" and "diligently" used by the ILC and the
intention of the drafters regarding the word "genuinely," one may reach
such a conclusion.
35
Since the test of "unwillingness" as elaborated in article 17(2), is in
effect a test of the good faith of national authorities, the Statute provides
a set of combined criteria to assure the effectiveness of this test. The first
criterion mentioned in article 17(1)(a), requires the Prosecutor or the
Court to establish that the proceedings'36 or the decision were "for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility."
Given that proving such a purpose may be difficult for the Prosecutor or
the Court, it was agreed to add a second criterion: "undue delay." This
phrase emerged and was linked to the intent of the State to bring the ac-
cused to justice. However, since this phrase was later criticized in the
Committee of the Whole as being too low a threshold, the Committee
replaced it in the final draft with "unjustified delay," the current text of
article 17(2)(b).'3 7 This change has merit, since the word unjustified "sets
133. Id. at 50; see also Williams, supra note 118, at 392.
134. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 418 (2000).
135. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "genuine" means real as opposed to false.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (5th ed. 1979).
136. The term "proceedings" covers both investigations and prosecutions. In this respect,
see Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting in Zutphen, supra note 115, at 43.
137. Id.; Williams, supra note 118, at 390-91; see also Bureau Proposal on Part 2 (Ju-
risdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law), U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Comm. of the
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a higher standard than [the word] undue, in that it implies the right of
States to explain any delay before the Court determines that a case is
admissible."'' Otherwise the Court's finding of "undue delay" could oc-
cur without considering the views or rationalizations of the State
concerned."'
However, this change might leave room for any State which has ju-
risdiction over a case to act in bad faith and rely on an invented
justification. Thus it could decrease the accuracy of the Court's and the
Prosecutor's assessments regarding the admissibility of a case, especially
since such an assessment must take into consideration a critical criterion,
the "intent to bring the person concerned to justice.' 40 Having to prove
this intent makes the situation even more complex. Either term is very
difficult to assess in practice however, and it can be argued that the word
"unjustified" increases the objectivity of the assessment. Hence, this
would assist both the Prosecutor and the Court to determine in a more
objective manner whether the State is acting in bad faith.'4'
The third criterion to determine unwillingness was the independence
and impartiality of the proceedings. If the ICC determines that the pro-
ceedings "were not or are not being conducted independently or
impartially" but are in fact being conducted in a manner, "which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to jus-
tice," the case will be admissible.'42 At first it was proposed that this
paragraph should be under the heading of inability. If the State could not
provide impartial proceedings and procedural guarantees for the accused
person the Court should intervene.44 This view was opposed by some
delegations that argued that procedural fairness should not be a basis for
the purpose of defining complementarity.'8 " Even so, in the negotiations
it emerged that there could be procedural problems in a State which,
while not meeting the test of shielding the accused, could be inconsistent
with an intent to bring the accused to justice. For example the State may
be genuinely endeavoring to prosecute someone, therefore the intent to
shield is not an issue. However, there may be individuals who are trying
Whole, art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/C.1/L.59 (1998) [hereinafter Bureau Proposal on Part
2].
138. Holmes, supra note 86, at 54.
139. Id.; Williams, supra note 118, at 391.
140. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(b).
141. This does not mean that the Prosecutor or the Court would not be granted any
subjective criterion to their assessment. The idea behind this argument is that the objective
criterion would weigh more than the subjective. This reduces the risk of facing arbitrary deci-
sions based merely on subjective assessments.
142. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(c).
143. Williams, supra note 118, at 394.
144. Holmes, supra note 86, at 50.
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to cause a mistrial, or taint evidence and ensure that the accused will not
be found guilty.'45 "[T]he added criterion was thus believed to be neces-
sary, even though it may appear to duplicate the two other criteria of
shielding or unjustified delay."' 46
Finally the phrase "having regard to the principles of due process
recognized by international law,"' 1 7 was agreed to at the final negotia-
tions. The phrase "in accordance with the norms of due process
recognized by international law" was the original language, and it was
thought that it should be added to the paragraph that dealt with the inde-
pendence and impartiality of the national proceedings, in order to have
more objective criteria.' 4' The Bureau, in advancing the negotiations on
part 2 of the Statute, included this idea in both its Discussion Paper and
its Proposal. 49 As the bilateral negotiations proceeded, several delega-
tions also favored this idea, but indicated their concern that this still left
other criteria relating to unwillingness less objective. Accordingly, Mr.
Holmes-the coordinator of the complementarity discussions in the
PrepCom-developed the current language in the chapeau of the para-
graph on unwillingness.'50 It was inserted to inject more objectivity into
the criteria for determining unwillingness and to suggest an assessment
of the quality of justice from the standpoint of procedural and even sub-
stantive fairness.'' However, Lieutenant Colonel Newton argues that
since the Statute does not define the aforementioned phrase, the Prosecu-
tor would have a wide margin of discretion to meet the objective
admissibility criteria. 52 Thus, this may have a direct effect on the con-
ception of complementarity.
Article 17(3) introduces another criterion for determining the effec-
tiveness of domestic procedures, namely, whether the State is able to
carry out its duty. In regard to the concept of inability, paragraph 3
states:
[I]n order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court
shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable
145. Williams, supra note 118, at 394.
146. Holmes, supra note 86, at 51.
147. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2).
148. Holmes, supra note 86, at 53.
149. See Bureau Discussion Paper on Part 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable
Law), U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Comm. of the Whole, art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/C. 1/L.53 (1998)
[hereinafter Bureau Discussion Paper on Part 2]; Bureau Proposal on Part 2, supra note 137.
150. Williams, supra note 118, at 390-91.
151. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 68.
152. Newton, supra note 121, at 66.
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to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
Accordingly, the ICC may assert its jurisdiction only when it identi-
fies a gap in State jurisdictions, a gap created by the lack of repression.
This gap may be the consequence of poor administration of justice, or a
breakdown of State institutions, such as the national judicial system, or
of widespread anarchy."' The State must be unable to obtain an accused
or key evidence and testimony, and its inability must relate to the total,
substantial collapse,'54 or unavailability of its judicial system.' 5 However,
combining these two criteria concerned some of the delegations during
the preparatory work. They believed that combining the two criteria
could limit the Court's ability to act. 56 Thus, to meet these concerns, the
phrase "or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings" was added.'57
These concerns have merit, since the failure of a State to obtain the ac-
cused or the necessary evidence and testimony might be attributed to any
external reason other than those mentioned in paragraph 3.
Meanwhile, although the terms "total" and "substantial collapse"
seem io raise the threshold of the criterion,' some practical problems
still exist. For example, a developed and functional justice system that is
unable to obtain custody of an offender because of a lack of extradition
treaties would still be able to defy ICC prosecution on the ground of
complementarity' 59 The dilemma is that the term "partial collapse" could
function as a double-edged sword. For example, a situation might
emerge where a partial collapse might only affect some regions, while
the courts in the remaining regions would continue to function.
However, the fact that some other circumstances might cause this
partial collapse does not change the fact that the State cannot obtain cus-
tody of the accused, which is the heart of inability. The State could not
153. Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 44.
154. Holmes, supra note 86, at 49.
155. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3); see also SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 68; Wil-
liams, supra note 118, at 394.
156. Holmes, supra note 86, at 49. In this respect, some delegations reflected their con-
cern by providing an example, that is, if the accused and some evidence were obtained but
other aspects of the national proceedings were affected by the collapse.
157. Some delegates believed that adding this criterion seemed superfluous. Id.
158. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
159. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 68. This is because of the deletion of the earlier term
"partial" collapse. However, some delegations argued vigorously in favor of its deletion:
[T]hese delegations argued that it was possible to have a partial collapse of a na-
tional judicial system and yet that country could still undertake a bona fide
prosecution. The example was given of a breakdown in one region of a State, while
the Courts in the remaining regions continue to function.
Holmes, supra note 86, at 55.
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obtain the accused because of the partial collapse of its judicial system
and thus would be unable to prosecute the case, unless it had the neces-
sary evidence to try the accused in absentia. Even though the State
would not meet the requirements of inadmissibility, it could block the
Court's jurisdiction over this case. Therefore, a partial collapse might
have the same consequence as a total collapse. In other words, even
though the State would be unable to genuinely handle the case due to a
partial collapse, since the term "partial" is no longer included in article
17, it could impede the prosecution of the Court. Accordingly, there is a
possibility that the perpetrator might escape punishment.
The delegations that proposed the deletion of the term "partial," ar-
gued vigorously that it was possible to have a partial collapse of a
national judicial system and yet that country could still undertake a bona
fide prosecution. They gave as an example a situation where a break-
down in one region of a State would not necessarily impede the
functioning of the courts in the remaining regions.' 6 This would be dif-
ferent from a state of emergency in a country. Responding to this
argument, Oradt states: "[I]t is hardly conceivable that a grave emergency
would not affect the whole nation one may think, for instance of grave
disturbances of public order taking place in a dependent territory of a
State, which do not affect the nation as a whole."' 6' Thus, it seems that in
a country facing a state of emergency because of the collapse of an indi-
vidual region's judicial system, the entire national judicial system would
be compromised. 
62
The final criterion for finding a case inadmissible is if the case is not
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the ICC. This aspect of
the ILC approach proved to be non-controversial' 63 and was included in
the draft articles.'64 It was also inserted in the Rome Statute. The Statute
has always had threaded through it the idea of gravity-that the Court
should hear only the most serious cases of truly international concern.
This is logical given that the philosophical underpinning of the ICC-as
represented in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble,'65 and in articles 1166
160. Id.
161. JAMIE ORA,,, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
29(1992).
162. According to this interpretation, the aforementioned situation would be covered by
the total or substantial collapse.
163. Holmes, supra note 86, at 47.
164. See, e.g., Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting in Zutphen, supra note 115, at 43;
1998 Draft Final Act, supra note 116, at 41.
165. ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 4 (reading "[a]ffirming that the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished...").
166. Id. art. I ("[The ICC] shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern....").
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and 516 7-is deterrence through the threat of prosecution and punishment
of grave crimes that threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the
world.' 68 If the ICC had to deal with all sorts of international crimes, in-
cluding those of lesser gravity, it would be flooded with cases and would
become ineffective as a result of an excessive and disproportionate work-
load. To a certain extent, this has already occurred at the ICTY and has
necessitated the withdrawal of indictments of minor perpetrators in the
political-military hierarchy.
69
Although "gravity" is not a defined term and it is presumably up to
the Court to elaborate its meaning over time, the chapeau of articles 6, 7,
and 8 give some guidance regarding the application of this criterion. The
chapeau of article 8 suggests that war crimes are particularly appropriate
subjects for the Court's jurisdiction if they are part of a plan or policy or
are committed on a large-scale basis. Article 7's chapeau requires that
the acts be committed "as part of [a] wide spread or systematic attack"
There is also the concept of the "group" in article 6 and its discussion of
genocide. All of the above suggest that at least one element of gravity is
scale. That is, the magnitude or widespread nature of the crimes may be
an element of their admissibility before the Court or even of the Court's
jurisdiction. Other elements might be how heinous the offense is, or the
need to distinguish between "major" war criminals and "minor" perpe-
trators who should be tried locally. This can best be observed through the
Nuremberg experience where the major war criminals were tried by the
IMTs and the minor ones were tried at the national level.' 0
1. Complementarity and the Preliminary Rulings
The principle of complementarity reconciles two competing features
and jurisdictions. The first is State sovereignty, which claims national
jurisdiction over its citizens or those crimes committed on its territory,
even though these crimes are of an international character and may fall
under the international jurisdiction. The second feature only functions in
exceptional circumstances and gives an international tribunal jurisdiction
over these heinous crimes. The ICC Statute's procedural aspects either
protect national sovereignty and jurisdiction or strengthen the ICC's
167. Id. art. 5 ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole . .
168. Id. pmbl. 3.
169. Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Prelimi-
nary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, 158 (1999) (citing the Order Granting Leave for
Withdrawal of Charges Against Minor Offenders Govedarica, Gruban, Janjic, Kostic, Paspalj,
Pavlic, Popovic, Predojevic, Savic, Babic, and Spaonja issued by Judge Riad on May 8, 1998).
170. Sadat & Carden, supra note 134, at 419. For a thorough discussion regarding the
IMT, see supra Section I.B.
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jurisdiction. This Section will analyze the direct impact these procedural
aspects have on the principle of complementarity, and which feature of
complementarity they favor in particular circumstances. 7
Article 18 elaborates on the complementarity principle as expressed
in article 17, by providing the mechanism for preliminary rulings regard-
ing admissibility. The provision was added in a later phase of the
drafting, as a further procedural filter to the benefit of States' sover-
eignty. The creation of a specific control aimed at evaluating the issue of
admissibility when the Prosecutor decides to commence an investigation,
at a very early stage, strengthens the first feature of complementarity.
Such a control precedes the procedure described by article 19 relating to
"challenges of the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a
case."
According to article 18(1), when a State Party refers a situation to
the Court and the Prosecutor has identified a reasonable basis to com-
mence an investigation, or the Prosecutor initiates an investigation
proprio motu, the Prosecutor must initiate a pre-trial procedure."'73 It
171. That is to say that if we demanded to examine the impact of a certain provision on
the principle of complementarity, the first criterion would be that this provision should func-
tion in favor of States, thus serving or strengthening the idea of complementarity through this
angle. By contrast, for example, under the exceptional circumstances mentioned in article 17,
the ICC would be granted primacy. Thus, when examining the impact of a certain provision on
the complementarity principle, the criterion should change, since the examined provision
should function in favor of the ICC and not States. Accordingly, the scope through which the
examination takes place would change.
172. ICC Statute, supra note I, arts. 13(a), 14.
173. Id. arts. 13(c), 15(3), 53(1). Article 53(1) reads:
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or
her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable
basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation,
the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is be-
ing committed;
b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims,
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation
would not serve the interests of justice.
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or
her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform
the Pre-Trial Chamber.
It should be noted, however, that in cases where the Prosecutor acts proprio motu, article
15 applies, while in the case of referral by a State Party according to articles 13(a) and 14,
article 53 applies, and article 15 does not apply. Thus, the question of a Pre-Trial Chamber
authorization of the commencement of the full investigation becomes moot. In those situa-
tions, the Prosecutor proceeds to the consideration under article 53(l) directly. However, one
might suggest that this does not preclude the Prosecutor from relying on the criteria set under
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starts by notifying "all States [P]arties and those States which, taking
into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdic-
tion over the crimes concerned" of the investigation commenced or
about to be commenced.7 4 In this context, a question arises whether the
Prosecutor has an obligation to notify States that are not party to the
Statute. One possible construction of the clause is to limit it to States
Parties, and particularly "those States that would normally exercise ju-
risdiction over the crimes concerned." Another construction suggests that
the clause also refers to States that are not a party to the Statute. The lat-
ter view found support in the deliberate use of the conjunction "and"
and argued that it reflects the drafters' intention to include non-party
States."'
article 53. This sounds logical, since rule 48 provides for a clarification of the relationship
between article 15 and article 53 as follows: "[i]n determining whether there is a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation under article 15, paragraph 3, the Prosecutor shall con-
sider the factors set out in article 53, paragraph 1(a) to (c)." See also Report of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, at 31, rule 52(1), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/l/Add. 1 (2000) [hereinafter ICC Rules]. The criteria set under article 53 are
the appropriate criteria, and those which, inter alia, the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Trial Cham-
ber will later rely upon at the jurisdiction and admissibility stages. Moreover, article 53
provides a further opening for prosecutorial discretion, by incorporating a consideration of
interests of justice in the Prosecutor's final determination of whether to actually proceed with
an investigation following authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 15(4). In addi-
tion, article 53 ensures an equal Prosecutorial burden in all triggering modes outlined in article
13. New circumstances may arise after the Pre-Trial Chamber has given its authorization un-
der article 15(4), which further justifies the applicability of article 53(2) on situations arising
under articles 13(c) and 15. The latter is not mentioned in the Rules, but could be inferred
from the entire context of the Statute. For a discussion of article 15, see generally Morten
Bergsmo & Jelena Pejic, Prosecutor, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE: OBSERVERS'
NOTES, ARTICLE By ARTICLE, supra note 25, at 359, 367-68, 370. However, the opinion found
in that discussion was examined solely in light of the Statute, thus excluding the Rules of
Procedures and Evidence, which made some changes to the final view and the appropriate
construction of the Statute as mentioned above. For an updated source on this subject, see JUrg
Lindenmann, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in IN-
TERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION .OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 59, at 173, 182-84.
174. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(l); see also ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 52(1)
("Subject to the limitations provided for in article 18, paragraph 1, the notification shall con-
tain information about the acts that may constitute crimes referred to in article 5, relevant for
the purposes of article 18, paragraph 2."). In case of referral by the Security Council according
to article 13(b), no pre-trial procedure or notification is necessary. In this regard, Benvenuti
observed that this distinction may be considered reasonable, because there is no need for a
specific filter aimed at protecting State sovereignty when the Prosecutor proceeds as a result
of a referral of a situation by the Security Council acting under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter:
in this case the principle of domestic jurisdiction is not supposed to work in favor of States.
Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 47.
175. Daniel D. Nsereko, Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 25, at 395, 399.
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However, if this is true, why does paragraph 5 mention, "States Par-
ties shall respond to such requests without undue delay?"' 7 6 One possible
answer is that this paragraph suggests that the drafters' intention was to
limit the application of article 18 to States Parties only. The correct an-
swer is that drafters could not apply the strong language in paragraph 5
to non-party States, but this does not change the overall application of
article 18 to non-party States. The term "undue delay" provides the key
to the appropriate interpretation of paragraph 5. The drafters used the
word "undue" instead of the word "unjustified" mentioned in article
17(2)(b). According to the drafting history, the term "unjustified" is
more lenient and leaves room for justification in case of any delay, while
the term "undue" removes this opportunity. In addition, the strict lan-
guage of paragraph 5 suggests that it is imposing an obligation upon
those States to respond to the Prosecutor's requests without any delay,
even if justified. Since "a treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third State without its consent,"' 71 the drafters could not have
mentioned third States in this context. Accordingly, one can deduce that
the Prosecutor is obliged to notify non-party States.
It was suggested that the purpose of the notification would seem to
be twofold: To give general information to the general assemblage of
States Parties, and to put on notice those States that might otherwise have
jurisdiction,' that the Prosecutor intends to investigate the matter. The
State concerned is thus given an opportunity either to allege jurisdiction or
to allow the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation. "9
The notification might be held on a confidential basis, according to
the prosecutorial assessment.' 8 The Prosecutor may decide to limit the
scope of information provided to the States, in order to ensure that the
information does not fall into the wrong hands. Revealing the informa-
tion to the wrong people may hurt innocent individuals, particularly
potential witnesses and other providers of information, or may destroy
evidence, or assist suspects and witnesses to abscond justice.
Apparently, these privileges seem to empower the Prosecutor with a
broad discretionary assessment. Article 18(1) left it to the Prosecutor to
determine how much information is presented to States. Nevertheless,
176. Cassese, supra note 169, at 159. However, according to Cassese, article 18 applies
also to "[tihird [S]tates, i.e. [S]tates that are not parties to the Statute." Id.
177. Vienna Convention, supra note 95, art. 34.
178. An example of a scenario where a State may otherwise have jurisdiction is a State
whose citizen commits one of the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction while in the territory
of a State Party.
179. See also Nsereko, supra note 175, at 399.
180. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(l); see SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 102.
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rule 52(2)8 ' seems to weaken this discretionary assessment, since it
grants States the right to request additional information from the Prose-
cutor. Thus, it might hinder the main purpose of article 18(1), that is, to
preserve valuable or other significant evidence, since according to this
rule the State can request it and destroy it or otherwise hinder the inves-
tigation.
This analysis of article 18 suggests that the idea of notification is
dangerous and has a double impact on the principle of complementarity.
Although it apparently strengthens the first feature of complementarity,
because it encourages States to act and exercise their primary jurisdic-
tion, it also impedes the second feature of complementarity, that of
effective international prosecution. If a State was acting in bad faith,
once it received the information from the Prosecutor, it could destroy
this evidence or act in other ways to allow the accused to escape justice,
while pretending that it is investigating or prosecuting the case. There-
fore the second feature of complementarity would be impeded, and the
ICC's primary jurisdiction to act in such exceptional cases might be
thwarted due to the State's false assertion.' However, Bergsmo, sug-
gests that this problem could be partially ameliorated by article 18(6)
which says that the Prosecutor may, on an exceptional basis, request au-
thorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to "pursue necessary
investigative steps for the purpose of preserving evidence where there is
a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a signifi-
cant risk that such evidence may not be subsequently available."'" 3 By
contrast, Cassese wonders whether the provisions of paragraph 6 are suf-
ficient when "one is faced with a [S]tate bent on shunning international
jurisdiction and therefore unwilling to cooperate in the search for and
181. Rule 52(2) reads, "[a] State may request additional information from the Prosecutor
to assist it in the application of article 18, paragraph 2. Such a request shall not affect the one-
month time limit provided for in article 18, paragraph 2, and shall be responded to by the
Prosecutor on an expedited basis." ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 52(2).
182. Notifying and providing the State concerned with further information will
strengthen this assertion. See Cassese, supra note 169, at 159. Cassese has also taken a similar
view. He expressed his opinion in the following words:
Complementarity might lend itself to abuse. It might amount to a shield used by
[SItates to thwart international justice. This might happen with regard to those
crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity) which are normally perpetrated with
the help and assistance, or the connivance or acquiescence, of national authorities.
In these cases, [S]tate authorities may pretend to investigate and try crimes, and
may even conduct proceedings, but only for the purpose of actually protecting the
allegedly responsible persons.
Id.
183. Bergsmo, supra note 130, at 45.
Summer 20021
Michigan Journal of International Law
collection of evidence, or even willing to destroy such evidence to evade
justice.""4
Article 18(2) obliges the Prosecutor to defer to a State investigation
if informed of the existence of such investigation within one month of
the notification sent to all States Parties and other States which would
normally exercise jurisdiction.85 The only exception is if the Pre-Trial
Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the
Prosecutor to investigate.'86 To receive this authorization, the Prosecutor
bears the evidentiary and legal burden to show by a preponderance of
evidence that valid grounds exist to justify the Prosecutor's investiga-
tion. ' Additionally, the Prosecutor in submitting the application before
the Pre-Trial Chamber can also rely on the criteria for holding a case
admissible, listed under article 17.
184. Cassese, supra note 169, at 159.
185. However, in this context, what if a State that prior to receiving the Prosecutor's no-
tification has not investigated the acts subject to the notification, but prompted by the
notification, now wishes to institute investigations into those acts? Is it precluded from re-
questing the Prosecutor to defer to its jurisdiction? The general conclusion is that it is not. The
spirit and general tenor of the Statute is to give due deference to State jurisdiction according to
the complementarity regime. So a State that has not yet started investigations, but is otherwise
able and willing to do so, must be given a chance to exercise its jurisdiction under article
18(2). Another question might pose itself in this regard, where the State concerned does not
respond at all to the Prosecutor's notification or, if it does, it does not "request" the Prosecutor
to defer to its investigations. In fact, the logical answer would be that the Prosecutor might go
ahead with his or her investigations. However, in such a case, both the State and the Prosecu-
tor may be concurrently investigating the same matter. Such a situation runs counter to the
spirit and purpose of the Statute, since the Statute is to function based on the principle of
complementarity and not concurrent jurisdiction as it is in the ad hoc tribunals. Nevertheless,
if the Prosecutor proceeds to file a case before the Court whilst the State's investigation or
proceedings are still pending, such a case may be ruled inadmissible by the Court under article
17, unless it is shown that it falls under the exceptions of that article.
186. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(4); see also ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule
53 ("When a State requests a deferral pursuant to article 18, paragraph 2, that State shall make
this request in writing and provide information concerning its investigation, taking into ac-
count article 18, paragraph 2. The Prosecutor may request additional information from that
State."); id. rules 54 and 55. Rule 54 reads:
I. An application submitted by the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Chamber in
accordance with article 18, paragraph 2, shall be in writing and shall con-
tain the basis for the application. The information provided by the State
under rule 53 shall be communicated by the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial
Chamber;
2. The Prosecutor shall inform that State in writing when he or she makes an
application to the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 18, paragraph 2, and
shall include in the notice a summary of the basis of the application ....
Rule 55(2) reads: "[t]he Pre-Trial Chamber shall examine the Prosecutor's application and
any observations submitted by a State that requested a deferral in accordance with article 18,
paragraph 2, and shall consider the factors in article 17 in deciding whether to authorize an
investigation." Id.; see also Bergsmo, supra note 130, at 44; Sadat & Carden, supra note 134,
at 420.
187. Nsereko, supra note 175, at 401.
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The Pre-Trial Chamber's decision is subject to appeal,' but if the
State avails itself of this right, it cannot attack the investigation or prose-
cution on the basis of admissibility unless there is a subsequent change
of circumstances or additional significant facts are raised.'89
If the Prosecutor defers to a State's investigation,' 90 she or he may
review the deferral after six months or whenever there has been a "sig-
nificant change of circumstances based on the State's unwillingness or
inability genuinely to carry out the investigation." 9' This provision al-
lows the Prosecutor to monitor and reassess the State's ability and
willingness to administer justice.' 92 In this context, one might suggest
that this provision should be read in conjunction with article 18(5). At
the lapse of six months the Prosecutor may review the deferral, and may
request to be kept periodically apprised of the progress of the investiga-
tions and any subsequent prosecutions without "undue delay." In this
regard, the inclusion of this strict language suggests that the idea of de-
laying the response in this context is entirely unacceptable. When a State
undertakes to investigate and prosecute those heinous crimes it does so
as an agent, and on behalf of the entire community. Hence, it is only fair
that the State be accountable to the Prosecutor, who is otherwise respon-
sible for investigating and prosecuting those crimes on behalf of the
international community. Failure on the part of the State to respond at all
or in a timely manner would be grounds for the Prosecutor to review the
deferral and seek the Pre-Trial Chamber's authorization to initiate an
investigation."'3 This seems logical, since paragraph 5 appears to forestall
any attempt to escape justice. Furthermore, paragraph 5 strengthens the
first feature of the complementarity regime, since the monitoring author-
ity provided to the Prosecutor could frighten States and encourage them
to act in good faith.
If the Prosecutor observed any change of circumstances based on the
State's unwillingness or inability prior to or subsequent to the six months
188. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(4), 82(l)(a),(d).
189. Id. art. 18(7). In this regard, a State which has challenged a ruling by the Pre-Trial
Chamber under article 18 is not prevented from challenging the admissibility under article 19
on the grounds of "additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances." For a
discussion concerning this issue, see Bergsmo, supra note 130, at 361; Nsereko, supra note
175, at 404; Sadat & Carden, supra note 134, at 420.
190. It should be noted, however, that the Prosecutor's deferral applies not only to States
Parties, but also to third States. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Gerhard Hafner,
The Status of Third States before the International Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 239, 248-49 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi Politi
eds., 2001).
191. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(3).
192. Ruth B. Philips, The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and Admis-
sibility, 10 CRIM. L.F. 61, 80 (1999).
193. Nsereko, supra note 175, at 403.
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period, she or he will investigate the matter subject to the Pre-Trial
Chamber's authorization. However, the Prosecutor must show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that such a change has occurred.
Accordingly, the State concerned is also given the opportunity to appear
before the Pre-Trial Chamber and oppose the Prosecutor's application
for authorization to investigate a matter with which it is already suppos-
edly seized.
Paragraph 3 buttresses the two features of the complementarity prin-
ciple. On the one hand, the provision for monitoring a State's
investigation assures that States are acting bona fide in their exercise of
national jurisdiction. The provision fulfills the main purpose of the com-
plementarity regime of not trampling on national sovereignty and
jurisdiction unless necessary. On the other hand, authorizing the Prose-
cutor to intervene when the State concerned is acting in bad faith ensures
that the second feature of complementarity is functioning, that is, that
the Court can assert primacy in case of unwillingness or inability.
Based on the foregoing, the provisions of article 18 in general appear
to empower the complementarity regime. However this regime, through
the provisions of article 18, seems to have a negative impact on the func-
tioning of the ICC. According to Hans Kaul, the principle of
complementarity is strengthened by the article 18 preliminary rulings
regarding admissibility, one of the "safe-guard provisions" which the
American delegation forcefully pushed into the Statute. He observed that
while a strong complementarity regime sounds positive-in reality it
means a considerable weakening of the Court. He further argues that a
State, especially if this State is not acting bonafide, can erect procedural
obstacles with this provision,'9 4 and impede the expeditious and appro-
priate functioning of the Court.
2. Complementarity & Challenges to the Jurisdiction
of the Court or the Admissibility of a Case
Article 19 seems to supplement the provisions of article 18, but at a
latter stage and in a broader sense. Unlike article 18, which is applicable
only in a case of referral of a situation by a State Party and in case of an
investigation by the Prosecutor proprio motu,'95 article 19 applies to "Se-
curity Council referrals and cases in which States do not open
investigations" in response to a Prosecutor's notification. 96 Moreover, it
increases the categories of parties who could bring challenges to the ju-
194. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Trigger
Mechanism and Relationship To National Jurisdictions, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 190, at 59-60.
195. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
196. Sadat & Carden, supra note 134, at 420.
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risdiction and admissibility before the Court.'97 This does not preclude
the possibility of the Court98 and the Prosecutor'99 also availing them-
selves of this right. Indeed, the Court, on its own motion, may determine
the admissibility of a case brought before it,2°' but in doing so, it must
always satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction 20' in any case brought before
it.20
2
An international court has the power to determine whether it has ju-
risdiction in a particular case, even if there is no express provision giving
it the power to do so. In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber stated that
the power of a court to determine whether it had competence,
is part, and indeed, a major part, of the incidental or inherent ju-
risdiction of any judicial or arbitral tribunal, consisting of its
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. It is a necessary
component in the exercise of the judicial function and does not
197. Article 19(2) stipulates that challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds
refered to in article 17 or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by:
a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to ap-
pear has been issued under article 58;
b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investi-
gating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted; or
c) A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12;
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(2); see also ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 133. However,
there is a clear distinction between articles 18 and 19 in this respect. Article 19 seems to widen
the categories that can challenge the admissibility of a case-unlike article 18, which limits a
challenge to admissibility of an investigation to a State Party or the Prosecutor acting proprio
motu-still there is a technical distinction between them. Article 18 refers to situations re-
ferred to the Court, while article 19 refers to individual cases, a further procedural step, which
is discussed in more detail below.
198. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(1).
199. Id. art. 19(3).
200. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Explanatory Note on the ICC Statute, 71 INT'L REV. PENAL L.
1, 20 (2000).
201. It is noteworthy that article 53(2) of the ICJ Statute uses a similar term to that of ar-
ticle 19(1). Article 53(2) of the ICJ Statute reads, "[t]he Court must... satisfy itself, not only
that it has jurisdiction in accordance with articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well
founded in fact and law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
53(2), 59 Stat. 1055; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27). The Court defined the term as follows,
the use of the term "satisfy itself' in the English text of the Statute (and in the
French text the term "s'assurer") implies that the Court must attain the same degree
of certainty as in any other case that the claim of the party appearing is sound in
law, and, so far as the nature of the case permits, that the facts on which it is based
are supported by convincing evidence.
Id.
202. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(1); see also ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 58(4)
(stipulating, "[t]he Court shall rule on any challenge or question of jurisdiction first and then
on any challenge or question of admissibility").
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need to be expressly provided for in the constitutive documents
of those [t]ribunals."3
Thus, the ICC has a duty to determine its own competence and
therefore, the requirement in paragraph 1 that the Court "shall
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before
it," was not critically essential.'2
This duty is limited to "any case" which is "brought before it,"
which is narrower than the term "a situation" within the meaning of arti-
cles 13, 14, and 18. These terms were discussed in the 1996 PrepCom
and at the Rome Conference, but regarding different issues, that is,
granting ex officio powers to the Prosecutor. During the drafting process,
some of those who opposed granting ex officio powers to the Prosecutor
contended that the ICC Prosecutor would have the same independence as
the Prosecutors of the two Ad Hoc Tribunals to initiate an investigation
once a "situation" had been brought to the Prosecutor's attention by the
Security Council or a State's complaint. They argued that the powers of
the Prosecutor could be broadened, if the complaint referred to "situa-
tions" rather than individual "cases."2 5
In the 1996 PrepCom, the United States introduced a similar pro-
posal, which was supported by a large majority of States. It is argued
that the main reason for this support was that many States were uneasy
with the regime provided for in the ILC Draft Statute, which allowed a
State Party to select individual cases of violations and lodge complaints
with the Prosecutor with respect to such cases. This could, in their view,
encourage politicization of the complaint procedure. Instead, according
to the United States' proposal, States Parties would be empowered to
refer "situations" to the Prosecutor in a manner similar to that provided
for the Security Council. Once a State Party refers a situation to the
Prosecutor, the Prosecutor could then initiate a case against the individ-
ual or individuals concerned.20 6
At the Rome Conference, this problem emerged once more, but in a
different context, namely, in regard to the Security Council's referrals.
Among those delegations supporting referrals by the Security Council,
there was a division as to whether the Council should refer "matters," or
"situations." The majority of delegates rejected the possibility of refer-
ring "cases" by the end of the preparatory negotiations, finding "cases"
203. Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 60, 18.
204. Christopher K. Hall, Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility
of a Case, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 25, at 405, 407.
205. Silvia A. Fernandez, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 86, at 180.
206. Id.
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to be too narrow and not mindful enough of the Court's independence in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Consequently, only the "matters" and
"situation" were submitted to the Diplomatic Conference. As between
these two terms, those who preferred the narrow concept of a "matter"
did so on the basis of the need for some degree of specificity in the refer-
ral before the Court could assert jurisdiction, while those who preferred
"situation" argued that the referral of a "matter" by the Council was still
too specific for the independent functioning of the Court. In the end, the
latter view prevailed and the term "situation" was adopted.0 7
The entire process before the ICC starts with a referral of a situation
to the Prosecutor. Then the Prosecutor conducts the investigation, which
is monitored by the Pre-Trial Chamber through the different stages. In
the end the Prosecutor decides whether to file a case (within the narrow
meaning mentioned in the above paragraph). Then article 19 comes into
play, once a real case exists and someone is charged with committing
one of the crimes listed in article 5 of the Statute. Thus, the requirement
that a "case" be "brought before" the Court (presumably, the Pre-Trial
Chamber or Trial Chamber according to article 19(1)) implies some for-
mal proceedings beyond the initiation of an investigation of a situation in
response to a referral and at a later stage than the questioning, under arti-
cle 55, of a suspect still at liberty. Such formal proceedings might
include an application for a warrant under article 58.208 Thus, according
to article 19, the Court would not have a duty to make a determination,
on its own motion, of whether it had jurisdiction over an investigation
into a situation (as opposed to a case) being conducted by the Prosecu-
tor.209 This sounds logical, since part of the investigation of the situation
207. Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles
13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STAT-
UTE, supra note 86, at 143, 147-48.
208. In this respect,
[t]he Pre-Trial Chamber decision pursuant to Article 15(3) [sic] to authorize the
Prosecutor to commence an investigation proprio motu would not bring a case "be-
fore" the Court within the meaning of Article 19(l), even though it mentions the
word "case". The history and structure of Articles 13(c) and 15 demonstrate that
their purpose is to permit the Prosecutor to investigate an entire "situation," not to
make a definitive decision whether an individual case is admissible. Under article
15(3) [sic], the Pre-Trial Chamber does not formally determine that a case "brought
before it" is admissible, but simply makes a determination "that there is a reason-
able basis to proceed with an investigation," and that "the case appears to fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court, without prejudice to subsequent determinations
by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case".
Hall, supra note 204, at 408 n.8 (emphasis added) (text mistakenly refers to Article 15(3)
instead of 15(4)). However, this does not mean that the Pre-Trial Chamber is precluded from
determining "that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation" in light of arti-
cles 17 and 53(3)(a).
209. Hall, supra note 204, at 407-08.
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by the Prosecutor will be to determine whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion."O
Meanwhile, article 19(1) also provides that the Court (the Pre-Trial
Chamber or Trial Chamber) has the discretion, on its own motion, to de-
termine the "admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17." By
contrast to the duty of the Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
in a case brought before it, paragraph 1 does not restrict the Court's abil-
ity to make an admissibility dei,'rmination only with respect to a "case"
brought before it. It may decide on admissibility at an earlier stage than
when asked to issue a warrant under article 58.1 Moreover, the Prosecu-
tor also has a duty under article 53(1)(b) to consider the question of
admissibility in the early stages of an investigation. The Pre-Trial Cham-
ber may review the Prosecutor's conclusions in light of article %3(3)(a).
However, according to Hall, the Court would only review the Prosecu-
tor's admissibility conclusions if an admissibility challenge were
brought pursuant to article 19(2), unless clear circumstances require an
-.• • 211
admissibility determination in the interests of justice.
While complementarity is a right accruing to States, a specified class
of individuals may invoke complementarity on behalf of a State with
jurisdiction. Article 19(2)(a) permits an accused 213 or a person "for whom
a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued" to challenge
the jurisdiction or the admissibility of a case before the ICC.21 4 However,
article 19(2)(b) specifies that challenges to the admissibility of a case or
the jurisdiction of the Court on the grounds referred to in article 17 "may
215be made by" a "State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground
210. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(l)(b).
211. Hall, supra note 204, at 408.
212. Id.
213. It could be argued that, although the Rome Statute does not provide a definition for
"accused,"
[it would be consistent with the structure of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR to define an accused for the purposes of Arti-
cle 19, as a person identified in the "the document containing the charges" referred
to in Article 61(3)(a), as of the moment the document is provided to the Pre-Trial
Chamber, whether "in camera" pursuant to a sealed indictment or publicly, rather
than at the stage the charges are confirmed in accordance with Article 61(7)(a), and
to consider the person as an accused under the Statute until the charges are not con-
firmed or the person is acquitted or convicted.
Id. at 409; see also ICTY Rules Proc. Evid. 2(a), U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV. 24 (2002) (defining
an accused as "a person against whom an indictment has been submitted in accordance with
Rule 47"). Rule 47 specifies the different stages for confirmation of the indictment by a Judge.
id.
214. See generally, ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 58; Newton, supra note 121, at 56,
57.
215. At the Rome Conference, one of the problems that emerged was whether a non-
party State could make a challenge. Although many delegations from the "like-minded" States
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that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or
prosecuted. 216
Since all States under international law may exercise universal juris-
diction over the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction,"7 it is likely that
paragraph 2(b) meant only those States which had provided their own
courts with jurisdiction over the case under national law. Jurisdiction
could be based on territory, the protective principle, the nationality of the
suspect or the victim, or universality."8 However, according to Ben-
venuti, who favors a stricter construction, if the principle of
complementarity was applied to every State on the basis of any possible
jurisdictional link, it could block effective prosecution in a large number
of cases. Indeed, any State could invoke the principle of universal juris-
diction and initiate a prosecution before its domestic courts, thereby
impeding the work of the ICC.2 9 Thus, it seems rather more persuasive
to limit the principle of complementarity to those national jurisdictions
220that are directly connected to the criminal conduct or to the accused .
This makes sense and coincides with the spirit and purpose of the Stat-
ute.
It is noteworthy that, although the chapeau of paragraph 2 refers to
"challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in
article 17," an examination of the language of subparagraph (b) suggests
that it limits these grounds to those listed in article 17(a) and (b).
believed that only States Parties to the Statute should have this right, many other delegations
insisted that the principle of complementarity should apply to the Court regardless of whether
the national proceedings were being conducted by a State Party or a non-party State. The latter
delegation feared the real possibility that concurrent investigations or prosecutions could oc-
cur, which could jeopardize the efficacy of both. Holmes, supra note 86, at 66.
216. Id. at 67. In this context, "it is not enough that a State had instituted national pro-
ceedings, it must establish to the Court that it had jurisdiction in the case." Id. This addition
was intended to forestall situations where a State could challenge (and delay) the Court from
proceedings with a case on the ground that it was investigating when in fact the investigation
or prosecution was sure to fail because the State lacked jurisdiction even as far as its own
courts were concerned. Id.
217. Regarding the crime of genocide, see, for example, The Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos. and Herz. v.
Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 27-33 (July 11).
218. Hall, supra note 204, at 410.
219. In this respect, if one demanded to follow the wider interpretation-namely, that
any State could assert jurisdiction based on universality, absent any direct connection to the
conduct-it could be argued that this could have a negative effect on the second feature of
complementarity. In other words, although the wide construction appears to strengthen the
first feature of complementarity, that national jurisdiction is superior, it weakens the second
feature of complementarity, if, for example, the State concerned was able and willing but the
case oversteps the gravity test and should be tried under the ICC's authority.
220. Benvenuti, supra note 16, at 48 (observing "these national jurisdictions may rea-
sonably be presumed to be the ones in a position to collect evidence and testimony of the
crime and/or implement a judgment, but are unwilling or unable to act").
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Therefore, it excludes the circumstance where a person has already been
tried and the gravity test as viable admissibility challenges.
A close reading of the entire article reveals that the above interpreta-
tion may not be the correct one. From paragraph 4 one might deduce that
it covers the situation when a person has already been tried. The gravity
test however is not mentioned anywhere in article 19. The main chal-
lenges to admissibility remain that the State concerned has conducted, is
conducting or will conduct an investigation and a prosecution. However,
a State may argue that a case lacks gravity, thereby adding an extra ar-
gument to its admissibility challenge. For example, a State could
challenge the admissibility of a case on the ground that it has investi-
gated the case. In order to enhance its argument, it could claim that
according to its investigation and final determination, it concluded that
the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
This example demonstrates that it is possible to apply article 19(2)(b) in
an extended manner in order to overstep the gaps of the Statute. Al-
though article 19 appears to exclude "gravity" as a ground for
challenging the admissibility of a case, this example demonstrates that
the absence of "gravity" does not prevent a State from using it to bolster
its argument.
Another problem which might hamper the Court's determination of
admissibility challenges emerges from reading article 19(2) in conjunc-
tion with article 17(1). First, article 19(2)(b) makes reference to a State
that has prosecuted a case. This situation is not defined nor mentioned in
article 17(1). Article 17(l)(a) refers to a case, which is "being investi-
gated" or being "prosecuted." Article 17(l)(b) refers to a case, which has
been investigated, and in which the State decided not to try the person
concerned. Thus, in this context, the text of article 17(l)(b) should have
included the following language: "The case has been investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has
decided not to prosecute or try the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute or try such a person."
Based on the foregoing, one wonders how would the Court rule on a
challenge, made according to article 19(2)(b) that argues that the State
has prosecuted the case, since the latter criterion is not mentioned in ar-
ticle 17(1)? In other words, when the Court is ruling on an admissibility
challenge, in order to decide that a case is inadmissible, it should use the
criteria set out in article 17. However, because article 17 lacks the
aforementioned criterion, the Court might be legally paralyzed to rule on
any admissibility challenge based on this particular ground.
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There is another possibility unaccounted for in the Statute. If the
Court interprets article 19(2)(b) in a strict manner, it would limit a
State's challenges to those situations mentioned in the text. What would
be the Court's determination if a State challenged the admissibility of a
case on the ground that it has already prosecuted the case, and now is
unwilling or unable to carry out a trial? How could the Court decide that
the case is admissible, absent any criterion for determining unwilling-
ness or inability in article 19? These questions suggest that article 17 is
the main guide for the admissibility test. However, there is a gap in para-
graph 1, which the drafters seem to try to overstep through article
19(2)(b). 2 '
Even if a State does not fit the criteria set out in article 19(2)(b),
paragraph 2(c) allows some States another challenge. It allows a State
from "which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12" to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of a case.
Acceptance of a State's jurisdiction is not required if the Security Coun-
cil, pursuant to article 13(b), refers a situation to the Prosecutor.
However, acceptance by a State is required when a situation is referred
to the Prosecutor by a State according to articles 13(a) and 14, or when
the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation proprio motu in accordance
with articles 13(c) and 15(1). Thus, in those circumstances, article 12(2)
requires the acceptance of jurisdiction by the State on whose territory,
vessel or aircraft the crime occurred-the territoriality principle"-or
the State of the accused's nationality-the active personality principle. 23
Reading article 19(2)(c) in conjunction with articles 12 and 13, one
could conclude that the State, who is not a party to the Statute, but
whose national is suspected of a crime, cannot make a challenge to ju-
risdiction or admissibility until the suspected person is accused.
221. However, according to Professor William Schabas, this gap was not forgotten, but
the drafters left it intentionally. Interview with William Schabas, Professor, National Univer-
sity of Ireland, in Galway, Ir. (Sept. 25, 2001).
222. Obviously, this might give rise to practical conflicts between States asserting juris-
diction on the basis of the two related types of the "territoriality principle," namely, the
"subjective territoriality," and the "objective territoriality." "While subjective territoriality
requires an element of the offense to occur within the asserting [S]tate, objective territoriality
obtains when the effect or result of criminal conduct impacts on the asserting [Sitate, but the
other elements of the offense take place wholly beyond its territorial boundaries." Christopher
L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2, at
33. For a thorough discussion on the basis of jurisdiction, see id. at 33-70.
223. Id.; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 295-312 (1996) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRA-
DITION]; Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A
Critique of the U.S. Position, 63 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 44-45 (2000); Sharon A. Wil-
liams, The Rome Statute on the Ilternational Criminal Court: From 1947-2000 and Beyond,
38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 298, 322-24 (2000).
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It should be noted, however, that paragraphs 2(b) and (c) might also
cover challenges to the jurisdiction or admissibility of a case by a State,
which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber under article
18(7). States that have had their article 18 preliminary challenges re-
jected by the Pre-Trial Chamber may make a further challenge pursuant
to article 18(7) to the admissibility of the case under article 19(2) and
(4). This additional challenge is subject to the existence of "additional
significant facts or significant changes of circumstances,"2I which
should limit frivolous challenges.
Because of this additional challenge one can imagine a situation
where the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the State's challenge on the basis
of article 17, and the State decides to challenge admissibility again under
article 18(7).225 Should a State that the Court found was unwilling to
carry out an investigation or prosecution be give a second chance and
another opportunity to impede justice? What about a State whose pro-
ceedings "were undertaken, or the decision was made to shield the
person concerned from criminal responsibility? ' 26 Or one whose pro-
ceedings "were not being conducted independently or impartially?, 27 Is
it possible that "additional significant facts or changes of circumstances"
would indicate a State's willingness to act, even though the State has
already revealed its bad intentions earlier? One can imagine that a State
that was unable to carry out its duties due to the collapse or unavailabil-
ity of its judicial system might become able at a later time due to
changed circumstances. The only possibility that a State, which has
demonstrated its unwillingness to act can later conduct a bonafide inves-
tigation or prosecution, is that its government has changed. This seems
the only sensible reason for article 18(7). It reflects the drafters' inten-
tion to create a complementarity regime and emphasize the favoring of
national rather than ICC jurisdiction. 8
Article 19(3) entitles the Prosecutor to seek a ruling from the Court
on a question of jurisdiction or admissibility. In such proceedings vic-
tims and those who referred the situation under article 13229 may submit
224. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 18(7).
225. Although article 17 is not mentioned under article 18 as a ground for determination
to authorize an investigation, from a reading of the mechanism of the Statute, it might be de-
duced that the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber take into account the criteria set
under article 17 in addition to other factors that might emerge before them.
226. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(a).
227. Id. art. 17(2)(c).
228. This makes sense, since States consider that international intervention touches the
very essence of their sovereignty. For a thorough discussion on this issue, see supra Part I.
229. Hall argues:
Although the impetus for this provision was the intent to ensure that the victim's
right to be heard at all stages of the proceedings was effectively guaranteed, the
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observations to the Court.23° Rule 59 extends this right of victims and of
the referring party to challenges submitted by a State or by the accused
under article 19(2).231
The Prosecutor may obtain a prompt ruling from the Court on the
questions of admissibility and jurisdiction at any stage, whether the
question relates to an entire situation or to an individual case. Since the
text of article 19(3) does not limit the Prosecutor's ability to "seek a rul-
ing regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility" to a "case," the
Prosecutor may also seek a ruling in regard to situations. In addition, she
or he could seek a prompt determination that a State's judicial system
was unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute, thus mak-
ing all investigations or prosecutions admissible in that State. This
procedure would conserve the Court's resources by not having each in-
dividual case litigated in a piecemeal fashion.232
As a general rule, according to article 19(4) a State or a person men-
tioned in paragraph 2 is permitted only one challenge to a determination
of jurisdiction or admissibility. This challenge must be brought prior to
or "at the commencement of the trial." '233 This provision was introduced
to ensure a degree of finality.
However, some exceptions still exist. While challenges to the juris-
diction of the Court must be made prior to or at the commencement of
trial, in "exceptional circumstances" they may be made at a time
language is broad and clear enough to include the Security Council or a State which
referred the situation to the Court. The term "proceedings with respect to admissi-
bility" is broad enough to include proceedings regarding preliminary challenges to
admissibility under Article 18.
Hall, supra note 204, at 412.
230. See ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 59, 133(3) (regulating the proceedings under
article 19(3)). According to Hall, those who have the right to submit observations are not lim-
ited to written submissions, "so the Court would be free to permit oral interventions." Hall,
supra note 204, at 411. However, rule 59(3) states, "[tihose receiving the information, as pro-
vided for in sub-rule 1, may make representation in writing to the competent Chamber within
such time as it considers appropriate." ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 59(3). Thus, it is not
clear whether the Court limits such representation to written submissions or may extend this
by allowing also oral observations. Nevertheless, one may suggest that oral observations may
be possible also, since rule 58(2) allows the Court to "hold a hearing" separately or "[i]t may
join the challenge or question to a confirmation or a trial proceeding ... and in this circum-
stance shall hear and decide on the challenge or question first." Id. rule 58(2).
231. ICC Rules, supra note 173, Rule 59(3); see also Lindenmann, supra note 173, at
188.
232. Hall, supra note 204, at 411.
233. In this respect, article 19(5) assures that the general rule (and not the exception) is
that challenges shall be made at the earliest opportunity. According to Bassiouni, the phrase
"at the earliest opportunity" implies that this challenge generally must be made prior to or at
the commencement of trial. Bassiouni, supra note 200, at 20. However, one could argue that
this interpretation does not cover the exceptional circumstances mentioned under article 19(4).
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subsequent to the commencement of the trial. Challenges to the admissi-
bility of a case are limited to the period prior to the start of a trial. They
may be brought at the commencement of a trial or subsequently, on
grounds of ne bis in idem. It seems that the drafters' intention was to nar-
row the possibility of challenges to admissibility at later stages. Prior to
the confirmation of charges, challenges will be directed to the Pre-Trial
Chamber and, afterwards, to the Trial Chamber.3 The rulings of either
Chamber are appealable in accordance with article 82. Article 82(1)(a)
provides that "either party may appeal ... a) A decision with respect to
jurisdiction or admissibility." The term "either party" is not defined and
even the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are silent regarding this issue.
It presumably would include a State making a jurisdictional or admissi-
bility challenge. An examination of the text of articles 19, 56(3), and
82(1)(c), implies that this right is not limited to a State making a
jurisdictional or admissibility challenge. Thus, it might extend to cover a
person under article 19(2)(a) 35 and the Prosecutor as well.236 Further-
more, one assumes that whoever is granted the right to challenge
admissibility should also be granted the right to appeal the resulting de-
cision.
234. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 102-03; see also ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(6);
ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 60 (regulating the procedures to be followed subsequent to
the confirmation of the charges but before the constitution or designation of the Trial Cham-
ber). Rule 60 reads:
[i]f a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of a case is
made after a confirmation of the charges but before the constitution or designation
of the Trial Chamber, it shall be addressed to the Presidency, which shall refer it to
the Trial Chamber as soon as the latter is constituted or designated in accordance
with rule 130.
Id. Rule 130 reads, "[w]hen the Presidency constitutes a Trial Chamber and refers the case to
it, the Presidency shall transmit the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the record of the
proceedings to the Trial Chamber. The Presidency may also refer the case to a previously
constituted Trial Chamber." Id. rule 130.
235. One of the main concerns, which emerged during the drafting process, is to avail an
accused the right to appeal a ruling on admissibility in accordance with article 82. Delegations
who opposed the right to appeal, on an interlocutory basis, a ruling on admissibility, pointed
out that an accused can preserve his or her objection at the trial and maintain it for a later
appeal against any final judgment, pursuant to article 81. See Helen Brady et al., Appeal and
Revision, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra
note 86, at 299, 300.
236. See ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 56(3)(b) (stipulating, "[a] decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under this paragraph may be appealed by the Prose-
cutor"); see also id. art. 82(l)(a), (c) (stipulating, "[e]ither party may appeal any of the
following decisions ... a) A decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility; ...c) A
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under article 56, paragraph 3").
Thus, a literal reading of the two articles in conjunction might lead one to conclude that the
Prosecutor also is authorized to appeal "[a] decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibil-
ity." ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 82(1)(a).
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On the other hand, paragraph 4 also permits the Court "in excep-
tional circumstances" to grant leave for a challenge to be brought more
than once. Such circumstances are not spelled out. Professor Hall argues
that it
would be consistent with judicial economy and with due process
to limit "exceptional circumstances" in a challenge to admissi-
bility to adopt a standard similar to that in Article 84(1)(a) for
revision of convictions or sentences, which would require that
the challenge based on newly discovered information be suffi-
ciently important so that the decision on the ruling on
admissibility would have been different. Given that both the
State and the Court have concurrent jurisdiction over the crimes,
if the Court has determined that a case was admissible, the right
of the accused to a prompt trial would appear to outweigh the
State's interest in trying the case, as a transfer of the case to the
State's court would lead to delay.237
Consequently, the closer a case is to trial the more exceptional the
circumstances would have to be to permit a second challenge to admissi-
bility under article 17(1)(a)(b). It is possible to imagine a situation where
records of a previous trial, in a State where the judicial system has bro-
ken down, were not available-through no fault of the accused-at the
time of the first challenge based on article 17(l)(c).238
Although article 19(4) appears to strengthen the feature of the com-
plementarity regime favoring States by granting any person or a State
referred to under article 19(2) multiple challenges, a thorough reading of
paragraph 4 reflects the opposite. The last part of paragraph 4 restricts
challenges to the admissibility of a case to a situation based on ne bis in
idem. The ne bis in idem provision seems to deal only with the grounds
and timing for challenging the admissibility of a case, and not with the
number of challenges. However, a closer reading of article 19(4) reveals
that in practice it will limit even the number of challenges. For example,
if one challenge is brought prior to trial, the second challenge will
probably not be brought during the same period, but at a later stage-at
the commencement of trial or subsequently "with the leave of the Court."
However, these latter challenges must be article 17(l)(c) or ne bis in
idem challenges. As a result, a State or a person concerned will not bring
multiple challenges to admissibility in this context arbitrarily. This out-
come makes sense, because allowing several challenges based on all the
237. Hall, supra note 204, at 412-13.
238. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(l)(c) (providing that cases are inadmissible when
a second trial was prohibited under article 20(3), except when the first was designed to shield
the person or was not independent or impartial).
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grounds listed in article 17 might delay and obstruct the Court from car-
rying out its duties effectively.
The Statute is unclear as to the meaning of the phrase "may be chal-
lenged only once. 239 Must challenges to admissibility and jurisdiction be
brought at once, meaning together at the same proceeding? Or must ad-
missibility and jurisdiction be challenged in separate proceedings, but
only one time?20 Carden and Sadat drew two conclusions. First, it would
seem necessary to require parties to bring their admissibility challenge at
the same time as their jurisdictional challenge, except on grounds of ne
bis in idem, although it might be necessary to permit jurisdictional chal-
lenges subsequent to the bringing of admissibility challenges, since the
former go to the Court's power over the case. Second, if several States
have the right to bring a challenge and one of those States proceeds to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the case,
the remaining States should not be permitted to bring additional chal-
lenges except on different grounds.24'
However, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence seem to give the
competent chamber flexibility to organize the procedure. Rule 58(2)
provides that the chamber "shall decide on the procedure to be followed"
and "may take appropriate measures for the proper conduct of the pro-
ceedings. [It] may join the challenge or question to a confirmation or a
trial proceedings as long as this does not cause undue delay.' 242 Although
sub-rule 2 is not very clear on the procedure, it is clear that it leaves the
question of a joinder of challenges to the discretion of the Court.24
If a State made a challenge,2" then the Prosecutor must suspend the
investigation until the Court makes its determination in accordance with
article 17.245 But, must the Prosecutor suspend the investigation if either
type of challenge is brought? In this regard, Professor Hall argues that
239. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 19(4).
240. See Newton, supra note 121, at 57 (expressing that "[t]he text is vague as to
whether this means one appeal as to jurisdiction with an additional appeal regarding admissi-
bility, or whether both grounds for removing the case from the ICC authority should be
combined in one appeal"). The author's reference to the word "appeal" in this context meant
challenge.
241. Sadat & Carden, supra note 134, at 420.
242. ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 58(2).
243. For a valuable discussion concerning the problem of joinder, see Lindenmann, su-
pra note 173, at 177.
244. In this context, a State covered by paragraphs 2(b) and (c). ICC Statute, supra note
1, art. 19(2)(b)-(c).
245. Id. art. 19(7); Bergsmo, supra note 130, at 361-62; see also Bassiouni, supra note
200, at 20.
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since article 19(7) makes reference to article 17246 and since the latter
addresses only admissibility, not jurisdiction, therefore, a challenge lim-
ited to jurisdiction would not require the Prosecutor to suspend the
investigation. Any other construction would mean that the Prosecutor
would have to suspend the investigation forever, since the Court would
not be considering the question of admissibility, unless it did so on its
own motion.
247
Pending the ruling on admissibility, the Prosecutor may seek author-
ity to continue the investigation from the Court: if it is necessary to
preserve important evidence and the risk of destruction is high; 48 to
complete a previously begun witness statement; or to prevent the ab-
sconding of persons in respect of whom the Prosecutor has already
requested a warrant of arrest.
2 49
Although article 19(8) expressly authorizes the Prosecutor to seek
these three specified measures, the Prosecutor may have an inherent
right to seek authority from the Court to take additional measures. The
additional measures are necessary to preserve the Court's jurisdiction
and its ability to render a fair decision. Accordingly, nothing in article
19(8) limits the power of the Prosecutor under article 56(1) to inform the
Pre-Trial Chamber whenever she or he "considers an investigation to
present a unique opportunity to take testimony or a statement from a
witness or to examine, collect or test evidence, which may not be avail-
able subsequently for the purposes of a trial. 250
The types of steps identified in article 18(6) are similar to those
listed in article 56(1), but are not identical. Thus, they should be seen as
an independent basis for the Prosecutor-as opposed to the Pre-Trial
Chamber-to act. Furthermore, since article 19(8)(a) speaks of "investi-
gative steps of the kind referred to in article 18, paragraph 6" rather than
246. "If a challenge is made by a State referred to in paragraph 2(b) or (c), the Prosecu-
tor shall suspend the investigation until such time as the Court makes a determination in
accordance with article 17." ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(7).
247. Hall, supra note 204, at 414. It should be noted that challenges by the individual
concerned do not require a Prosecutor to suspend an investigation. This is clear from the text
of paragraph 7, which restricts the suspension of an investigation to".., a State referred to in
paragraph 2(b) or (c)." ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(7).
248. ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 18(6), 19(8)(a). Paragraph (a) of article 19(8) should
be read through the scope of article 18(6), since the latter identifies those "necessary investiga-
tive steps" to be taken as mentioned above.
249. Id. art. 19(8); ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 61; see also Bassiouni, supra note
200, at 20. In this context, the authority granted to the Prosecutor would be limited to persons
for whom an "arrest warrant" has been requested under article 58(1) and does not cover per-
sons for whom the Prosecutor requests only a "summons" to appear. The latter suggests that
the Prosecutor will, as a precautionary measure, often request arrest warrants, ensuring that he
or she can take effective measures during a suspension of investigation if that person ab-
sconds.
250. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 56(1)(a); see also Hall, supra note 204, at 415.
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"the investigative steps" referred to in article 19(8), the steps identified
in article 19(8) should be seen as broader than those in article 18(6). This
broad language, together with the powers identified in article 19(8)(b)
and (c), suggests that the Prosecutor could be authorized to use most of
the powers he or she would have under article 54 and other articles to
continue the investigation. This makes sense, because at this very critical
stage, the possibility that a State will act in bad faith in order to destroy
the evidence increases. This language was introduced to avoid the possi-
bility of a case not being investigated and prosecuted, even though the
Court rules that a case is admissible, because the evidence has been de-
stroyed or hidden.
If the Court deems a case inadmissible, the Prosecutor may appeal to
the Appeals Chamber"' or seek review by the Court, if new facts or evi-
dence arise.52 Neither the challenge of the State concerned nor the
appeal or the Prosecutor's new request for a review of the decision will
affect the validity of any "act performed by the Prosecutor or any order
or warrant issued by the Court prior to the making of the challenge," but
not prior to the request for review.
2 53
Article 19(10) imposes three requirements on the Prosecutor before
she or he may ask the Court to review its decision. It first requires that
251. Id. art. 19(6). The decision of the Trial Chamber or the Pre-Trial Chamber may be
appealed in accordance with article 82(l)(a). See ICC Rules, supra note 174, rules 150(3)-(4),
154(1), (3). Rule 150 stipulates:
1) Subject to sub-rule 2, an appeal against a decision of conviction or acquit-
tal under article 74, a sentence under article 76 or a reparation order under
article 75 may be filed not later than 30 days from the date on which the
party filing the appeal is notified of the decision, the sentence or the repa-
ration order;
2) The Appeals Chamber may extend the time limit set out in sub-rule I, for
good cause, upon the application of the party seeking to file the appeal;
3) The appeal shall be filed with the registrar;
4) If an appeal is not filed as set out in sub-rules I to 3, the decision, the sen-
tence or the reparation order of the Trial Chamber shall become final.
Rule 154 stipulates:
I) An appeal may be filed under article 81, paragraph 3(c)(ii), or article 82,
paragraph I (a) or (b), not later than five days from the date upon which
the party filing the appeal is notified of the decision ....
3) Rule 150, sub-rules 3 and 4, shall apply to appeals filed under sub-rules 1
and 2 of this rule.
252. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(10); see also ICC Rules, supra note 174, rule 62
(providing that the Prosecutor should make his or her request before the chamber which made
the latest ruling on admissibility). Furthermore, sub-rule 2 grants the State or States, which
challenged the admissibility under article 19(2) to make representations and to be notified of
the request of the Prosecutor. Id. rule 62(2).
253. Obviously, a request submitted by the Prosecutor for a review should not affect any
act taken by the Prosecutor prior to the challenge of the State concerned.
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"new facts have arisen." This phrase includes new facts that have oc-
cuffed since the decision.254 However, it also includes facts in existence
at the time of the decision, but not discovered by the Prosecutor until
after the decision was reached. Another requirement is that these facts
must "negate the basis on which the case had been previously found in-
admissible." This appears to be a highly objective criterion left to the
Court's assessment. Finally, the Prosecutor must be "fully satisfied" that
the other two requirements have been met. This requirement is a very
subjective test, which the Prosecutor can apply with wide discretion.
In the absence of paragraph 10, the Prosecutor would have been able
to seek a new ruling on the question of admissibility pursuant to para-
graph 3. There is no express provision in paragraph 10 allowing the
Prosecutor to seek review of a determination that there was no jurisdic-
tion in a case. Therefore, in the event that new information was
discovered after such a determination, the Prosecutor should be able to
seek a new ruling on the question of jurisdiction.pursuant to paragraph 3,
which does not restrict the time or number of such requests. Without this
provision, States which concealed evidence could frustrate the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction.255
Finally, article 19(10) is not clear whether such a request for review
is an extra right granted to the Prosecutor in addition to the right to an
appeal under paragraph 6. If the answer is yes, when can the Prosecutor
exercise this right prior to or subsequent to the appeal? Moreover, the
first sentence of paragraph 10 reads: "If the Court has decided that a case
is inadmissible under article 17, the Prosecutor may submit a request for
a review of the decision." The text is silent as to whether this decision is
the outcome of proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial
Chamber or the Appeals Chamber. These questions are not answered in
the Statute or even in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
If this decision were the outcome of proceedings of the Appeals
Chamber, the conclusion would be different than if it were the outcome
of proceedings of the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Trial Chamber. Arguably,
the right for a review should not be mixed with the right for appeal, since
the Appeals Chamber is not authorized to rule on situations where "new
facts have arisen."256 Accordingly, if the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Trial
Chamber decided that "a case is inadmissible under article 17," the
Prosecutor could appeal this decision. If, pending a ruling by the Ap-
peals Chamber, "new facts ... arise which negate the basis on which the
254. This interpretation would be consistent with the approach taken with respect to re-
views of convictions and sentences under article 84(1). ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 84(1).
255. See generally Hall, supra note 204, at 417.
256. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 221.
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case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17," the
Prosecutor then submits a request for a review of the decision "to the
Chamber that made the latest ruling on admissibility." Thus, the Prosecu-
tor could submit a request for review, even while the appeal is pending,
since the appeal and the request for review are two separate and inde-
pendent procedures.257 Inevitably, in this situation, the Prosecutor could
also submit a request for review subsequent to a decision by the Appeals
Chamber, if new facts have arisen.
The practical application of the latter example would contradict the
view, namely, that the Appeals Chamber should not rule on situations
where new facts have arisen. According to rule 62(1), "if the Prosecutor
makes a request under article 19, paragraph 10, he or she shall make the
request to the Chamber that made the latest ruling on admissibility."
Thus, it could be argued that rule 62(1) suggests that it is possible that
the Appeals Chamber should not rule on a request based on the emer-
gence of new facts. Inevitably, this leads to confusion. Professor William
Schabas argues that this interpretation prevails. He predicts that the
Court will follow the common law approach, and thus the Appeals
Chamber will be precluded from ruling on situations such as that men-
tioned under paragraph 10. He further assumes that the wording of rule
62(1) obviously targets the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Trial Chamber as
opposed to the Appeals Chamber.
Nevertheless, one might suggest that the appropriate construction of
these procedures will depend on the type of jurisprudence, common law
or continental law, which will be adopted by the Court once it starts
functioning. In other words, according to Professor Schabas's interpreta-
tion, it is assumed that the Court would follow the common law
approach, which denies the Appeals Chamber the right to rule on situa-
tions where new facts have arisen. According to another interpretation, it
is assumed that the Court would follow the continental law approach,
which provides the Appeals Chamber with a wider discretion in this re-
gard. Thus, the latter could deal with the entire situation. Consequently,
the mechanism to be followed in the interpretation of the Statute will
depend on the type of legal system-continental or common law-that
will be followed.
257. According to Professor Schabas, if the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible
in accordance with article 19(10), the Prosecutor could file an appeal, and if the following day
new facts have arisen in accordance with paragraph 10, he or she could request a review. Id.
According to rule 62, a request for a review of the decision should be submitted "to the
Chamber that made the latest ruling on admissibility." ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 62.
Thus, the request could be made to the Trial Chamber which ruled on the first decision or the
Appeals Chamber if at the time the request was submitted, it has decided on the appeal.
258. Interview with William Schabas, supra note 221.
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If the Prosecutor follows the criteria in article 17 and decides that the
case is inadmissible, she or he may defer the investigation to the State
with jurisdiction. According to article 19(11), the Prosecutor may request
"information on the proceedings" from the relevant State. Hall argues
that the scope of information that can be requested under paragraph 11
appears to be broader than the information, which can be requested un-
der article 18(5). Under article 18(5), the Prosecutor can request
information concerning "the progress of the State's investigations and
any subsequent prosecutions." 259 However, under article 19(11) the
Prosecutor would be seeking information concerning an individual case
rather than a situation. It can be argued that, although it is true that the
information requested at this stage concerns an individual case rather
than a situation-and this makes the circumstances more critical-
nevertheless this does not necessarily support the conclusion that article
19(11) is broader than article 18(5) because the scope and amount of
information varies from one case to another. Moreover, it could happen
that the scope of information required with regard to a situation might be
greater than the scope of information regarding an individual case.
Furthermore, a literal reading of the wording of both paragraphs,
suggests that the content of article 18(5) is broader than that of article
19(11). Article 18(5) permits the Prosecutor who has deferred an investi-
gation to request the State concerned to "periodically inform" on "the
progress of its investigations and any subsequent prosecutions." Under
article 19(11), the Prosecutor may ask the State concerned to "make
available ... information on the proceedings." Thus, the strict language
of paragraph 5, which reflects the obligation of the State concerned to
inform the Prosecutor periodically, suggests that article 19(11) is not
broader than article 18(5). In addition, paragraph 5 imposes a duty upon
State parties to respond to such "requests without undue delay," while
paragraph 11 lacks this obligation.
Those arguing that article 19(11) is broader than article 18(5) do not
believe that the lack of a requirement to act without undue delay is deci-
sive to this interpretation. They point out that the State Party required to
respond to the Prosecutor's request is already under the obligation to act
without delay. Article 86 of the ICC Statute places this duty upon all
States Party to the ICC. However, the strict requirements of paragraph 5,
place an obligation on the State in question to inform the Prosecutor pe-
riodically of the status of the State's actions.26°
259. Hall, supra note 204, at 418.
260. Newton, supra note 121, at 58, 59; see also ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 86
(stipulating "States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, co-operate
fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court").
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The Prosecutor, at the request of the investigating State, has a duty to
keep confidential the information collected. This is done so that the
State's investigation is not undermined by the release of sensitive infor-
mation, such as sealed indictments. Moreover, the Prosecutor has a duty
to inform the investigating State if she or he resumes the investigation.
Paragraph 11, unlike article 18(3), lacks requirements or guidelines that
the Prosecutor must follow when proceeding with an investigation after
she or he has deferred the investigation to a State in accordance with
paragraph 11. In this respect only, one could suggest that paragraph 11 is
wide enough to cover all possible situations, including that of article
18(3), in order to assist the Prosecutor to pursue the investigation, if the
situation thereafter so required. The language in 19(11), "if the Prosecu-
tor thereafter decides to proceed with an investigation," reflects a wide
discretionary power to intervene at any time according to his or her as-
sessment. 6 '
The provisions of articles 18 and 19 reflect the severe tension be-
tween the powers of the Prosecutor, and the priority of States in the
complementarity regime. The text of article 19(4) fortifies the latter fea-
ture, while the text of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 11 reinforce the former.
Although giving States multiple chances to assert jurisdiction over cases
through some of the provisions of articles 18 and 19 strengthens the first
feature of complementarity (State primacy) other portions of the same
articles favor the Court and the second feature of complementarity (the
Court's supremacy). Once the Court comes into operation, these
conflicting provisions that reflect the tension between the two features of
complementarity will be resolved either in favor of the Court or in favor
of States. If the latter prevails, one could emphasize that the idea behind
creating a Court based on the notion of complementarity has succeeded.
In the case of the former, it could be accentuated that the ICC has suc-
ceeded in becoming a supranational institution provided with implied
primacy, which, although not reflected in its Statute, is reflected in its
practices.
III. THE Ne bis in idem PRINCIPLE
The principle of ne bis in idem is a corollary of the principle of
complementarity reflected in article 17, which likewise prevents the
Court from asserting jurisdiction when a competent national legal sys-
261. It is argued that paragraph 11 appears to address a voluntary deferral by the Prose-
cutor of an investigation based on an assessment that the factors listed in article 17 exist,
rather than a deferral pursuant to article 18(2) or a suspension of an investigation pursuant to
article 19(7) after an admissibility challenge.
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tem has already accepted jurisdiction.262 While article 17 covers investi-
gations and prosecutions, article 20, covers cases that have already been
tried. Article 20(3) sets out the standards for assessing whether a domes-
tic adjudication of a case makes it inadmissible before the ICC.
The discussions over the principle of ne bis in idem in Rome came in
the wake of the hard fought compromises on the complementarity provi-
sions related to national investigations or ongoing prosecutions. In
contrast to the parallel "unwilling or unable genuinely" standards appli-
cable to investigations or ongoing prosecutions by States, the provisions
of completed trials only amplify the "unwilling" criterion. The appropri-
ate domestic courts were obviously able to handle a trial that was in fact
completed. The ne bis in idem standards applicable to domestic trials
focus on domestic systems that have used the faqade of legal proceed-
ings to frustrate the ends of justice.263
When a domestic justice system has already tried a case, the com-
plementarity mechanism, reflected in the ne bis in idem article, points to
a test of whether the national trial proceedings were legitimate. Thus, the
judgment bars a prosecution by the Court except in the case of sham
proceedings.'6 These are defined as trials held
(a) ... for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially
... and were conducted in a manner which, in the circum-
stances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
265
concerned to justice.
This test may appear simple, but applying the criteria of this test in light
of article 20(3) is extremely complex.
262. Bassiouni, supra note 200, at 20.
263. Newton, supra note 121, at 58-59. For a detailed discussion regarding the concept
and application of the principle of ne bis in idem, see Mohamed El Zeidy, The Doctrine of
Double Jeopardy in International Criminal & Human Rights Law, 6 MEDITERRANEAN J.
HUM. RTS. 183 (2002).
264. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 69.
265. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3). Two examples cover paragraph 3. The first ex-
ample occurs when a State charges a perpetrator of genocide with assault. Such a trial,
although respecting all the safeguards concerning impartiality, would be aimed at shielding the
person from responsibility for an extremely serious crime. The second example occurs in a
broader spectrum of situations. It does not mean, however, that the ICC will have the power to
intervene in every case where it judges that a procedural safeguard was violated in a trial con-
ducted by a national authority. In order for the ICC to begin a new trial, the violation of
procedural safeguards must have been committed with the aim of preventing the person con-
cemed from being brought to justice. DANIEL PREFONTAINE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: MANUAL FOR THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROME
STATUTE 85-86 (2000).
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Paragraph 3, which is the most complicated and controversial part of
article 20, reflects the entire array of procedural and substantive provi-
sions relevant for implementing complementarity. Thus, an individual,
who has been tried by a national court for conduct "also proscribed un-
der article 6, 7, or 8" shall not "be tried by the Court with respect to the
same conduct." The inclusion of this language was the outcome of com-
promises among different proposals submitted during the drafting
process.266 At the 1998 PrepCom, a proposal was submitted, which sub-
stituted the following language: "A person who has been tried by another
court for conduct constituting a crime referred to in article 5.' ' 267 This
proposal was rejected on the ground that a conduct could constitute a
crime only if a court has determined that the conduct is a crime. This
would not be logical in the case of an acquittal. The Chairman proposed
reintroducing the language of the ILC Draft Statute, "acts constituting a
crime of the kind referred to in Article 42(2)" but it was also rejected.268
Even the reference to the word "offence" was not adopted. Conse-
quently, the compromise proposal, "conduct also proscribed," was
adopted. However, the latter term seems to be unclear and might lead to
different interpretations in practice.
According to Immi Tallgren, this phrase should be understood
broadly. Thus, if a national trial of the conduct has taken place for the
conduct falling under the ICC's jurisdiction, the ICC shall not try the
person again for that conduct. The categorization used in the national
trial-that is, whether it relied on definitions of international crimes or
crimes under national law (for example, murder of several persons)-is
basically not relevant.169 Nevertheless, the text of paragraph 3 is not easy
to understand. There are at least two possible interpretations of para-
graph 3, which would result in different outcomes when applied.
266. While several proposals were made to change the article on ne bis in idem at the
Rome Conference, only two amendments were eventually included in the final package fol-
lowing bilateral consultations conducted by the coordinator. The first change made was a
technical one, in the chapeau of paragraph 3, with the phrase "with respect to the same con-
duct." The addition clarified that the Court could try someone even if that person had already
been tried in a national court, as long as different conduct was the subject of the second prose-
cution. The second change added the same phrase as appears in the article regarding
admissibility to make the criteria more objective-namely, the phrase "in accordance with the
norms of due process recognized by international law." Since this phrase had been accepted
for admissibility, it was believed that it should be made applicable for ne bis in idem. Holmes,
supra note 86, at 59.
267. Immi Tallgren, Article 20: Ne bis in idem, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STAT-
UTE, supra note 25, at 419, 430.
268. Id.; see also Holmes, supra note 86, at 56-57. For a thorough discussion on the
negotiating history, see generally, id. at 56-60.
269. Tallgren, supra note 267, at 431.
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First, the chapeau of paragraph 3 stipulates that "[n]o person who
has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article
6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct."
Let us take article 7 as an example. According to the first interpretation
the chapeau refers to any of the acts listed under article 7. If any of those
acts were committed by a person, who has already been tried once in a
domestic jurisdiction, the ICC is barred from trying that person again for
the same act or conduct. 70 For example, article 7(1)(a) refers to murder.
Thus, according to this construction, if the national court tried the person
for the conduct also proscribed under article 7, here murder, the ICC is
barred from trying him, even though the murder was considered an ordi-
nary crime.
According to a second construction, based on the same example, the
phrase "conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8" is the key to the
interpretation. Thus in order to become conduct proscribed under articles
6, 7, or 8, such conduct or act should meet the specific requirements
listed in those articles. Looking again at article 7(a), the murder must be
"part of a wide spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack."27' Hence, according to this
construction, one may conclude that the drafters intended to refer to
crimes against humanity, and not to murder as an ordinary crime. Thus,
according to this interpretation, the ICC is therefore barred from trying
the person who has previously been tried by a competent national court
for a crime against humanity. However, if this is the appropiate interpre-
tation then why did the drafters not make reference to the term used in
paragraph 2: "for a crime referred to in article 5",?272
This is unclear and confusing. 73 To counter the argument above, one
could argue that the difference of formulation between paragraphs 2 and
3 in this respect suggests that the drafters could not have made reference
to the term "for a crime referred to in article 5" in paragraph 3, since the
crime of aggression in article 5(1)(d) is not defined yet. Furthermore, the
drafters intended for paragraph 3 to have the same meaning and purpose
as paragraph 2, namely, the crimes set out in article 5. However, they
wanted to widen the interpretation of paragraph 3 to cover the specific
270. According to Bassiouni, the term "same conduct" means: a) identical acts; b) a se-
ries of acts related to each other by the scheme or intent of the actor; or c) multiple acts
committed at more than one place and at different times, but related by the actor's criminal
design. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 223, at 602.
271. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
272. id. art. 7(2).
273. Even the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are silent with regard to article 20. The
only rule that exists is rule 168, which deals with ne bis in idem, albeit in the different context
of article 70 (offences against the administration of justice). ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule
168.
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acts listed under articles 6, 7, and 8 by using the term "conduct." It was
not therefore possible to identify the acts of aggression because they
were not defined yet. There is another reason the drafters did not make
reference to the phrase "a crime referred to in article 5" in paragraph 3.
The drafters intended to make reference to the list of acts set out in arti-
cles 6, 7 and 8, in order to limit the subjectivity of the Prosecutor's
assessment of whether the crime in question, which was subject to a pre-
vious trial by a national court, lies within the Court's jurisdiction.274
Professor William Schabas reaches a similar interpretation. He as-
serts that there
is some doubt about the application of complementarity and the
ne bis in idem principle to situations where an individual has al-
ready been tried by a national justice system, but for a crime
under ordinary criminal law such as murder, rather than for the
truly international offences of genocide, crimes against human-
ity and war crimes. It will be argued that trial for an underlying
offence tends to trivialize the crime and contribute to revision-
ism or negationism. Many who violate human rights may be
willing to accept the fact that they have committed murder or as-
sault, but will refuse to admit the more grievous crimes of
genocide or crimes against humanity. Yet murder is a very seri-
ous crime in all justice systems and is generally sanctioned by
the most severe penalties. Article 20(3) seems to suggest this,
when it declares that such subsequent proceedings before the In-
ternational Criminal Court when there has already been a trial
"for conduct also proscribed under Articles 6, 7 and 8" is prohib-
ited. In the alternative, the Statute ought to have said, "for a
crime referred to in Article 5", as it does in Article 20(2).275
Nevertheless, the second argument is the appropriate one because it
reflects the main purpose of the ICC, that of trying persons committing
crimes within its jurisdiction if national courts fail to do so. Reading ar-
ticle 20(3)(a) in conjunction with article 22(1) further supports this
conclusion. Article 20(3)(a) refers to crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. Accordingly, the ICC Statute grants the Court jurisdiction only
over the four crimes listed under article 5, and not over ordinary crimes.
274. For example, under article 5, the Prosecutor could argue that the crime which was
the subject of a previous trial before the national court is not a crime against humanity, and, as
a result, the person should be tried before the ICC. In a case using the term "conduct pro-
scribed under article 6, 7 or 8," however, the situation would be different because every act
that might build or create a crime against humanity would be identified. Thus, the Prosecutor
would not enjoy the broad subjective criterion in his assessment.
275. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 70.
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Article 22(1) also stipulates: "A person shall not be criminally responsi-
ble under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the
time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court." Because
articles 5 and 7 of the Statute do not cover murder as an ordinary crime,
the Court would not be empowered to exercise its jurisdiction over such
a crime.
It seems that paragraph 3 was formulated in such a complex way be-
cause States vigorously defended their rights under complementarity.
Although there is some doubt that the drafters intended this complexity;
nevertheless, the final package reflected it.
It should be noted, however, that paragraph 3 gives rise to other
problems of interpretation. The Court is barred from trying any person
who has been tried by a national court with respect to the same conduct
"unless the proceedings in the other court" were a sham and meet the
requirements of subparagraphs (a) and/or (b). 6 What is meant by the
term "proceedings" in this context? Is it the proceedings of only the trial
stage? Or does the term reflect the early intention of the drafters when
they were preparing what eventually became article 17, that the term
"proceedings" should mean the process of investigation and prosecu-
tion. 7 The text is vague and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are
silent in this respect.
Let us apply the term according to both ways of interpretation in or-
der to observe the different conclusions. If the term "proceedings" is to
be construed as limited to the trial stage only, then any procedural aspect
of the trial which affects its outcome negatively, could allow the ICC to
intervene and try the accused subsequent to his trial in a national court.
The practical implementation of this article presents a serious problem.
For example, the trial stage proceedings could have been perfect, but the
investigation or the prosecution was not conducted independently or im-
partially, or was done for the purpose of shielding the person concerned.
What would be the situation if this were not discovered until the trial
before the domestic court was completed? In other words, there could be
a situation where the investigation or prosecution stages were not con-
ducted properly, the trial proceedings were conducted in bona fide
276. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3)(a),(b).
277. Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting in Zutphen, supra note 115, at 43.
278. The problem is that no specific rules were proposed, and none were adopted for a
number of articles in part 2, including the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as they
were considered extensively in the context of the elaboration of the "Elements of Crime." ICC
Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5-10, 16, 20, 21. For a general valuable discussion concerning the
drafting history of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence regarding jurisdiction and admissibil-
ity, see generally John T. Holmes, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 321-48
(Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001).
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manner, but the outcome of the trial would not be just since it would be
based on false evidence. According to the above construction of the term
"proceedings," in this situation the Court would be barred from trying
that person, since "proceedings" does not cover the investigation or the
entire prosecution, but only the trial stage. However, one could argue
that the Prosecutor has other options available at this point. Under article
19(10), if the Court has earlier found the case to be inadmissible, the
Prosecutor may seek a review based on the new facts, which "negate the
basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible. '" 79 The
new facts could be facts not previously discovered, or they could be facts
exposing the investigation and prosecution as a sham. Hence, the Court
may have another chance to try that person. The State concerned also has
a chance to defend itself and "shall be given a time limit within which to
make representation."' 80 In its defense the State could argue, based on
article 20(3), that the person has been already tried before its courts and
the trial proceedings were bona fide, according to the strict construction
of the term. Therefore the ICC would be barred from retrying that person
despite the sham investigation or prosecution. 8
This outcome is far from hypothetical. Still, this situation might not
always convince the Court. The Court may rely on the general rule,
which says that what is based on falsehood must be void, and extend the
word proceeding to cover sham investigations or prosecutions. Thus,
since the evidence submitted to the national court was the outcome of
improper investigation and prosecution, therefore, the trial is void.
Moreover, the Court could also argue that if it followed this strict con-
struction, there would be a great risk of hindering and defeating the main
purpose of the ICC. It seems that the theoretical application of the Stat-
ute and its practical application will be different.
On the other hand, if the term "proceedings" were to be construed
within the same frame and meaning of article 17, i.e., investigation and
279. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(10).
280. ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 62(2).
281. Id. rule 181. Although article 19 seems to limit to the accused the right of bringing
a challenge based on ne bis in idem, rule 181, on the other hand appears to leave room for the
State concerned to act in favor of the accused in this respect. Rule 181 stipulates:
When a situation described in article 89, paragraph 2, arises, and without prejudice
to the provisions of article 19 and of rules 58 to 62 on procedures applicable to
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case, the Cham-
ber dealing with the case, if the admissibility ruling is still pending, shall take steps
to obtain from the requested State all the relevant information about the ne bis in
idem challenge brought by the person.
Id. However, since rule 181 is concerned with pending admissibility challenges, one might
wonder whether the rule covers situations where the Court decided that a case is inadmissible,
and the Prosecutor requested a review based on new facts.
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prosecution, the conclusion would be different. A literal reading of the
chapeau of article 20(3) suggests that the term "proceedings" according
to this construction, would not fit with the rest of this paragraph because
of the phrase "in the other court." Thus, it is hardly imaginable that the
paragraph refers only to investigation or prosecutions as the phrase "in
the other court" seems to emphasize that what is in fact meant by "pro-
ceedings" is the procedures taken during the trial. Nevertheless, from an
analytical standpoint and according to the main purpose of the ICC one
could suggest that the practical construction of the term "proceedings"
should take into account the situation as a whole. Thus, the Court might
examine the genuineness of the investigation, of the prosecution, and of
the trial. Any other construction might lead to a complete blocking of the
Court's jurisdiction. It seems that the drafters of paragraph 3 intended a
very strong first feature of the complementarity regime, favoring national
sovereignty. Its formulation and the different scopes of its interpretation
suggest this. The gaps resulting from the different interpretations empower
States to build strong arguments that might lead the Court to determine
that a case is inadmissible.
Finally, there is another problem that might lead to misinterpretation.
Paragraph 3 is silent with respect to whether the national court should
reach a decision. If it must, what kind of decision is required? Is a ver-
dict needed, or does it refer to a decision reached before then; for
example, to dismiss because of insufficient evidence? Is the decision of
the court of first instance sufficient? Or should the decision be final, that
is, not appealable? These questions are not clearly answered in the Stat-
ute, or in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
According to Immi Tallgren, a "[n]ational decision not to proceed be-
cause of insufficient evidence or because prosecution would not serve the
interest of justice would suffice. A national decision, not amounting to a
conviction or acquittal, must be subject to the same criteria, the negligence
of which lead to the application of the exception. 282 In a common law ju-
risdiction, the decision to dismiss could be made during the trial stage by
either the judge or the prosecutor (with the judge's consent). In a continen-
tal law jurisdiction (e.g., France or Egypt) this decision could not happen
during the trial because neither the prosecutor nor the judge is authorized
to dismiss a case during the trial stage. The prosecutor can only dismiss
the case after his or her prosecution and prior to the trial stage,283 while
the only possibility for the judge is to render a decision on the merits,
282. Tallgren, supra note 267, at 431.
283. This is the case in Egypt. In felony cases, I, as the prosecutor, have the authority to
dismiss a case until I submit the indictment to the court. Once the case is in the court's posses-
sion, I cannot take that kind of action. Once in the court's possession, it must rule on the case
and issue a ruling of acquittal or conviction, but it cannot dismiss it for insufficient evidence.
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either an acquittal or a conviction. It is uncertain whether the ICC will
follow the continental or the common law approach, since the Statute is
a combination of both.
In this situation the answer is simple. The Court should apply both
systems depending on what jurisdiction the case comes from. In other
words, if the Court is dealing with a case from a common law jurisdic-
tion, then it will follow the common law approach. If the case originates
in a State with continental law, the Court should apply the continental
law procedure. If the Court followed the common law approach, then the
aforementioned construction would seem to run counter to the wording
of the chapeau of paragraph 3, since the latter speaks about completed
trials: "No person who has been tried by another court.... ." However,
one might counter that if what is meant is a decision amounting to an
acquittal or conviction, then why is paragraph 3 formulated differently
than paragraph 2, which requires the person "has already been convicted
or acquitted by the Court"? Could a completed trial be named so, with-
out a court reaching a decision to acquit or convict?
Professor Bassiouni seems to suggest an answer to this question. He
uses a different construction than the one previously mentioned. He ar-
gues that "[a]n individual, who has been either previously acquitted or
convicted by a national court for conduct that formed the basis of crimes
under the Statute, may not be prosecuted by the Court," unless the pro-
ceedings met the requirements of article 20(3)(a) and/or (b)."' It seems
that he ignored the previously mentioned possibility that might arise
from applying the common law approach.2"5 His current interpretation is
appropriate, but only when dealing with continental law cases.
Moreover must a national court's decision-either an acquital or a
conviction-be a final one?286 Although this seems vague according to
Bassiouni's construction there are at least two answers based on two dif-
ferent legal arguments. First, it might be suggested that the outcome of
the national court should be final. This argument looks at article 20(1)
284. Id. According to Bassiouni's argument, a decision must be either an acquittal or a
conviction.
285. However, Bassiouni's argument could work when applying the common law ap-
proach if a dismissal is considered to be the equivalent of an acquittal.
286. See, e.g., Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting in Zutphen, supra note 115, at 47. In
the proposal, the drafters made reference to final decisions rendered from national courts as
follows:
Any person(s) mentioned in the submission to the Court have already been acquit-
ted or convicted by a final rule in a State for the acts involved unless the decision
failed to take account of all facts contained in the submission or the proceedings
were conducted in the State concerned by evading the rule of international law for
the manifest purpose of revealing the persons concerned of criminal responsibility.
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and (2), which anticipated final decisions. It presumes that the drafters
had the same intent, evidenced in earlier proposals 2 ' about the entire
article, notwithstanding the fact that the finality in paragraphs 1 and 2
refers to the ICC's outcomes.
A second answer holds that in the case where a decision is the out-
come of a national court, it is not necessary to reach a final judgment.
There could be situations where the Court demands to intervene and
waiting for a final decision prevents the Court from acting expedi-
tiously.288 However, it could be argued that norms of due process require
finality, since this would be a guarantee in favor of the accused.
In conclusion, article 20(3) seems to set standards preserving the
right of States to complementarity notwithstanding the obstacles that
might arise when paragraph 3 and its different possible interpretations
will be implemented. However, one might suggest, as mentioned previ-
ously, that the Court's interpretation of the article should consider the
type of legal system with which it is dealing. Thus, paragraph 3 could be
understood in two different ways depending on the legal system from
287. "As regards article 42, the remark was made that the principle of non bis in idem
... should apply only to res judicata and not to proceedings discontinued for technical rea-
sons." 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 1, supra note 87, 170; see also Report of the Inter-
Sessional Meeting in Zutphen, supra note 115 (drafters' proposal).
288. In this situation, the Prosecutor would act either according to article 19(3) or (10),
and in both situations, the Court will hold a hearing to determine the admissibility of the case
concerned. However, the problem lies within the aforementioned constructions concerning
finality. If the requirement is that the national decision should be final, then the Court might
face the problem of ruling on the admissibility of the case, since the person concerned might
argue that he or she has not been tried except before the court of first instance. Article 89(2)
permits the person arrested to bring a challenge before the national court on the basis of ne bis
in idem. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 89(2). The national court does not, however, have the
power to rule upon this. In fact, the Statute requires the requested State to immediately consult
the Court in order to determine whether or not it has already ruled thereon. If the Court has
decided that the case is admissible, the State must proceed with the execution of the request,
or in other words, surrender of the person in question. If, however, an admissibility ruling is
pending before the Court, the requested State may postpone surrender. Accordingly, the ICC
would be coerced to postpone its ruling until the judgment in the national court is final, and
the State may postpone his or her surrender of the person until that time (this is very risky,
since the person could flee). Thus, the whole situation is very dangerous, despite the authority
of the Prosecutor to act in accordance with article 19(8) to preserve evidence.
It should be noted, however, that article 89(2) does not grant the requested State the right
to raise the ne bis in idem plea before the Court. Although this seems strange, article 19(2)(b)
suggests the same conclusion, as it limits the challenge to the admissibility of a case to pend-
ing investigations and prosecutions or completed investigations and prosecutions. Thus, trials
are excluded.
On the other hand, if a decision of first instance is sufficient, this might solve the former
problem, but might run counter to the accused's rights regarding the judicial guarantees or
norms of due process. For a thorough discussion concerning ne bis in idem and surrender, see
Dino Rinoldi et al., International Co-operation and Judicial Assistance between the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and States Parties, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 16, at 348-51.
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where a case originates. This seems to be the most appropriate construc-
tion.
On the other hand, the Prosecutor will face a very hard test in inter-
preting and assessing the requirements of paragraph 3, especially those
of subparagraph (b). It places the burden of proof on the Prosecutor to
determine that the proceedings "were not conducted independently or
impartially ... and were conducted in a manner which, in the circum-
stance, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice." '289
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE
PROBLEM OF AMNESTIES AND PARDONS
An unresolved but controversial issue related to jurisdiction and ad-
missibility is the question of amnesties and pardons that States from time
to time grant to perpetrators of the crimes within the Court's mandate.29 0
Does the grant of an amnesty or pardon to an accused person appearing
before the ICC render a case inadmissible? While no specific language
in the ICC Statute deals with amnesties and pardons, they could be dealt
with by applying the complementarity provisions.
A possible answer to the above question argues that for a case to be
inadmissible, it ought, at least, to have been investigated. Thus, the
granting of blanket amnesties to persons who are otherwise amenable to
ICC jurisdiction without a prior investigation and careful delving into the
merits of their case is prima facie evidence of unwillingness or inability
of the State concerned to prosecute.9 While this first construction makes
sense, a careful perusal of the Statute and a strict interpretation might
suggest the opposite and lead to a different conclusion.
289. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3)(b).
290. For a good discussion regarding the technical differences between the two terms
"amnesty" and "pardon," see Luc Huyse, To Punish or To Pardon: A Devil's Choice, in REIN-
ING IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIRACUSA CONFERENCE 17-21 SEPTEMBER 1998, at
79, 79-80 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998). In this respect, Huyse defines amnesty granted by
the executive or the legislator in the following words:
Amnesty ... means that the punishability of certain acts is removed; amnesty thus
abrogates crime and punishment; it can be used to foreclose prosecutions, but also
to cancel sanctions that have already been imposed. Pardon is, according to
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, an "executive action that mitigates or sets aside pun-
ishment for a crime." The DICTIONARY adds, "the distinction between amnesty and
pardon is one rather of philological interest than of legal importance." Thus, impu-
nity (or immunity) is a defacto situation, which is the result of amnesty or pardon.
Id. at 80 n.2.
291. Daniel Nsereko, The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related Is-
sues, 10 CRIM. L.F. 87, 119 (1999).
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Article 17 stipulates that the "Court shall determine that a case is in-
admissible where [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling and un-
able genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."29 2 Thus, if
the State is unwilling, the Court shall determine that the case is admissi-
ble. In order to reach a decision about "unwillingness," the Court or the
Prosecutor must check whether the State meets the specific criteria listed
in article 17(2). Here, a problem arises because these criteria are limited
to situations where investigations or prosecutions have already begun.
Accordingly, it seems difficult to conclude that a State is "unwilling" in
such a situation. In order to determine unwillingness, the Court
shall consider ... whether one or more of the following exist, as
applicable: a) Proceedings were or are being undertaken or the
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the per-
son; b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings
which in the circumstances is consistent with an intent to bring
the person concerned to justice; c) The proceedings were not or
are not being conducted independently or impartially .... 293
Thus, from a literal reading of the above quoted text, one could con-
clude that the criteria to determine unwillingness comes into play only at
the commencement of an investigation and not prior to an investigation.
Moreover, this method of construing the article may be supported by
referring to the second part of article 17(1)(a), which stipulates: "unless
the State is unwilling." Thus, a case would be admissible when the State
is unwilling, and in order to decide that a State is unwilling, the Court
must apply the exhaustive criteria set under paragraph 2, and should not
extend them by analogizing. This strict construction, might lead to the
conclusion that granting an amnesty prior to an investigation would
block the Court's jurisdiction and would render the case inadmissible,
especially since the Statute does not prohibit granting amnesties through
any specific provision. The travaux preparatoires reveal the drafters'
intent concerning this issue.
At the Rome Conference, the bilateral consultations on the proposal
regarding amnesties, pardons, parole or commutation of the sentence
were not very successful. Among a wide range of delegations the resis-
tance to the inclusion of such an article remained strong. Delegations
continued to argue that the Statute should not permit the Court to inter-
cede in the administrative (parole) or political decision-making process
(pardons, amnesties) of a State. However, other delegations argued that
292. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a).
293. Id. art. 17(2)(a)-(c).
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the proposal was not absolutely necessary, as the provisions on admissi-
bility could give the Court sufficient breadth to examine cases of pardons
or amnesties made in bad faith. Consequently, the proposal was not in-
cluded in the final package.29 It seems that the latter view, that the
proposal was unnecessary, coincides with the first interpretation of arti-
cle 17.
Despite the possibility, discussed above, of construing article 17 in a
strict manner, the first construction seems to reflect the main purpose
and target of the ICC. The Court was created to guarantee that those who
commit the heinous crimes mentioned in the Statute must not go unpun-
ished. Thus, a State granting an amnesty without even commencing an
investigation allows a primafacie determination that the State is preclud-
ing that person from facing criminal responsibility. Moreover, if article
17 is to be read in a broader manner, one could conclude that paragraph
1(a) may be understood that the Court "shall determine that a case is in-
admissible where ... [t]he case is being investigated ... by a State."
This implies that if a State did not conduct an investigation, the case is
admissible, because it reflects the State's bad intention and/or unwilling-
ness. This seems to meet the aforementioned interpretation, which is the
first construction. Based on the foregoing, one could conclude that the
problem appears from the formulation of article 17 itself and the exclu-
sion of any reference in the Statute governing amnesties.
On the other hand, the situation is different if the State has investi-
gated the case and, in its sovereign wisdom, decided not to prosecute the
persons concerned because they had been granted amnesty. It appears
that the ICC may differentiate between good faith and bad faith amnes-
ties.9 Thus, both the Prosecutor and the Court could examine and assess
the State's decision not to prosecute in light of article 17. According to
Daniel Nsereko, in such a situation, the State concerned
does not have to disclose the reasons for declining to prosecute.
But if it does, and says that it has done so in the interests of
peace and national reconciliation, the Court will have to listen
sympathetically. It should not dismiss out of hand the State's ef-
forts at national reconciliation as unwillingness or inability to
294. Holmes, supra note 86, at 59-60; see also John T. Holmes, Complementarity: Na-
tional Courts Versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 678 (Antonio Cassese et a]. eds., 2002).
295. However, according to Professor Schabas it is very difficult to provide a set of crite-
ria for determining good faith amnesties. William Schabas, Statement Made During the ICC
Summer Course held at the National University of Ireland, Galway, Ir. (July 30, 2001).
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prosecute. Peace and national reconciliation are legitimate goals
296for any country to pursue.
Yet, it could be argued that following this trend is a de facto legiti-
mization of impunity. The State could shield the perpetrators from
criminal responsibility under the umbrella of national reconciliation.
A related problem arose during the drafting of the Statute. There was
a great debate about the attitude that the Court should take to alternative
methods of accountability. The South Africans were the most insistent on
this point, concerned that approaches like their Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, which offers amnesty in return for truthful confession,
would be dismissed as evidence of a State's unwillingness to prosecute.
Although, there was widespread sympathy with the South African
model, it was counterbalanced by memories of the disgraceful amnesties
accorded by South American dictators to themselves and their cabal. 97
The most poignant example was that of former Chilean President Au-
gusto Pinochet 9  Thus, it has been suggested that genuine but
nonjudicial efforts at accountability that fall short of criminal prosecu-
tion would have the practical effect of convincing the Prosecutor to set
priorities elsewhere. 99 This conclusion is surprising, since the simple
telling of the truth to a nonjudicial body may convey an individual im-
munity from national prosecution .3  Yet, judicial attitudes are impossible
to predict, and judges or prosecutors might well decide that it is pre-
cisely in cases like the South African one where amnesties for such
crimes is unacceptable. Only time will tell whether the practice of
296. Nsereko, supra note 291, at 119.
297. For a thorough discussion on the issue of disgraceful amnesties, see PRISCILLA
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY-How
TRUTH COMMISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD ARE CHALLENGING THE PAST AND SHAPING THE
FUTURE 32-49 (2001). In this respect,
[t]he armed forces seized power in 1976, and went on to rule the country, in several
successive military juntas, for the next seven years.... Before leaving power, in
fear of being held accountable for its crimes, the military junta granted itself immu-
nity from prosecution and issued a decree ordering the destruction of all documents
relating to military repression.
Id. at 33.
298. Id. at 35-38. In September 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the civilian
government of Chile, brutally repressed all opponents, and proceeded to rule Chile for seven-
teen years. The regime espoused a virulent anticommunism to justify its repressive tactics,
which included mass arrests, torture, killings, and mass disappearances. The worst of the vio-
lence was in the first year after the coup, when some 1200 people were killed or disappeared,
and many thousands more were detained, tortured, and eventually released. In 1978, Pinochet
instituted an amnesty law, which barred prosecution for almost all human rights crimes that
had occurred since the coup.
299. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 68-69.
300. Holmes, supra note 86, at 77.
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granting amnesties or pardons is acceptable, especially because the Stat-
ute left room for this possibility.30' The Prosecutor and the Court are
granted broad discretion in this respect, either to set precedents which
imply that the practice is permitted or block it by determining that those
cases are admissible.
A related problem is the question of pardons, which is considered
the greatest weakness to the second feature of the complementarity re-
gime, the powers of the ICC. This problem lies in the failure to include
in the Statute provisions related to pardons. The lacunae may permit a
State to investigate, prosecute, convict, and sentence a person, and then
pardon that person soon thereafter.32 This is more than merely hypo-
thetical. In the early 1970s, a U.S. court convicted William Calley of war
crimes for massacring hundreds of civilians in My Lai village in Viet-
nam. For this he was sentenced to life imprisonment. "Then the United
States President, Richard Nixon, however, intervened and granted him a
pardon after only a brief term of detention had been served.
' 303
Two contradictory views emerged regarding this crucial issue of par-
dons. First, according to Professor William Schabas, in a case where an
individual is properly tried, but then is subsequently pardoned, the Court
would seem to be permanently barred from intervening.3 °M
The opposing view, articulated by Mr. Holmes, sees the ne bis in
idem principle in article 20(3), as a possible solution to the problem of
pardons. He argues that the ne bis in idem principle would apply in any
case brought before the Court where a person was convicted by the na-
301. In this respect the silence of the ICC Statute concerning issues of amnesties, par-
dons, and paroles seems to contradict the early statement made by the Secretary General to the
United Nations when he said:
[B]ringing war criminals to justice, and making them accountable for their viola-
tions, is essential, both as a matter of justice, and else because the ending of
impunity is a vital prerequisite for post-conflict peace-building. Ensuring that jus-
tice rather than impunity or vengeance triumphs at the end of the day should be our
major aim and objective. The principle of individual responsibility for crimes under
international law should be reaffirmed.
Message of H.E. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General to the United Nations to the Conference on
Reining in Impunity for International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human
Rights, Siracusa, Italy, Sept. 16-21, 1997.
302. Holmes, supra note 86, at 76.
303. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 70. Nixon only granted Calley a partial pardon freeing
him from the stockade and allowing him to stay under house arrest while his lawyers appealed
his sentence. A series of appeals reduced Calley's life sentence to twenty years and then to ten.
He was eventually paroled after serving only three and a half years under house arrest. Wil-
liam George Eckhardt, My Lai: An American Tragedy, 68 UMKC L. REV. 671, 683 n.48
(2000); Court TV Online, The Greatest Trials of All Time: The Court Martial of Lt. Calley,
available at http://www.courttv.comlgreatesttrials/mylai/aftermath.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2002).
304. Id.
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tional court and subsequently pardoned. He further argues that the fact
that a pardon or a parole took place shortly after a conviction may give
rise to the presumption that the entire proceedings were not genuine; a
presumption that may not have been evident during the proceedings
themselves.
While this is a well-founded solution, it does not accommodate all
possible situations. William Schabas's example shows that there could be
a case where a State genuinely investigates, prosecutes, tries, and sen-
tences an individual. However she or he is pardoned shortly after due to
a change of the administration or the leader of that country. In such a
situation one could argue that those proceedings were not "for the pur-
pose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility'"
and were "conducted independently or impartially" and not "in a manner
which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice.,,3" 6 Even if the new administration's inten-
tion was de facto a sham, if it occurred subsequent to a bona fide trial,
the Court seems to be barred from ruling on the case. The conjunction
"and" used in article 20(3), appears to be the key to interpreting this
paragraph. Because of the conjunction "and" the Court must look not
only to the manner in which the proceedings were conducted but also at
the administration's intentions at the time the proceedings took place. It
seems that Holmes also relied upon the meaning of the conjunction in
paragraph 3(b), which requires that during the period where the im-
proper proceedings take place, the intention must be to protect the
person from facing criminal responsibility. Thus, Holmes's solution will
only be triggered if the administration that oversaw the trial proceeding
is the same one granting the pardon.3 °7
The outcome will be subject to the Court's and the Prosecutor's in-
terpretation. If they decide to follow a strict construction in interpreting
paragraph 3, there is some doubt about whether Mr. Holmes's opinion
will be adopted. Rather the Court will probably agree with Professor
Schabas's interpretation. However, if the Court or the Prosecutor choose
to adopt a wider construction, as well as look at the main purpose of cre-
ating an international justice system, especially as reflected in
305. Holmes, supra note 86, at 77.
306. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3).
307. The idea behind the new administration argument is that a person could be tried
perfectly, yet subsequent to his trial and prior to granting him any pardon, a new president is
inaugurated. Presumably, the latter does not have any ties to the trial. She or he wants to par-
don all the accused persons in the country. In this situation it is impossible to say this pardon
reflects that the entire previous proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially
or were conducted for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility. In
addition, even if this new president intended to shield that person, a thorough reading of para-
graph 3 suggests that it does not cover such a situation.
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paragraphs 4 and 5 of its preamble, then, Holmes's view might prevail.
Nevertheless, in such a situation it would be very difficult for the Prose-
cutor to distinguish between good and bad faith pardons. It appears that
the solution to these ambiguities will have to wait until the ICC starts
functioning. However, it is clear that the failure to include a provision in
the Statute which would govern the issue of amnesties or pardons is an
enormous gap, which affects the notion of complementarity in both of its
two features. °8
A. Amnesties & Pardons as Tools of Impunity that
Threaten the Validity of the ICC Statute
The ICC Statute left room for States to grant amnesties and pardons.
This possibility not only affected the complementarity regime, but also
gave rise to other unexpected consequences.
Amnesty and pardon are both bars to punishment. Amnesty can also
be a bar to prosecution, because it is usually granted before a prosecu-
tion or a conviction. A pardon is usually granted after a person is found
guilty.3"9 The main problem in this context is when should an amnesty or
a pardon not be granted? Are these crimes, punishable under the ICC,
crimes whose very nature prohibits them from being subject to an am-
nesty or a pardon, whether directly or indirectly?
The crimes the ICC drafters included in the ICC's jurisdiction are
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. These
are offenses against the law of nations, delicti jus gentium, and by their
very nature affect the world community as a whole.30 It is these crimes
that the world community found so heinous that they require a high
mechanism of repression, and therefore placed them under the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Court.
Given the gravity of these crimes and their extraordinary nature, the
legal literature discloses that these international crimes rise to the level
308. This is true, since granting a blanket amnesty to a person prior to investigation
means no prosecution will take place, which runs counter to the idea that the State has the
primary duty to prosecute. On the other hand, the second feature of complementarity would be
affected by applying pardons, for example, since this conduct often reflects a State's unwill-
ingness to prosecute, and the Court would be barred from taking any action toward that
person. However, this deduction is based on the strict construction of the Statute as mentioned
above.
309. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 223, at 629-30. In this re-
spect, the author argues that amnesty and pardon, however, also apply to situations where a
person has been legally found to have committed a crime and is subsequently given the benefit
of a remission of sentence or a removal of the consequences of the criminal conviction.
310. Id. at 566.
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of jus cogens.3'" Jus cogens holds the highest hierarchical position among
all other norms and principles of international law.3' 2 This legal basis can
be found in international pronouncements, or what can be called interna-
tional opinio juris, that reflect the recognition that these crimes are
deemed part of general customary law. Language in preambles3" such as
that of the ICC Statute314 or other provisions of treaties applicable to
these crimes, also indicate that these crimes have a higher status in inter-
national law. Another indication is the large number of States that have
ratified treaties related to these crimes.3 5 In addition the ad hoc interna-
tional investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of these crimes by
the IMT, ICTY, and ICTR also emphasize the gravity with which the
world views these crimes. The writings of scholars and diplomats further
buttress this legal foundation. It is argued that the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court with inherent jurisdiction over
these crimes would further raise the status of crimes such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression to being part of jus
cogens and would impose obligations erga omnes to prosecute or extra-
dite.
3'1 6
From an analytical reading of the above paragraph, one could ob-
serve that jus cogens norms hold a very high position among other
norms. However, it is said that jus cogens norms not only occupy a high
position, but also hold the highest hierarchical position among all other
norms and principles.3 7 The implication of recognizing these interna-
tional crimes as part of jus cogens applies to them the universality of
jurisdiction, makes statutes of limitation inapplicable to them, and car-
ries the duty to prosecute or extradite.38 The principle aut dedere aut
judicare-prosecute or extradite--dates back to Grotius, one of the ear-
liest international legal scholars. The purpose of the principle is to
ensure that those who commit crimes under international law are not
311. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 41 (2d ed.
1999).
312. Id. at 40.
313. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 28, 1; Apartheid Convention, supra
note 49, J 5. In this respect, the Preamble of the Genocide Convention was cited by the ICTR
in its sentencing decisions. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, No. ICTR 97-23-S, 16 (Sept. 4,
1998); Prosecutor v. Serushago, No. ICTR 98-39-S, 15 (Feb. 5, 1999).
314. ICC Statute, supra note 1, 1 3, 4.
315. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 28, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatylgen.htm (listing 133 States as of Nov. 20, 2002);
Apartheid Convention, supra note 49, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
treaty8_asp.htm (listing 101 States as of Nov. 20, 2002).
316. BASSIOUNI, supra note 311, at 40.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 39.
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granted safe haven any where in the world, thus making prosecution
mandatory.39
Above all, the characterization of certain crimes asjus cogens places
upon States the obligatio erga omnes not to grant impunity to the viola-
tors of such crimes. In the ICJ's advisory opinion on Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,32" ' the
court reflected the current genesis of the concept obligatio erga omnes
for jus cogens. The erga omnes and jus cogens concepts are often pre-
sented "as two sides of the same coin. 322 The term "erga omnes" means
"flowing to all," and therefore obligations arising fromjus cogens, which
means "compelling law," are probably erga omnes. "Indeed, legal logic
supports the proposition that what is 'compelling law' must necessarily
engender an obligation 'flowing to all.' ,323
The previous discussion about pardons and amnesties revealed how
the Statute itself seems to leave room for States to practice impunity.
This is supposed to be prohibited according to the concepts of jus cogens
324and erga omnes.
It would not be enough for the ICC Statute to raise the possibility of
monitoring and determining bad faith amnesties or pardons. Even am-
nesties granted by Truth Commissions such as that of South Africa, are
unacceptable. The main practice of that type of commission is to substi-
tute prosecutions with confessions. The practice of amnesties or pardons
319. Id.
320. Id.; see also Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35
NEw ENG. L. REV. 383, 393 (2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens
and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (1996).
321. Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion]; see also
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bos. and Herz. v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 27-33, 31 (July 11). The ICJ opinion regarding
obligations erga omnes is that it follows from the "object and purpose of the [Genocide] Con-
vention that the rights and obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention are rights and
obligations erga omnes." Id. This wording emphasizes that the Convention imposes an obliga-
tion erga omnes to punish and prevent the crime of genocide.
322. BASSIOUNI, supra note 311, at 44.
323. Id. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 'Jus cogens" is a mandatory norm of
general international law from which no two or more nations may exempt themselves or re-
lease one another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999).
324. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
4, 32 (Feb. 5). The ICJ defined the concept of erga omnes and its legal effect toward the entire
community in the following terms:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State to-
wards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-A-vis another
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
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whether in good faith or bad faith leads to the same conclusion, namely,
that they legitimize impunity.
The purpose of the ICC, which arises from the jus cogens nature of
these crimes, is to provide an effective forum for the prosecution and
suppression of these violations. Thus, in a situation of a bona fide am-
nesty or pardon, a decision not to prosecute would conflict with the
State's obligation under international law to suppress and punish these
offenses.325 The Rome Treaty does not have any explicit provision to
prohibit the practice of amnesty or pardon over such crimes.326 The
travaux preparatoires are evidence that States intended3 27 to exclude a
provision prohibiting pardons or amnesties in the Statute.328 Given the
fact that this omission allows such an undesired practice in regard to
these crimes,"' one could suggest that the treaty is legitimizing impunity,
and thus, infringing the peremptory norm of jus cogens.
325. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Amnesty and the International Criminal Court, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 78 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
326. However, the Statute incorporated a provision in article 110, which governs the
execution and reduction of sentences rendered by the Court. ICC Statute, supra note 1,
art. 110.
327. According to the subjective school of interpretation, which is also known as the
"Founding Fathers' School," the object of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the
parties and give effect to them. Moreover, as Professor Westlake has said, "[t]he important
point is to get at the real intention of the parties .. " P. K. MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES
BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 71-72 (1992). While according to
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, "[i]ntention of the parties must be the paramount factor in the inter-
pretation of treaties." Id. (citing H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principles
of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. YB. OF INT'L L. 48, 75 (1949)).
328. Holmes, supra note 86, at 59-60; see, e.g., 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 1, supra
note 87, at 37, 160 (reflecting the delegation's intention toward legitimizing the practice of
amnesties granted by truth commissions by stating, "[i]t was further suggested that considera-
tion should be given to how the complementarity regime would take account of national
reconciliation initiatives entailing legitimate offers of amnesty or internationally structured
peace processes."); 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 2, supra note 87, at 294-96 (indicating no
reference for prohibiting pardons or paroles concerning the crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court at the national level).
329. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 321. In its decision, the Court set specific criteria
for determining whether it is possible to make reservation to the Genocide Convention, absent
any provision or text referring thereto. It wrote, "[i]n the absence of an article in the Conven-
tion providing for reservations, one cannot infer that they are prohibited. In the absence of any
express provisions on the subject, to determine the possibility of making reservations as well
as their effects, one must consider ... their mode of preparation and adoption." Advisory
Opinion of 28 May 1951, Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Case Summaries, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
idecisions/isummaries/ippcojsummary510528.htm. Accordingly, one could conclude that in
the absence of an article in the ICC Statute providing for amnesties or pardons, one must con-
sider their "mode of preparation and adoption," that is, the travaux preparatoires. This reflects
the common intention.
According to article 32 of the Vienna Convention, "[r]ecourse may be had to supplemen-
tary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
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Within the law of treaties, jus cogens imposes a sanction-in the
form of invalidating any treaty which conflicts with it-and a deter-
rence on concluding treaties with an unlawful object.3 ' According to
article 53 of the Vienna Convention "a treaty is void if, at the time of
its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law.
' 33
'
Based on the above analysis of the ICC Statute and its practical ap-
plication, it can be argued that this analytical conclusion raises some
doubt regarding the validity of the Rome Statute. In addition, based on
this conclusion, one could further argue that when a later treaty conflicts
with the provision of an earlier treaty, subject to specific criteria, the
later would be void.
Lord McNair suggests a case which would render the later treaty
null and void. He argues that when there exists a conflict between a
treaty to which States A and B are parties and a later treaty to which
States A and C are parties, the treaty may be void and null if "the earlier
treaty is of a constitutive character (such as the Charter of the United
Nations) and State A later concludes a treaty which is in conflict with an
imperative provision of the earlier treaty.,
332
By applying this conception to the situation of the ICC,
one might reach a similar conclusion to that of Lord McNair.
For example, the Genocide Convention,333  the Apaheid
circumstances of its conclusion . . . to determine the meaning when the interpretation accord-
ing to article 31: a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure... "Vienna Convention, supra
note 95, art. 32. Thus, according to the preparatory work, it was clear that the drafters intended
not to incorporate such an article that limits the practice of amnesties or pardons to ordinary
crimes and not the heinous crimes. Moreover, from an analytical standpoint of the final
decision of the Court, one might suggest that since reservations seem to be prohibited with
regard to any of the provisions of the Convention, one might wonder how the ICC Statute
could permit any practice that runs counter to the provisions of the Convention, namely, the
obligation to punish and to provide effective penalties, given that most of the States Parties to
the Treaties are common to both. In addition, allowing the latter practice infringes article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, which refers not only to "relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties," but also other treaty obligations existing
for the parties. 1. M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 76
(1973).
330. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 175 (1988).
331. According to Anthony Aust, "[i]f part only of a treaty conflicts with an existing jus
cogens the whole of the treaty is void, not just the offending part." ANTHONY AUST, MODERN
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 258 (2000).
332. SINCLAIR, supra note 329, at 62-63; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 95, art.
30.
333. Genocide Convention, supra note 28, at 280. However, according to Professor
Schabas, although a general amnesty for genocide would be contrary to the Convention, under
exceptional circumstances it could be acceptable. He observes that there are other forms in-
stead of prosecution, which could be followed in these specific situations:
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Convention,"' the Convention Against Torture,35 and the 1949 Geneva
Conventions... impose a common obligation to prosecute and punish
those who commit the crimes discussed above. Most of the Parties to
these Conventions are or will be Parties to the Rome Convention. The
ICC Statute allows the possibility of waiving this obligation to prosecute
and punish these grave offenses, by permitting amnesties and pardons.
As previously argued, this could lead to impunity. Therefore, the treaty
would be in conflict with any of the imperative provisions concerning
punishment and prosecution set forth under these earlier Conventions. It
seems that the weakness of the complementarity regime in the Statute
regarding the issue of amnesties and pardons might cause future legal
obstacles concerning the application of the treaty, and perhaps even its
invalidation under international law.337
Ordinary criminal law recognizes a variety of forms in which prosecutorial discre-
tion may be exercised, for example by granting immunity from prosecution in
return for incriminating testimony of accomplices. Priorities may also be estab-
lished where there are a large number of accused and limited resources with which
to try them. This is precisely the problem that confronted Rwanda following the
1994 genocide. Rwanda's effort[s] at prosecution for genocide are hampered by its
desperate shortage of resources and the sheer numbers of the accused. At some
point it may be unable to continue and decide to accept some alternatives to crimi-
nal prosecution ... Transitional regimes may also consider alternative mechanisms
for justice and reconciliation such as truth commissions. In the context of another
crime against humanity, apartheid, South Africa granted amnesties to individual
criminals who appeared before the Commission and who testified to their involve-
ment in the crimes of the previous regime. Defenders of the South African approach
explained that this was the only way to allow transition to majority rule without the
terrible bloodshed that would accompany the otherwise inevitable civil war. All of
these measures may be deemed, in effect, to be exceptions to the obligation to
prosecute contained in the Convention. To the extent that they contribute to the ul-
timate goals of the Convention, it may be argued that they are acceptable. Each case
must, of course, be examined on its own individual merits.
SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 399-400. Based on the foregoing, one may suggest that Schabas's
opinion tends to reach a practical compromise between the law and the reality. It seems that he
tries to avoid the strict construction of the law. However, he is trying to apply the law by plac-
ing it in a wider frame of interpretation through looking at the very purpose and goals of the
Convention and not the strict meaning of the articles. But can these goals be achieved effec-
tively through these alternative means by excluding the element or the policy of deterrence?
334. Apartheid Convention, supra note 49, pmbl. T 9, art. 4.
335. Convention Against Torture, supra note 49, arts. 2(1), 4(2).
336. Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 44.,
337. The purpose of this Section is to demonstrate that excluding some important provi-
sions could lead to serious legal problems. However, the whole argument could be countered
if viewed from a different perspective. One could argue that the reference to paragraphs 4 and
5 of the preamble, which affirm that these crimes, must not go unpunished, by putting an end
to impunity suggests that the silence of the Statute with regard to the practice of amnesty and
pardon over these crimes could be interpreted as prohibition of such practices. In other words,
in practice the person who is applying the Statute could interpret it in a way to be consistent
with the purpose and object of the treaty. Thus, according to articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna
Convention, the treaty must be performed and interpreted in good faith and in light of its
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B. Complementarity and Statutes of Limitations
The legal effect of a statute of limitations has a procedural effect in
that it is a bar to prosecution, and a substantive effect because it extin-
guishes the offense for the purpose of its legal effects (substantive). The
legal effects of a statute of limitations and amnesty may be treated alike
regardless of whether they extinguish the criminality of the actor or con-
stitute a bar to prosecution.33
International crimes which are erga omnes are not subject to statutes
of limitations. These include, inter alia, aggression, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide,339 and apartheid.3 40 Although the conventions
concerning the latter two crimes do not contain a provision concerning
statutes of limitations, a literal reading of the treaties prohibiting the ap-
plication of a statute of limitations to war crimes and crimes against
humanity suggests that the crimes of genocide and apartheid are also not
subject to statutes of limitations. However, these treaties do not have a
object and purpose. Any judge applying the Statute could read and construe the Statute as it
prohibits the practice of amnesties and pardons, because such practice runs counter to the
purpose of the treaty and contradicts its preamble, which is considered part of that treaty. This
conclusion will direct us to the same point mentioned in this Subsection, that is, the Court
could assert jurisdiction and override the jurisdiction of that State which practiced amnesty.
Thus, in practice the principle of complementarity would be defeated or extremely weakened,
since the Court would be overloaded with cases. The Court might collapse under such a bur-
den. This was not the intention of creating this principle. The principle was created, inter alia,
to distribute the work. The ICC comes into play only when the national courts fail to fulfill
their duties and the case is of certain gravity, which justifies the Court's intervention.
338. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 223, at 608.
339. Att'y Gen. of Gov't of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, at 78-79, T 53 (Dist. Ct. Je-
rusalem 1961). Eichmann pleaded that his prosecution was time barred, invoking a fifteen-
year limitation period in force in Argentina. The District Court ruled that Argentine norms
could not apply. It also noted a provision in the applicable Israeli legislation declaring that
"the rules of prescription ... shall not apply to offences under this Law." Id. at 78-79, 1 53.
See also William Schabas, Non-Applicability of the Statute of Limitations, in COMMENTARY OF
THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 25, at 523 [hereinafter Schabas, Non-Applicability of the
Statute of Limitations]; SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 417.
340. Schabas, Non-Applicability of the Statute of Limitations, supra note 339, at 619; see
also Bassiouni, supra note 320, at 63. Even torture is considered jus cogens, and imposes an
obligatio erga omnes not to be subject to statutes of limitations.
341. See, e.g., Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, art. I, Jan. 25, 1974, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. Article
I reads:
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date
of their commission:
(b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace
as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nurenberg,
of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3(l) of 13 February 1946 and 95(I)
of I I December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, eviction by
armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid,
[Vol. 23:869
The Principle of Complementarity
great number of States that have signed and ratified them.342 The low rate
of adhesion to the U.N. Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutes of
Limitations343 has led some academics to contest the suggestion that this
is a customary norm. The insignificance of their suggestion was demon-
strated and emphasized by the approach of the French Court of
Cassation in the Barbie case. The Court ruled that the prohibition on
statutory limitations for crimes against humanity is now part of custom-
ary law.344
Unlike the problem of amnesty and pardons, which the ICC drafters
failed to solve, the ICC Statute makes a significant contribution to inter-
national criminal law in this regard. It contains a provision that bars the
applicability of statutes of limitations to the crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court.3" Although the debates surrounding adoption of article
and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a viola-
tion of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.
Id.; see also European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes of January 25, 1974, art. 1, E.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Euro-
pean Convention on Statutory Limitation]. Article 1 (1) reads:
Each Contracting State undertakes to adopt any necessary measures to secure that
statutory limitation shall not apply to the prosecution of the following offences, or
to the enforcement of the sentences imposed for such offences, in so far as they are
punishable under its domestic law: 1. the crimes against humanity specified in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted
on 9 December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations ...
Although the Convention did not make any reference to the crime of apartheid, a thorough
reading of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the preamble and article I of the Apartheid Convention em-
phasizes that it is a crime against humanity and thus not subject to statute of limitations.
342. However, there were some other attempts made on the international level, which
took the form of General Assembly Resolutions. See G.A. Res. 3, U.N. GAOR, I st Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/Res/3 (1946); G.A. Res. 2583, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/2583 (1969); SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 404.
343. The United Nations instrument still has only forty-three States Parties. 754
U.N.T.S. 73. Note also the paltry number of States who signed or ratified the European Con-
vention: as of October 31, 2002, only the Netherlands and Romania had signed and ratified the
Treaty, compared to France and Belgium which had only signed it. European Convention on
Statutory Limitation, supra note 341, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
EN/CadreListeTraites.htm
344. Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriots and Others v.
Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125, 135 (Fr. Ct. of Cassation 1984). Since apartheid is considered a crime
against humanity and some acts of torture rise to such level of criminalization, the Barbie
decision obviously covers these categories as customary law.
345. However, Schabas writes:
None of the preceding international instruments concerned with international
prosecution of atrocities, from the Charter of the International Military Tribunal to
the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, has contained anything similar. This is only
logical, because in the absence of texts within the instruments creating a time bar,
silence was all that was required. Nevertheless, Control Council Law No. 10 stated
that: "[I]n any trial or prosecution for a crime herein refered to the accused shall not
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29 of the ICC Statute revealed a lack of unanimity on the subject, the
result clearly demonstrates the Statute's contribution to the progressive
development of international law.
346
During the drafting process," 7 with the exception of a handful of
delegations, among them China and Japan, no one spoke against the
principle that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court should not
be subject to any statutory limitations. Even countries that applied a stat-
ute of limitations to every crime in their national system accepted this,
notwithstanding the repercussions this would have because of comple-
mentarity. "France argued that the principle should be valid for genocide
and crimes against humanity, but that a statute of limitation was neces-
sary for war crimes. 348 In light of their argument, their subsequent action
was to be expected. France is the only country, which declared that it
does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to war crimes
for a period of seven years after the entry into force of the Statute.349 In
the end, the only exception from nonapplicability of statutes of limita-
tions was made for offenses against the administration of justice.35
Professor Schabas argued that article 29 of the Statute is unneces-
sary, at least to the extent it would be applied to trials before the Court
for offenses listed under article 5. Inevitably, in the absence of a provi-
sion actually establishing statutory limitations, the silence of the Statute
can only mean that there are no statutory limitations. However, article 29
is not superfluous, since it would appear to be part of the complex rela-
tionship between national and international judicial systems. 35 It
be entitled to the benefits of any statute of limitation in respect of the period from
30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945." Since Control Council Law No. 10 was applicable
to national prosecutions within Germany, the provision was required in order to
neutralize any alleged time bar to trials for Nazi-era crimes.
Schabas, Non-Applicability of the Statute of Limitations, supra note 339, at 523.
346. Id. at 524.
347. For thorough references to the drafting process, see, for example, Report of the In-
ter-Sessional Meeting in Zutphen, supra note 115, art. 21(F) (containing five different
proposals on statutes of limitations); 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 1, supra note 87, 91 195-
196. In this respect, "[s]ome delegations were of the view that, owing to the serious nature of
the crimes to be dealt with by the Court, there should be no statute of limitations for such
crimes... ' Id.; see also 1996 PrepCom Report, Vol. 2, supra note 87, art. F. However, the
first proposal under article F permits the time lapse for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. Proposal I reads, "[t]he period of limitation shall be completed upon the lapse of xx
years for the offence of......
348. Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS, supra
note 86, at 204.
349. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
350. Id. art. 70; see also ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 164.
351. Schabas, Non-Applicability of the Statute of Limitations, supra note 339, at 525.
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provides the key to the application of the complementarity principle, and
to interpreting how the regime should be applied.
In fact, many domestic criminal law systems provide a statute of
limitations for even the most serious of crimes. For example, under arti-
cle 15, paragraph 1 of the Egyptian law of criminal procedure,
prosecutions for murder are barred after ten years. The French law has a
similar provision in article 7 of its code of penal procedure.35 In general,
codes derived from the Napoleonic model have similar provisions.
Therefore, on these countries, and others with similar legislation, article
29 imposes an obligation to amend their national legislation by eliminat-
ing provisions that are incompatible with article 29. Should national
courts contradict the essence of article 29 by granting exemptions from
prosecution and trial based on statutory limitation, the complementarity
provisions of the Statute will grant the ICC jurisdiction. This problem
was also observed during the Rome Conference and it was included in a
footnote that reads:
[T]he absence of a statute of limitations for the Court raises an
issue regarding the principle of complementarity given the pos-
sibility that a statute of limitations under national law may bar
action by the national courts after the expiration of a certain time
period, whereas the ICC would still be able to exercise jurisdic-
311tion .
Thus, States Parties must ensure that their legislation is consistent
with article 29, which will help ensure that their courts, not the ICC, try
such crimes. However, would this be sufficient to ensure that those who
commit the most serious crimes do not go unpunished?
C. Complementarity-Statutes of Limitations and the
Problem of Third States
This Subsection will answer the aforementioned question through
tracing an important gap in the Statute, which could affect the appropri-
ate functioning of the second feature of the complementarity regime. The
example that will be explored below, demonstrates that there could be a
situation or a case where the Court could be barred from prosecuting the
accused, even though the national legislation of a State Party has not
changed.5
352. EGYPTIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 15(1) (1950); C. PR. PN. art. 7.
353. SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 415; see also Schabas, Non-Applicability of the Statute
of Limitations, supra note 339, at 525.
354. This scenario assumes that the Statute entered into force and the crime was commit-
ted later, but the person escaped for "x" years and then returned back to the country before the
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Suppose that P, who is a national of a non-party State Y, committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court on the territory of a State Party
X. State Party X has not yet amended its national legislation with regard
to the application of statutes of limitations to the crimes within the juris-
diction of the Court. Theoretically, the ICC would have jurisdiction over
the crime and the accused, since the crime was committed on the terri-
tory of the State Party X. However, since the latter's legislation may still
bar the prosecution of the accused if the time limit has passed, the ICC
could intervene if the State Party has not yet initiated an investigation on
the ground that the State Party is "unable to carry out its proceedings." '355
Inevitably, the ICC may act in accordance with article 89(1) and re-
quest the arrest and surrender of P to the State Party X where that person
resides. Meanwhile, non-party State Y requests the extradition of its na-
tional P because of a bilateral treaty between the two countries. In this
context, the requested State X may consider the case according to its
own statute of limitations provision,"' and shall satisfy itself that the re-
quirements of double criminality have been met. On the other hand, the
requesting non-party State Y has a similar provision to State X concern-
ing the statute of limitations regarding the crime in question. Thus, there
might not be any grounds for refusal to the extradition request for that
State Y, other than the request of the ICC.
Article 90(4) of the ICC Statute stipulates that: "If the requesting
State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if not under
an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State,
shall give priority to the request for surrender from the Court, if the
Court has determined that the case is admissible." According to the
above scenario, State X is under an obligation to extradite person P to
State Y, and according to article 90(4) the latter shall have the priority in
this situation. Therefore, the ICC would be permanently barred from
prosecuting the person, since non-party State Y might be unwilling to try
that person, either because the statutory limitation for the crime has
passed immediately subsequent to his extradition or for any other reason.
Moreover, two States could organize this scenario intentionally between
them to avoid the Court's jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the second
feature of the complementarity regime in this situation failed to fulfill
the expected duty, that is, to prosecute when the national jurisdiction
time has lapsed with respect to the crime, which was committed on the territory of that State
Party, and the latter has not yet started an investigation.
355. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3). Presumably, in this situation the Prosecutor's
assessment of the admissibility of the case would rely upon two criteria. First, that the State
had not yet started investigating the case. Second, according to the Prosecutor's information,
the State Party still has a time limit for such a crime.
356. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 223, at 608-09.
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fails. It seems that the gaps in other parts of the Statute would inevitably
affect the proper functioning of complementarity through other provi-
sions in the Statute.
V. COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
A. The Security Council's Referral: Article 13(B)
One of the greatest strengths of the complementarity regime in the
Statute appears in the relationship between the Court and the Security
Council's referrals.357
Given that the Security Council is a political body, referral is more
likely to be the result of a majority political decision. From a purely
formal standpoint, in fact, referral represents the interests of all the
United Nations Members (or even the international community given the
quasi-universality of United Nations membership)."' Accordingly, the
referral of a situation by the Security Council is deemed a reasonable
basis for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation, without the preven-
tive review of the admissibility of the situation with an eye to the
application of the principle of complementarity.359 However, due to the
vast powers granted to the Security Council, which might be influenced
by political decisions, the ICC Statute intentionally weakened the use of
these powers concerning situations referred to the Court by the Council.
The Statute declined to follow the expected norm and moved toward
making even the situations referred by the Council subject to judicial
review. The principle of complementarity, which is the cornerstone of
the ICC, was semi-preserved in this context.
Article 13(b) of the Statute provides that the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 if "a situation
in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter
357. But see Newton, supra note 121, at 44 (arguing a Chapter VII referral is a limit to
complementarity, since this practice would override a State's inherent national authority to
insist on using its own judicial processes as the forum of first instance). While this argument is
well-reasoned, the final assessment whether this practice weakens or strengthens complemen-
tarity merely depends on the angle through which this assessment is made. According to
article 53 complementarity appears to be strengthened by the provisions set therein.
358. U.N. CHARTER, art. 24; see also CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 202-03. By the terms of Article 24, members of the U.N.
not only "confer" on the Security Council the responsibility, but also agree that in carrying out
its duties the Council "acts on their behalf."
359. Pietro Gargiulo, The Controversial Relationship Between the International Crimi-
nal Court and the Security Council, in I ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 16, at 84.
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VII of the Charter of the United Nations." Thus, article 13(b) thereby
acknowledges the enforcement powers of the Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to refer a situation to the Prosecutor in
which one or more of the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the
Court appears to have been committed. These enforcement powers of the
Security Council bind all Members of the United Nations. Accordingly,
the situations referred by the Council could also involve a non-party
State without violating international norms.
Article 13(b) should not be understood incorrectly or in too broad a
sense. The powers of the Security Council reflected in the article are lim-
ited to situations where the Council is acting in accordance with Chapter
VII. The existence of such limits suggests a certain caution in analyzing
the recent practice of the Security Council. Not all measures that the
Council decides under Chapter VII can be taken until, according to arti-
cle 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council determines "the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of ag-
gression." Since its power with respect to the activity of the ICC is tied
to Chapter VII, the ascertaining of the existence of delicti jus gentium in
order to refer a situation to the Court must be preceded by the determina-
tion outlined in article 39. Thus, the Council is not authorized to say
what the law is before ascertaining whether one of the situations pro-
vided for by article 39 exist. The Security Council should first verify the
existence of a more or less objectively identifiable factual situation (cer-
tainly more identifiable in the case of aggression or breach of the peace,
less so in the case of simple threat). Only after having done so, it can
declare that in this situation "one or more of such crimes appears to have
been committed.,,360 Hence, the Security Council could not directly ascer-
tain the existence of acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity and deduce from them the existence of one of the situations
provided by article 39. This is the logical interpretation of article 13(b);
otherwise, the Security Council would be acting as a judicial body, and
thus, would impede the functioning of the Court.
Lattanzi argues that in light of the principle of complementarity, be-
fore referring to the Court a situation of alleged crimes connected with
the situations envisaged in article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council should take into account whether a State is willing and able to
repress these crimes.161 However, this attitude might turn the Security
Council from a political body into a judicial body. Moreover, the entire
360. Flavia Lattanzi, The Rome Statute and State Sovereignty: ICC Competence, Juris-
dictional Links, Trigger Mechanism, in I ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 16, at 62-63.
361. Id. at 63.
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practice of the Council should be consistent with the essence of the Stat-
ute. The latter rejected giving the Council the ability to refer a "case" or
a "matter," choosing instead the concept of "situation" in order to avoid
the possibility of the Council acting as a judicial body. This was done to
preserve the Court's independence in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
since the referral of a "case" would be a matter within the discretion of
the Court based on its investigations.362 Thus, leaving room for the Coun-
cil to determine admissibility issues before referring a situation would be
a clear interference with the Court's authority and independence, and
might lead to improper assessments based on political approaches. This
could have a negative effect on the appropriate functioning of the
Court. 3 63 However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the Secu-
rity Council's intention, because practically it could take into account the
admissibility criteria or any other criteria before referring any situation.
It is interesting to note that, even if the Security Council makes an
admissibility determination and decides to refer a situation based on its
determination, the complementarity principle comes into play and the
Council's assessment is contingent on the Court. As mentioned at the
beginning of this Section, the complementarity provisions in the Statute
appear to limit the exclusive powers granted to the Council acting under
Chapter VII.
Article 53 of the Statute seems to be the key to limiting this power of
the Council. Paragraph I stipulates that:
[t]he Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she
determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed .... In
deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor
shall: ... b) [consider whether] the case is or would be admissi-
ble under article 17; and c) tak[e] into account the gravity of the
364
crime.
If the Prosecutor decides "not to initiate an investigation under article 53,
paragraph [1], he or she shall promptly inform in writing.., the Security
Council in respect of a situation covered by article 13, paragraph (b). 365
Paragraph 2 stipulates that: "if, upon investigation, the Prosecutor con-
362. Yee, supra note 207, at 147.
363. There could be situations that deserve investigation by the Prosecutor, but due to the
improper assessment of the Council, the situation was not referred to the Prosecutor, causing
those involved to flee justice. On the other hand, another situation could exist which does not
deserve investigation, but the Council determined that it might, nonetheless, be admissible.
The latter example poses no problem, since the final word would be for the Prosecutor and the
Court.
364. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 53(1).
365. ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 105(1).
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cludes that there is not sufficient basis for a prosecution because: ... b)
The case is inadmissible under article 17 ... the Prosecutor shall inform
the Pre-Trial Chamber ... or the Security Council in a case under article
13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion .... ,6 Paragraph 3(a) reads:
"At the request of... the Security Council under [article] 13, paragraph
(b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor un-
der paragraph I or 2 not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to
reconsider that decision. 367
Thus, according to the above, it is clear that the Prosecutor could
dismiss any situation referred to him or her, even those referred by the
Security Council.3 68 This practice is an exception to the general powers
of the Security Council. For example, imagine the Council acting under
Chapter VII has determined that a situation that threatens the peace ex-
ists. On the other hand, the Prosecutor has decided not to proceed and
stands in opposition to the Council's decision. This conclusion might
lead to a misunderstanding. One could argue that in such a case the
Prosecutor's decision runs counter to the principles, purposes, and provi-
sions of the U.N. Charter, since such a decision disregards a
determination made by the Council that there is a threat to peace. How-
ever, the Court is neither a State Party to the U.N. nor a U.N. body.
The provision set out in article 53 is a corollary to the first feature of
the principle of complementarity-protecting national jurisdiction-and
reflects the strength of the complementarity regime to resist the powers
of the Council. This provision seems to protect States' sovereignty from
the powers of the Council by granting the Prosecutor discretion to de-
termine whether to initiate an investigation. Nevertheless, article
53(3)(a) seems to grant the Council another chance, by allowing the pos-
sibility of having the Prosecutor's decision not to proceed revised. This
is a normal result because of the far-reaching powers granted to the
Prosecutor. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber monitors this power, and
seems to act as a filter for the Prosecutor's decision.
Moreover, article 19 confirms the application of complementarity to
referrals by the Security Council. It provides a second opportunity to
States, even non-party States, to stop a prosecution by challenging the
admissibility of a "particular case" on the grounds set out in article 17.
By guaranteeing all those "who have referred the situation under Article
366. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53; see also ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 106(1).
367. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 3(a); ICC Rules, supra note 173, rule 107.
368. It could be argued that the Court is authorized to review the legality or the accuracy
of the Council's decision regarding the existence of threats to international peace and security.
This argument could be based on the early decision in the Tadic case challenging the compe-
tence and the jurisdiction of the ICTY, when the Court examined whether the Council is
authorized to create a judicial body and impose legal obligations via such a body.
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13," the chance to submit observations to the Court, the rule indirectly
confirms the applicability of terms for admitting a case even when it is
the result of a Security Council initiative."'
Obviously, by authorizing the Security Council to bring a situation
before the Court, article 13(b) is a significant exception to the consen-
sual basis of the ICC's jurisdiction. However, this is checked by the
complementarity principle in the ICC Statute.
B. Complementarity and the Security Council's Deferral: Article 16
While the powers of the Security Council appear to be governed and
limited by the complementarity provisions set out in articles 19 and 53
of the Statute, article 16, on the other hand, seems to empower the
Council to block the power of the Prosecutor and the jurisdictional activ-
ity of the Court. This is the most controversial aspect of the role of the
Security Council in the Statute. It is certainly the source of the greatest
difficulty with respect to ensuring the establishment of an independent
and impartial jurisdictional mechanism. As it now reads, article 16 is the
result of compromises and, overall, is better than the initial ILC pro-
posal. In it, the Court clearly appeared as an organ dependent upon the
Security Council and subordinate to its action.
Under article 23(3) of the ILC Draft Statute, "[n]o prosecution may
be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is being
dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or a breach of the peace
or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Se-
curity Council otherwise decides." The provision attempted
simultaneously to reconcile the priority of the Security Council action in
restoring and maintaining peace and security and the need to coordinate
the activities of the Security Council and the Court.3 70 A large number of
delegations opposed the solution proposed in article 23(3) of the ILC
Draft Statute on various grounds. One of the objections was that the
Council, which was regarded as a political organ, could interfere with
the independent functioning of the ICC. The mere placement of a situa-
tion on the agenda of the Council, where it could remain under
consideration for an indefinite period could deprive the Court of jurisdic-
tion.7 Once the Council decides to debate the "situation" the veto of one
permanent Security Council member could prevent or stop the ICC from
369. Gargiulo, supra note 359, at 84-85.
370. Id. at 86.
371. Yee, supra note 207, at 150.
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acting, thereby rendering the Court politically dependent on the Coun-
cil. 3
72
The search for a compromise formulation coalesced around what
eventually became known as the Singapore Compromise. At the August
1997 session of the PrepCom, Singapore formally proposed an amend-
ment revising the structure of the ICC-Security Council relationship as
initially proposed in the 1994 ILC Draft Statute. The Singapore text be-
came the basis for drafting work of the second option of article 23(3). It
stated that "[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or pro-
ceeded with under this Statute where the Security Council has, acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, given a direction
to that effect."3 73 The compromise proposed the opposite effect to that of
the first option of article 23(3) of the ILC Draft Statute. Thus, proceed-
ings of the Court may proceed, unless the Security Council makes a
formal decision to stop the process. Since the adoption of a Security
Council decision requires a minimum of nine affirmative votes in the
Council, only a concerted effort by the Council's members can stop the
174Court's proceedings. Theoretically, not even all five permanent mem-
bers joined together can block a Court's proceedings, since nine positive
votes including the five permanent members' are required.3 75 Thus, pur-
suant to the Singapore formula, the negative veto given to the Council in
the ILC text would be replaced by a positive arrangement where the
Court could exercise its jurisdiction unless it was directed not to do so by
the Council.
This proposal prepared the ground for what is now article 16 of the
Statute. Canada added to the Singapore proposal by suggesting the
372. Morten Bergsmo & Jalena Pejic, Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution, in COM-
MENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 25, at 373, 377.
373. Id. at 375.
374. Yee, supra note 207, at 150. It is interesting to note that not even the nine affirma-
tive votes requirement succeeded in preventing the Security Council from invoking the right of
deferral. In the first test to current article 16, the Council successfully adopted Resolution
1422. The resolution prevents the ICC from investigating or prosecuting cases involving cur-
rent or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute,
over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation. S.C.
Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1422 (2002); see generally Mo-
hamed El Zeidy, The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC Statute:
Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. (forth-
coming November 2002).
375. U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3). Accordingly, matters treated by the Security Council as
falling within the category of "other matters" as set out in article 27(3) have included, inter
alia, those relating to the discharge of its responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security. These matters require nine votes including the "concurring votes of the
permanent members." See CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND Docu-
MENTS, supra note 60, at 215.
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twelve-month renewable deferral period376 and Costa'Rica further pro-
posed that deferral be requested by a "formal and specific decision" of
the Security Council. The United Kingdom was the first permanent Se-
curity Council member to support the change of emphasis in ICC-
Security Council relations as provided for in Singapore's amendment. It
was a British text for article 10(2) (formerly article 23(3) of the ILC
Draft Statute), introduced at the March-April 1998 PrepCom session,
that served as a basis for the final wording of what is now article 16 .
Some conclusions and observations can be drawn in regard to the
drafting history of article 16. First, political considerations were given as
much, if not more, weight than legal arguments in the determination of
the appropriate role of the Security Council in ICC proceedings. Sec-
ondly, the Security Council's deferral power confirms its decisive role in
dealing with situations where the requirements of peace and justice seem
to be in conflict. Finally, article 16 provides an unprecedented opportu-
nity for the Council to influence the work of a judicial body."8 In
practice, this opportunity could provide a legal obstacle to the Court's
proper functioning.
Article 16 allows the Council to request the Court not to investigate
or prosecute when the requisite majority of its members conclude that
judicial action-or the threat of it-might harm the Council's efforts to
maintain international peace and security pursuant to the U.N. Charter.
The Statute did not define this reference to the terms "investigation" and
"prosecution." The Statute indicates that an investigation involves action
that may be taken with respect to both a situation and/or an individual,
while a prosecution comprises only actions taken with respect to a spe-
cific person. The Prosecutor upon the referral of a situation either by a
State Party to the Statute or by the Security Council initiates investiga-
tions. They comprise the totality of investigative actions undertaken by
the Prosecutor under the ICC Statute after an investigation has started in
order to ensure the confirmation of charges against an individual sus-
pected of having committed crimes within the Court's jurisdiction.379
Inevitably, the Prosecutor, after having evaluated the information
376. Gargiulo, supra note 359, at 88.
377. Bergsmo & Pejic, supra note 372, at 376. Pursuant to the UK proposal, which was
also included in the Draft ICC Statute forwarded by PrepCom to the Rome Conference,
no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
Statute [for a period of twelve months] after the Security Council [acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,] has requested the Court to that
effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
Id.; see also 1998 Draft Final Act, supra note 116, art. 10.
378. Bergsmo & Pejic, supra note 372, at 377.
379. Id. at 378.
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available, will initiate an investigation if she or he finds that there is a
reasonable basis to proceed. Accordingly, one could conclude that there
is still a step before an investigation that the Prosecutor is not precluded
from taking, even though the Security Council asked for a deferral under
article 16. The Statute clearly makes it possible for the Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary examination as described in article 15, evaluate
the information made available to him or her,380 seek "information from
States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or nongovern-
mental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems
appropriate," and receive "written or oral testimony at the seat of the
Court."38'
The wording of article 16 is vague in terms of its application and
might cause obstacles in its interpretation. Article 16 provides that "no
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with" af-
ter a Security Council request to defer it has been issued. Thus, the first
question is when is an investigation or prosecution "commenced"? It
could be suggested that the commencement of an investigation does not
depend on how the Court's jurisdiction is triggered. The investigation is
commenced when the Prosecutor determines that there is a "reasonable
basis to proceed" '382 and renders a decision to that effect. It is obviously a
step beyond the preliminary examination, and probably by virtue of the
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, if the Prosecutor is acting proprio
motu.,383
The wording of article 16 not only prevents the start of an investiga-
tion or prosecution, but also stops an investigation or prosecution already
underway. However, the issuance of a deferral once proceedings have
begun might create practical problems. For example, does such a deferral
request mean that a person arrested by a custodial State must be set free?
Alternatively, must a person who appeared before the Court pursuant to a
request for surrender in accordance with article 89(1), stay in custody
until the lapse of the twelve-month period or whenever the Council de-
cides otherwise? What precautions are required for the preservation of
evidence? Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
appear to have definite answers to these questions.
An answer concerning the question of custody can be found by ex-
amining the nature of the decision of deferral. Security Council
decisions bind all States. However, do the effects of the decision to defer
prosecution go beyond stopping the proceedings? In other words, a lit-
380. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1).
381. Id. art. 15(2). All of these steps are considered proceedings taken before the com-
mencement of the investigation. Thus, article 16 does not cover such steps.
382. Id. arts. 15(3), 53(l).
383. Id. pmbl. 4.
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eral reading of article 16 suggests that its application is limited to a cer-
tain phase, to blocking the commencement of an investigation or
prosecution, or stopping ongoing proceedings. Thus, according to a strict
construction, the article does not suggest that a decision of deferral
means that the person is not incriminated any more. This is merely a
procedural decision made by the Council, based on political reasons, to
suspend the ongoing proceedings for a period of time and for specific
reasons related to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Thus, after the lapse of the specified period, the Prosecutor could pro-
ceed if the Council did not renew the deferral. Accordingly, the matter of
setting free the person in custody seems to be discretionary and does not
depend on the Council's decision, since this matter is not a legal effect
arising from that decision." Any other construction would mean that the
Council is fulfilling the role of a judicial body, and this construction is,
as previously mentioned, one the drafters did not want. One could fur-
ther suggest that in the context of dealing with the most heinous crimes,
the accused should not be freed. However, this outcome conflicts with
the right of the accused to "be tried without undue delay""38 whether she
or he is in custody or free,386 since the effect of this decision might last
for years."'
Meanwhile, although the Prosecutor may conduct measures of pre-
liminary examination, even after the issuance of a deferral request, those
384. From a humanitarian standpoint, that person may be set free. However, there is a
risk that the person may escape.
385. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(l)(c).
386. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); see, e.g., Glenn Ashby v.
Trinidad & Tobago, Communication No. 580/1994, Hum. Rts. Comm., 10.5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/741D/580/1994 (2002); K.T. v. Trinidad & Tobago, Communication No. 677/1996,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 9.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/677/1996 (2002). In the latter communica-
tion, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) made it clear that the right of an accused to be
tried without undue delay is essential throughout the entire proceedings. It expressed itself in
the following words:
[T]he Committee recalls that all stages of the procedure must take place "without
undue delay within the meaning of article 14 paragraph 3(c). Furthermore, the
Committee recalls its previous jurisprudence that article 14 paragraph 3(c), should
be strictly observed in any criminal procedure. In the absence of an explanation by
the State [P]arty, the Committee, therefore, finds that a delay of four years and five
months between conviction and dismissal of appeal constitutes a violation of article
14 paragraph 3(c).
The above paragraph gives rise to the possibility of accepting a prolonged period of delay, if it
is well justified by the State Party. Thus, one might wonder whether a Security Council defer-
ral for prolonged periods could be held as a justification by virtue of threat to the peace or
maintenance of peace. Id.
387. Luigi Condorelli, Referral and Deferral by the Security Council, in I THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 294, at
652-53.
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measures are entirely inadequate when faced, for example, with the
threat of imminent destruction of evidence as mentioned in the third
question above."' However, when faced with such a problem, and absent
Security Council guidance, the Prosecutor may apply article 54(3)(f) to
"take necessary measures, or request the necessary measures be taken
... [for] the protection of any person or the preservation of evidence."3 9
Article 16 poses a further obstacle to the function of the Court be-
cause of the number of times a request for deferral may be renewed. It
provides that a request for deferral of ICC proceedings may be renewed
under the same conditions as the initial one, which means that the re-
newal must be effected by a Security Council's resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The text contains no limitation on the
number of times a request for deferral may be renewed. Theoretically,
this means that a deferral could be renewed indefinitely. This is very
dangerous and might block the Court's jurisdiction over many cases.
Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that the Security Council's reso-
lution is subject to judicial review. Professor Schabas argues "the Court
could asses whether or not the Council was validly acting pursuant to
Chapter VII."'390 This is true, but how could this scenario be performed?
Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedures and Evidence provide a
direct answer to this question. However, one might suggest that since the
decision of deferral hampers the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction, the
problem touches the essence of jurisdiction lato sensu, and thus, the Pre-
Trial, Trial, or Appeals chambers could deal with it during the various
stages. 9 ' The Appeals Chamber shall examine the compatibility of the
decision with the requirements of article 16 of the ICC Statute and arti-
cle 39 of the U.N. Charter, and in so doing, the Court shall ensure that
article 39 has been invoked in light of the purposes and principles of the
U.N. 39 2
In conclusion, article 16 in effect seems to function contrary to arti-
cle 13(b). The Security Council acting in accordance with article 13(b)
can grant the Court jurisdiction by referring to the Prosecutor a "situa-
388. At the Rome Conference, Belgium submitted a proposal pointing to the need for
"further discussion" of preservation of evidence. See Bureau Discussion Paper on Part 2,
supra note 149, art. 13.
389. The author and Condorelli have similar views but based on different argumentation.
See El Zeidy, supra note 374; Condorelli, supra note 387, at 651-52.
390. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 66.
391. By virtue of articles 15, 19, 57, 64(2) and 82 the aforementioned Chambers have
the competence to examine this situation through the various stages. See, e.g., Condorelli,
supra note 387, at 649-50. He holds the same view and explains in detail how this scenario
could be performed.
392. For a detailed discussion regarding the compatibility of the Security Council's deci-
sions with the purposes of the U.N. Charter, see El Zeidy, supra note 374.
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tion in which one or more" of the crimes referred to in article 5 "appears
to have been committed." However, the Prosecutor has broad discretion
and could decide not to proceed in accordance with article 53. Thus,
both the Prosecutor and the Court could block the Security Council's
referral. The roles are reversed when it comes to article 16. This time the
Security Council has the power to block the Court's efforts. By asserting
that proceeding with this situation threatens the international peace and
security the Security Council could prevent the ICC from asserting juris-
diction over any case. One can imagine the negative effect of such a
decision on the complementarity regime if a State is "unwilling or un-
able genuinely" to carry out the investigation or prosecution, and the
Council decided to suspend the proceedings an infinite number of times
on the basis that this threatens the international peace and security.
Would not this practice be a legitimization to impunity? However, article
16 is a small price to pay for keeping the Council happy.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the principle of complementarity stems from the no-
tion of State sovereignty and dates back to World War I. Its origin is not
limited to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute. Its practice could be traced even to
the Treaty of Versailles, when the Allies allowed the Germans to exercise
national criminal jurisdiction over their nationals that were suspected
war criminals. At the same time, the Allies reserved the right to set aside
the German judgments and carry out the provisions of article 228 of the
Treaty of Versailles, if Germany failed to do its part. The practice re-
flected two interlinked ideas, namely, the respect of Germany's State
sovereignty to try the offenders, and the creation of international juris-
diction to try them if Germany failed to act. Although there was no
explicit reference to the term or principle of complementarity, the condi-
tional scenario that took place between the German government and the
Allies demonstrates that the principle existed. Meanwhile, the early ex-
perience of Turkey and the Allies also reflected the identical idea.3 93
At the end of World War II, the practice of this principle was evident
through the operation and establishment of the International Militart Tri-
bunal (IMT). The IMT mirrored the complementarity regime in a
different form; the Tribunal tried only major criminals whose offenses
had no particular geographical localization, and left the minor criminals
to internal criminal jurisdictions.
393. See supra notes 13 and 14.
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The early attempts to create an international criminal jurisdiction
serve as valuable examples to demonstrate that the complementarity
concept was established during this era. The 1943 Draft Convention for
the Creation of an International Criminal Court, which simply stated
that, "as a rule, no case shall be brought before the Court when a domes-
tic court of any one of the United Nations has jurisdiction to try the
accused and it is in a position and willing to exercise such jurisdiction,"
is a marvelous example that reflects the prevailing idea of State sover-
eignty in the mechanism of the complementarity principle.3 94 The same
conclusion could also be reached from the drafting history of the Geno-
cide Convention. The exception to this principle can be seen in the
practices of the Ad Hoc Tribunals (the ICTY and ICTR). The Ad Hoc
Tribunals were set up on the notion of primacy, which permits uncondi-
tional international intervention. However, as observed in the current
study, the permanent members of the Security Council endeavored to
limit such primacy to the specific situations by construing the ICTY
Statute narrowly. Their undermining of primacy reflected their implicit
intention, to build a more lenient regime based on complementarity be-
tween national jurisdictions and international jurisdictions.
States often deny waiving the right of practicing their national juris-
diction, which is derived from the very essence of sovereignty. This can
be observed through the aforementioned examples and through the lan-
guage of most international instruments, such as the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Apartheid Convention, and others. The language of
these instruments seems to empower States to exercise their national ju-
risdiction by imposing duties upon them to do so. Since the idea of
sovereignty often prevails and persuades States to exercise their national
jurisdiction through their domestic courts, therefore, it is hardly imagin-
able if not impossible that States would accept a permanent international
intervention that might defeat or override their sovereignty. This is ex-
actly the situation of the ICC. States demanded to reach an agreement in
order to create an international institution with jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes of international concern, but also preserve their sovereign
rights. Presumably, the practice of such an institution should not override
domestic courts, unless the latter fail to carry out their duties. Hence, the
only compromise was a regime based on complementarity, which gives
priority to domestic courts and makes an exception for the international
institution. Such a system reinforces the primary obligation of States to
prevent and prosecute the most heinous crimes-obligations which exist
for all States under conventional and customary international law.
394. Draft Convention for the Creation of an Int'l Crim. Ct. (London Int'l Assemb.), art.
3(1), LONDON INT'L ASSEMB. -REPORTS ON PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMES 324 (1943).
[Vol. 23:869
The Principle of Complementarity
The success in Rome is due in no small measure to the delicate bal-
ance developed for the complementarity regime. States that were
concerned primarily with ensuring respect for national sovereignty and
the primacy of national proceedings were able to accept the provisions
governing the principle of complementarity, because they recognized
and dealt with these concerns. Where the Court was given authority to
intervene, the criteria on which such interventions would be based were
clearly defined as objectively as possible. It was argued that the funda-
mental strength of the Statute's complementarity regime is that the
interpretation and application of the provisions is left to the Court itself.
Of course, it could be argued that the regime is far from perfect.
Clearly, as mentioned in the current study, there are strengths and weak-
ness in the regime. Some provisions seem to work in favor of States,
which inevitably strengthen the first feature of the complementarity re-
gime, while others seem to work in favor of the Court and reinforce the
second feature.
For example, through article 18 States are given early notice of the
Court's interest in a situation, permitting them to inform the Court of
their own investigations and prosecutions. This provision clearly reflects
an effective complementarity practice that works in favor of States. On
the other hand, this provision reduces the chance for the ICC to assert
jurisdiction when it is supposed to intervene. The main problem might
arise if the State receiving the information is not acting bona fide. In this
situation, such notification would be very dangerous to preserving evi-
dence. Moreover, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence render the
situation more critical, since rule 52(2) allows the State concerned to
seek additional information. Accordingly, this weakens the second fea-
ture of complementarity. Inevitably, one could argue that the main goal
of inventing a regime of complementarity is to provide States with pri-
mary responsibility. While this is true, it could be counter-argued that the
regime should not defeat the main purpose of creating an ICC by render-
ing the Court useless. Nevertheless, article 18(3) and (5) seem to balance
the situation by allowing the ICC Prosecutor to supervise the proceed-
ings taken by the national courts. Thus, such provision works in favor of
the Court.
Another observation regarding article 18 is that it grants States an-
other chance to challenge the admissibility of a case under article 19.
This provision is unclear. What could be the new significant facts or
change of circumstances? Would this be a change of the relevant State's
intention or attitude? Or did the State, which was rendered unable for
reasons regarding collecting evidence and taking action, become able to
carry out its proceedings? If this right of challenge could be based on the
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change of the State's intention, this might cause a real dilemma. How
could the Court trust the State, which showed its bad faith previously, to
pursue proceedings concerning the same case? It seems that the drafters'
desire to build a strong complementarity regime made them consider
these issues through a political scope.
Article 19, which appears to be broader than article 18, poses other
critical questions which could affect the appropriate application of com-
plementarity. These questions raise specific problems of interpretation.
One such problem, for example lies in the formulation of article 19(2)
and the principle of ne bis in idem.395 By contrast, the provisions of arti-
cle 19(8) in conjunction with article 18(6) are significant, and hopefully
will assist the Prosecutor to preserve the effectiveness of the Court.
The most interesting provisions relating to complementarity are set
out in articles 17 and 20 of the Statute. According to their interpretations,
any situation could be reversed. For example, the application of the word
"genuine" poses two controversial questions. Does "genuinely" refer to
situations where the State's motives are not "genuine" (i.e., are duplici-
tous or disingenuous) or situations where the State is "really" unable or
unwilling to prosecute?
396
The wording of article 17 could give rise to different interpretations.
For example, paragraph 1 states that the "Court shall determine that a
case is inadmissible where: a) the case is being investigated or prose-
cuted . . . , unless the State is unwilling or unable." Thus, according to
one interpretation, the State concerned should have initiated an investiga-
tion. A case would be admissible only when the State is unwilling, and in
order to decide that a State is unwilling, the Court should apply the criteria
set forth under paragraph 2 and should not extend them by analogizing.
Thus, from a literal reading of the entire text of article 17, one could con-
clude that the criteria to determine unwillingness come into play only at
the commencement of an investigation and not before an investigation.
Accordingly, it could be understood that the Court cannot render a case
admissible, if that State has not started its investigation yet. However, if
article 17 is to be read in a broader manner, one could conclude that if a
State has not conducted an investigation, the case is admissible since this
reflects the State's bad intention and unwillingness.
Obviously, the matter of interpretation is left to the Court's discretion.
Only the Court could render the Statute effective. According to the current
situation, a broad construction would be in favor of international justice,
but on the other hand, would have a negative effect on national jurisdic-
395. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 19(2), 20; see also supra Part III.
396. Id. art. 17.
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tion. Thus, the second feature of complementarity would be strengthened,
while the first would be weakened.
Another related problem is the formulation of article 17. Among the
criteria set out in article 17(1), there is no reference to a situation where
the person has been prosecuted and the State decided not to try him or
her. Once more, this might cause a legal obstacle, especially if it is to be
applied in light of article 19(2)(b).397
Likewise, article 20(3) of the Statute lends itself to different interpre-
tations, which might lead to ambiguity and the malfunction of the
Statute. One source of the problems surrounding interpretations of this
article is the vagueness of the term "proceedings." Is the term limited to
the proceedings taken during the trial stage, or does it cover the entire
proceedings, or just the investigation and prosecution as mentioned in
the travaux preparatoires?398 Moreover, paragraph 3 is silent with respect
to whether the trial of the national court should reach a decision, which
might also lead to misinterpretation. If paragraph 3 meant that a decision
must be reached, then, what kind of decision is required? Is the decision
of the court of first instance sufficient? Or should the decision be final?3 99
Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence answer
these questions.
The provisions implementing complementarity are complex and of-
ten call for difficult subjective assessments by the Court and its
Prosecutor. For example, in reviewing a State's unwillingness, the Prose-
cutor bears the burden of showing sufficient circumstantial evidence to
warrant a finding that a delayed movement toward domestic prosecution
"in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to
justice.,,40° The ICC Statute is silent on the need for any direct evidence
of unwillingness in this case. Moreover, meeting the requirements of this
test seems to be very difficult, and might leave room for subjective rather
than objective assessments.
Aside from the technical terms set out in articles 17 and 20, the Stat-
ute is also silent with regard to the significant issue of the right to waive
admissibility. In other words, as article 17 is currently drafted, a State
must be found unwilling or unable to investigate before the Court can
proceed to exercise jurisdiction. Hence, what would happen in a situa-
tion where a State chooses not to proceed and prefers that the Court
investigate a case? Can it waive the requirements of complementarity,
given that it is willing and able? Or must the Court proceed to declare
397. Id. art. 19(2)(b).
398. See supra Part III.
399. Id.
400. See, e.g., R. v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.); see also Benvenuti, supra note 16,
at 24-25.
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that the State was unwilling? The possibility of waiver was raised during
the PrepCom and was included in a footnote in the Draft Statute and
Draft Final Act.4°' However, it was not considered at the Conference, as
many delegations believed that it should be addressed in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.4 °2
Potentially, the greatest weakness to the complementarity regime lies
in the failure of the Statute to include provisions related to pardons and
amnesties. The lacunae may permit a State to investigate, prosecute,
convict, and sentence a person, and then pardon the person soon thereaf-
ter. The possibility exists, and there is a clear example given in the
current study concerning this issue.4 03 The travaux preparatoires will
indicate that a proposal existed to cover this possibility but was not in-
cluded in the Rome Conference.4 " Furthermore, it has been observed
through the current study that the exclusion of such references might
lead to a negative impact on the effective functioning of the Court. In
addition, this gave rise to some doubts concerning the validity of the
Rome treaty itself, which is extremely dangerous.
There are no major problems arising from the provision governing
statutes of limitations, since article 29 makes it clear that no statute of
limitations could be applied to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. However, the problem arises from the weak provisions of coop-
eration set out in the Statute, especially those dealing indirectly with
third States. The provisions regulating the surrender of persons to the
401. See 1998 Draft Final Act, supra note 116, art. 15 n.38. In this respect a footnote was
included in the draft, which reads, "[tihe present text of article 15 is without prejudice to the
question whether complementarity-related admissibility requirements of this article may be
waived by the State or States concerned."
402. Holmes, supra note 86, at 78 (arguing waiver is possible). However, one could
counter that a State should not be permitted to waive its right to complementarity for two
reasons. First, according to paragraph 6 of the preamble to the ICC Statute, which is part of
the context of the Statute, "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes'" ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 6. Thus, since
this is a duty imposed upon States, the latter should be banned from denying or waiving such a
duty. According to article 26 of the Vienna Convention (pacta sunt servanda), "Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna
Convention, supra note 95, art. 26. Article 31 imposes a duty that "[a] treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Id. art. 31. Thus, the wording
of the preamble is clear and should be interpreted in conformity with articles 26 and 31 of the
Vienna Convention. Second, article 17, which embodies the criteria for determining when the
Court should intervene, did not incorporate a situation where a State is willing and able but
preferred not to act. The latter situation is nowhere defined under the criteria which trigger the
jurisdiction of the Court. According to the notion of complementarity, the Court could act only
in the case where the State concerned is unwilling or unable, and not where the State is willing
and able, but decided not to act.
403. See supra Part IV.
404. Holmes, supra note 86, at 76.
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Court lack effective enforcement, and could negatively impact other pro-
405
visions in the Statute, such as statute of limitations provisions.
Finally, the problems of the Security Council's referrals and defer-
rals might also have significant effects on the complementarity regime.
In general the impact of the Security Council's referrals on the principle
of complementarity depends merely on the angle through which the pro-
vision is seen.4O6
For example, as a check on the power of States, and hence a limit to
complementarity, a referral under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter would
override a State's inherent authority to insist on using its own judicial
processes. Even though jurisdiction under article 13 is a legal inquiry
distinct from admissibility under article 17, a Security Council referral
would supersede the State's right to use its own courts as a forum of first
resort. While the text of the ICC Statute ostensibly preserves a State's
authority to implement complementarity407 following a Security Council
referral, the obligation of all States to "accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council" effectively nullifies this right of complementar-
ity.4°8 Furthermore, all Members of the United Nations are obligated to
405. Id. at 88-89.
406. In this context, the crime of aggression should be considered as an exception to the
principle of complementarity. See, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, Report on the Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 8 (1996). Article 8 reads:
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, each State
Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the crimes set out in articles 17, 18, 19 and 20, irrespective of where or by whom
those crimes were committed. Jurisdiction over the crime set out in article 16 shall
rest with an international criminal court. However, a State referred to in article 16 is
not precluded from trying its nationals for the crime set out in that article.
Id. Thus, the wording of article 8 of the Draft Statute appears to recommend that the interna-
tional criminal court should exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as an exception
to the rights of States to exercise their jurisdiction. However, the latter is not precluded from
doing so, if it is willing and able. Although the commentary did not use the words willing or
able, an analytical reading of the text suggests this conclusion. Moreover, in the commentary,
the drafters made it clear that their intention was pointed.toward an international criminal
court that complements national jurisdiction rather than exercising exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
art. 8, cmt. 1 4. The Commission expressed itself in the following words, "[t]hus, the interna-
tional community has recognized the important role to be played by an international criminal
court in the implementation of international criminal law while at the same time recognizing
the continuing importance of the role to be played by national courts .... "
407. However, one might wonder how would this authority practice complementarity on
the crime of aggression. It is hardly imaginable that aggression, which is a State crime, could
be governed by the complementarity regime. Since this crime is often committed by States'
leaders, it is impossible to ask those States committing this crime to exercise jurisdiction over
their administration. One could suggest, however, that the only possibility for practicing com-
plementarity on the crime of aggression is the change of administration. Thus, the new
administration might hand over for prosecution those who are responsible from the previous
administration.
408. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
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comply with orders of the Security Council, even if the ICC Statute or
any other international agreement would impose conflicting obliga-
tions.4 Thus, a Security Council referral has the practical effect of
creating jurisdictional primacy for the ICC similar to that enjoyed by the
ICTY and ICTR.4 0 However, other provisions of the Statute if applied to
the situation of the Security Council referrals strengthen the complemen-
tarity regime. As mentioned previously, article 53 functions in a manner
that limits the Council's power. Accordingly, the Prosecutor acting in
accordance with article 53(1) could decide that a situation referred by
the Council is inadmissible. This provision seems to bring balance to the
complementarity regime.
However, the real problem regarding the Security Council lies in the
power of deferral. Article 16 is a very dangerous tool, which the Council
could use. The broadness of this article leaves a wide room for the
Council to block the Court's jurisdiction permanently. 4'1
Complementarity is an intellectually simple concept that masks the
deep philosophical and political difficulties that the ICC must overcome
if it is ever to become a functioning institution. The drafters of the ICC
Statute and the delegates who negotiated the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence clearly understood that the ICC should not be the Court of first
resort. However, the political will which prevailed during the whole
drafting process led to the ignorance of some of the significant legal is-
sues. These issues inevitably will cause problems for the Prosecutor and
the Court when the Statute comes into play. The provisions addressed in
this Article make this fact self-evident and are formulated in a manner
which reflects the continuous tension between national jurisdiction and
the ICC. Nevertheless, the Court could overstep these obstacles if it
deals with the situations on a case-by-case basis. Some cases will require
a broad construction of the Statute, while others will require restricting
the reading of some provisions. Furthermore, it is clear that the Statute
lacks any direct form of enforcement. Thus, the effectiveness of the
Court will rely solely on States' cooperation. States themselves could
make the ICC effective, and could render it useless. One might argue
how could an "unwilling" State be requested to cooperate?
409. Id. art. 103.
410. Newton, supra note 121, at 49-50.
411. However, it could be argued that blocking the Court's jurisdiction is not as easy as it
appears, since the Security Council's decision requires the majority's affirmative votes (nine
votes). Nevertheless, the situation of blocking the Court's jurisdiction is far from hypothetical,
since the five permanent members could use political or economic pressures, for example, in
order to gain their votes. This is exactly what happened recently through the adoption of Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1422. See El Zeidy, supra note 374.
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There are some other concerns regarding the Statute, that were ad-
dressed by ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour when she argued essentially
that the regime would work in favor of rich, developed countries and
against poor countries."' This is because the ICC and its Prosecutor can
reasonably be expected to develop some guidelines and standards for
evaluating domestic systems. These standards if assessed in light of the
systems of the rich countries, would probablytnot be met by the poor
countries.
In light of the foregoing, one might wonder how would the Prosecu-
tor and the Court operate effectively in light of the exception to
disclosing information and documents based on national security found
in article 72 of the Statute? A literal reading of articles 18(6), 19(8) and
72 suggests that the latter has a negative effect on the application of the
former. It seems that the drafters intended to block the Court's jurisdic-
tion whenever they demanded and trigger the complementarity principle
whenever it is suitable. Only time and the effective functioning of the
Court will answer the abovementioned concerns.
412. SCHABAS, supra note 125, at 68.
Summer 2002]
